**AFF Answers**

**2AC – Plan Consequences Key**

**Debate should be centered on the consequences of the plan—comparing opportunity costs is best for clash and argument refinement, which is a prerequisite to making critique and activism portable.**

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The term ‘discourse ethics’ is Habermas’s (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 30-34), but we are using it here in a general sense: for the view that an **adequate framework for ethical evaluation** and **critique must include the comparison** and **evaluation of different arguments for different lines of action** in a process of deliberation. Such assessments of arguments pose difficult problems, and deliberation is by no means guaranteed to produce consensus. Nevertheless, deliberation can **contribute to the quality of ethical critique** by ensuring that a **wide range of arguments are considered** in making decisions, that all alternatives are **taken into account** and **thoroughly criticized**, and that people have to (at least) **moderate their own partialities** in evaluating a range of arguments collectively. To illustrate this, we shall refer to two ethically contentious political decisions and the courses of action which they led to. The first is the decision by the British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (we have discussed this in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 96-97). The second is the decision by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to open Germany’s borders to the refugees coming from the Middle East in the autumn of 2015. In so doing, we will illustrate the relevance of ethical critique from all three of the major ethical positions: deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics. CDA and practical argumentation CDA is mainly concerned with critical analysis of discourse which is **oriented to action**, including political discourse, but also managerial, organisational and other forms of discourse. The **primary activity** in such discourse is **practical argumentation**, argumentation over action, over **what is to be done** (e.g. **what policies should be adopted**). Practical argumentation should accordingly be the **primary analytical focus** in CDA (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This **does not exclude other** familiar **forms of analysis** (such as **analysing representations**) but subsumes them. The point of representing (or ‘framing’) an issue in a particular way is to **create particular** public **attitudes** and **opinions**, and thus **legitimize** or **facilitate a particular course of action**. Critique of discourse is the focal concern for CDA, but critique of discourse is by no means exclusive to CDA. On the contrary, critique of discourse is a normal part of all discourse. It is a **normal part of everyday practical argumentation**: people **find reasons in favour** and **against proposals for action**, they **consider alternatives**, **adopt them** or **discard them**, and so on. A course of action **worthy of being adopted** is **one that has withstood criticism**. Agents may decide to discard proposals either because they are **likely to be instrumentally inadequate** iun relation to the goals they are supposed to achieve, or because they find them **ethically problematic**, for example because the values or goals they are motivated by are unacceptable. Ethical critique is a concern for CDA at three levels: as an aspect of agents’ reasoning, for example as an aspect of politicians’ deliberation over what policy to adopt; as an aspect of the normative critique of those deliberative practices which CDA carries out; as an aspect of the critique that CDA itself is open to. There are therefore three main places where ethical values come into the picture: what values are arguers (e.g. politicians) arguing from? what are the values that CDA analysts are espousing, from the perspective of which they are evaluating the arguments of those arguers? what are the values of other critics (including critics of CDA)? CDA is itself a form of discourse, which is specialized for academic critique of social actions, events, practices and structures, with a focus on discourse. It can itself be viewed as a **form of practical argumentation** (Fairclough 2013), open to the **same critical questions** that it directs at the discourse it subjects to critique. CDA practitioners are bound by an obligation to address ethical evaluations that are critical of their work. Moreover, the ethical judgement which is part of the normative critique carried out in CDA **does not come out of thin air**, but is built upon elements drawn selectively from ethical judgement and critique in public discourse. And CDA needs to rethink its own critique in response to shifts in public discourse and political reality, such as the emergence of controversy over ‘political correctness’ (Fairclough 2003). We have argued that the **primary focus** of critical analysis in CDA should be **practical argumentation** and **deliberation** (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). This was based upon a claim about the character of political discourse, which we saw as primarily concerned with the question of **what is to be done**. Deliberation is an abstract genre in which **(alternative) proposals are being tested**. The **framework** for critical analysis of **practical argumentation** and **deliberation** which we have developed since 2012 provides CDA with an **effective way of evaluating** and **critiquing discourse** from an **ethical point of view**. One of its strengths is that it allows **different approaches** to thinking about ethical questions (deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics) to be combined within an **ethical deliberative procedure for achieving impartiality**. In a more recent version of this framework (Fairclough, I. 2016, 2018), deliberation is modelled as a critical procedure designed to **filter out** those **practical conclusions** (and corresponding decisions) that **would not pass the test of critical questioning**. Two distinct argument schemes are involved in deliberative activity types: an argument from goals, circumstances and meansgoal relations, and an argument from (negative or positive) consequences. Proposals are **tentatively supported** by **practical arguments from goals**, and are **tested in the light of their potential consequences**, via **practical arguments from consequence**. Goals are generated by various sources of normativity, and these can be what conventionally is called ‘values’, but can also be obligations, rights and duties. Critical questioning seeks to **expose potential negative consequences** of proposals and thus evaluate them in terms of their **acceptability** or **reasonableness**: if the consequences are **on balance unacceptable** for those affected, then it would be **more reasonable not to engage in the proposed course of action**. Unacceptable consequences are **critical objections** which can **conclusively rebut a proposal**. Where two or more proposals survive critical testing, one may be **chosen as the better proposal** on nonarbitrary grounds (e.g. being simpler to enact). In our view, the **most significant perspective** in the light of which proposals are to be tested is a **consequentialist** one (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, Fairclough, I. 2016). The term ‘consequence’ is however used here broadly to refer to several types of states-of-affairs: the goals of the proposed action (the intended consequences); the potential unintended consequences (or risks) involved; various known and predictable impacts, including impacts on institutional, social facts. If a proposal is **likely to result in a situation** that is illegal or **unjust**, then the proposal can be **evaluated as unacceptable** from both a **consequentialist ethics** and a **deontological ethical position**. Our framework can therefore **accommodate** deontological **ethical issues** within a broader **consequentialist perspective**. By inquiring into the motives of action, the framework can also accommodate a virtue-ethical perspective.

**2AC – Scenario Planning**

**IR Scenario analysis unlocks an intellectual openness to overcome cognitive biases and incorporate complementary theories while making research policy-relevant**

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Added-**value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship**

As Tomé and Açıkalın (2019) point out, in order to **fill the gap** between **IR theory** and **real-world problems**, “an increasing number of scholars have come to embrace a spirit of **intellectual openness**, recognizing both the need for **greater flexibility** in the **theoretical formulations** and the **possibility of complementarity** by **other theories** and approaches” (p. 12). This section discusses the added value of scenario analysis as a **complementary approach** to **traditional IR methods**. The most obvious advantage of **scenario analysis as a methodology**, grounded in the reservoir of foresight studies, lies by definition in its ability to **tackle future events**. As mentioned before, there are no specified instruments within traditional IR methods which would allow scholars to go beyond past and present. The only exception is forecasting, one of the formal methods in IR, which is, however, distinctly different from foresight.

The underlying logic of forecasting is to provide predictions about the future by drawing on mathematical models and big data-sets based on known patterns. Thus, it is not particularly suitable to accommodate discontinuities. Foresight, as described above, aims at going beyond existing patterns by developing alternative futures based on an innovative combination of multiple driving forces. Its goal is to capture a set of possible futures and learn from them by examining the causal relations between driving forces and their different evolutions. By applying scenario approaches, scholars can thus account for evolving dynamics and discuss such timely issues as the consequences of Brexit for both British and EU-security, economics and politics (Brakman, Garretsen, & Kohl, 2018; Martill & Sus, 2018; Musolff, 2017; Verschueren, 2017; Ziv et al., 2018). Yet, scenario analysis offers more than the possibility to talk about the future. We see a fourfold merit of adding scenario analysis to the range of methods applied by IR scholars.

Confronting enduring assumptions

As we presented in the previous section, the main feature of explorative scenarios, which are the subject of this paper, is to **stimulate creative thinking** by **challenging** the **deeply held assumptions of their authors**. In other words, this method is helpful for **overcoming** enduring **cognitive biases**—mental errors such as **linearity**, **presentism**, and **group think** caused by the **subconscious** and **simplified information processing of humans** (Heuer, 1999, pp. 111– 112). Humans have the tendencies to focus on the present at the expense of the future and to think about the future in linear terms by extrapolating past trends into the future. As Gaddis (1992) points out, “we tend to bias our historical and our theoretical analyses too much toward continuity (…) we rarely find a way to introduce **discontinuities into theory**, or to attempt to determine what causes them to happen” (p. 52). Even if Gaddis does not explicitly mention scenarios, he refers to the concepts underlying scenario approaches (Han, 2011, p. 51). Scenario analysis attends to “**deeper**, otherwise left **implicit**, **assumptions** about **continuous** and **linear patterns of development**” (Wilkinson et al., 2013, p. 707). The **process of scenario development** invites the participants to **reveal** and **question convictions** which have **so far remained unchallenged**, and to **question the linearity of world developments**.

The ability of **reexamining one’s own assumptions** and going **beyond linear patterns** of development is **essential** for **IR scholarship**. To illustrate it with two examples: IR scholars and historians did not think that the Soviet Union could collapse and were startled by its fall, the peaceful resolution of the Cold War and the transformation of the bipolar system (Davis, 2005; Gaddis, 1992). In a similar vein, United States scholars were for decades so convinced of China’s economic, political, and cultural limitations that they neglected the possibility of its sudden ascent and were taken by surprise when it happened (Hundley, Kenzer, & Peterson, 2015). Interestingly, since the rise of China became evident, the United States debate on its future has been marked by a similar linearity of thought, leading to single-outcome predictions of China’s long-term future (Kerbel, 2004). In both cases, the discipline proved incapable of anticipating events of such importance, because scholars took for granted the status quo instead of confronting their bias towards linearity and detect manifestations of upcoming change. As a result, two major geopolitical surprises—the end of the Cold War and the rise of China have at first been neglected, forcing academia to catch up.

Against this backdrop, foresight helps IR scholars to **exit** the **tunnel vision** on world affairs and discover potentially valuable nonlinear lines of development. These can be both **innovative** in terms of **scholarship**, and **policy-relevant** by offering a **reflection** on **unexpected discontinuities**. Thus, it can facilitate the **intellectual capability** to **think the unthinkable** (Porter, 2016, p. 259).

Bringing forward new research questions

Scenario analysis starts with **confronting one’s enduring assumptions** and **developing multiple causal possibilities**, through which scholars can potentially discover topics that have not been examined before. One of the greatest challenges for any scholar is to identify innovative venues for research that might bring the discipline forward and advance publicity for one’s work. In Lakatosian terms, such an ability is often considered an evidence of a progressive research program.10 Since the prime feature of scenario analysis is to **detect rapid and significant shifts** in **trajectories**, or the **forces behind them**, this method succors when defining new pressing topics for academia. In particular, as mentioned in the previous section, scenario analysis enables the detection of both weak signals and wild cards. By drawing attention to these hitherto overlooked but potentially pressing issues, scenario analysis can identify research agendas for **further investigation** (Barma et al., 2016). Therefore, scenario analysis seems to be the right tool to **advance innovative research** since it helps scholars **drive their research into new areas**, away from moribund topics that have been followed for many decades. By “identifying questions of likely future significance” (Barma et al., 2016, p. 6), scenario analysis can contribute to combatting the proliferation of researchers in fields occupying the political status quo, such as Soviet or Japan studies in the United States in the 1980s. At the same time, innovative research topics **confront the uncertainties** that are **crucial for policymakers** to be monitored closely.

Dealing with the complexity and interdisciplinarity of real-world issues

Another added value of the scenario analysis for IR scholarship lies in its ability to provide **comprehensive causal reasoning** and thus to **tackle complex issues**. As mentioned in the introduction, the **world’s complexity** combined with **abrupt shifts** poses a challenge for IR scholarship. The possibility to **accommodate multiple driving forces**, to **take into account different values** they might take and finally to **combine them with each other** and **see how they affect the dependent variable**, makes the scenario approach quite unique. Traditional IR methods work with a limited number of independent variables, formulate and test hypotheses usually based on the relation between a single causal variable and the dependent variable. Investigating complex causal trajectories is therefore not possible. Against this background, we agree with Barma et al. (2016) and his colleagues who argue that **scenarios are highly apt** for **dealing with complexity** and **uncertainty** and providing academia with a tool for “**actionable clarity** in **understanding contemporary global issues**” (p. 1).

Moreover, the scenario approach helps to tackle the challenges of interdisciplinarity that is tied to complexity. By drawing on the active participation of people from different disciplines, backgrounds, and with different expertise in the scenario development process, it brings interdisciplinarity to the table by default. The key advantage of the approach is that this interdisciplinary conversation takes place prior to and during the research phase, rather than after it. This distinguishes the scenario approach from other methods that bring interdisciplinary perspectives together but do not facilitate a discussion between them, rather letting them passively co-exist. By exploring the dynamics between seemingly unrelated vectors of change (key drivers), scenario analysis can be useful for shedding light on developments that would have been overlooked by narrower research designs. In **security studies**, for example, scenario analysis can **connect the dots** between hard, soft, traditional and non-traditional understandings of security and capture the **interplay of economic-societalenvironmental** and **technological changes**. Imposing interdisciplinarity also helps to **counter** the “**hyper-fragmentation of knowledge**” that “makes it difficult for even scholars in different disciplines to understand each other, much less policy-makers and general public” (Desch, 2015, p. 381).

Complex real-world issues that were tackled using scenario analysis include the Israel-Palestine conflict (Stein et al., 1998), Turkey’s geopolitical environment (Çelik & Blum, 2007), the prospects of the United States– China conflict (Friedberg, 2005) and the consequences of Brexit for EU foreign and security policy (Martill & Sus, 2018). An examination of these topics without the application of interdisciplinary approaches would not be possible precisely due to their multifaceted character.

Stepping out of the ivory tower

Finally, scenario analysis also enables **IR scholars** to **establish** a **channel of communication with policy-makers** other than conducting interviews for their own research or providing ad-hoc consultations. A participatory scenario process forges “**deep and shared understanding** between its participants” (Ramírez & Wilkinson, 2016, p. 21). In scenario workshops, academics and policy-makers work together, confront their world visions and assumptions and arrive at an agreement upon which they develop narratives for alternative futures. Hence, scenario analysis can be perceived as a tool towards **more exchange between academia and policy-making** that can contribute to a **better understanding between the two** worlds. For policymakers, it provides the opportunity to consider **long-term trends** (an occasion not often found in the day-to-day nature of politics). For academics, it provides insight into which trends are most concerning for policy-makers, allowing them to check and ultimately enhance the **relevance of their research agendas**.

We acknowledge the difficulty to engage policy-makers in foresight exercises caused by their time-constrains and possible lack of interest. Yet, in our experience, this problem mostly refers to high-level policy-makers. Mid-level and former officials and policy-makers have more time and willingness to participate in foresight exercises and contribute equally valuable perspectives. The participatory character of foresight exercises facilitates the exchange of views from different stakeholders on an equal level. In our case, as the evaluation has shown, it has proven to be stimulating for each of the engaged groups.

Moreover, the **policy dialogue** benefits from **scenarios’ accessibility** to a **broader audience**. Scenario publications tend to be shorter and easier to read than the average academic publication and as Nye (2008) rightly notes “a premium on time is a major difference between the two cultures” of academia and policy-making. Since scenario publications are **more suitable** to the **time- and attention-constraints** of many policy-makers, they improve the accessibility of research findings for the policy world (Cairney & Kwiatkowski, 2017). An illustrative example is offered by a foresight exercise conducted by the Aspen Institute Berlin in 2017. A group of academics, think tank experts and policy-makers developed scenarios on the future of the liberal world order that served as raw material for a newspaper from the future titled “The Aspen Insight” and dated October 21, 2025. Not only did the presentation of the newspaper catch the attention of many Berlin-based policy-makers but the “The Aspen Insight” was also attached as a supplement to the Berlin daily Tagesspiegel, and reached more than 300,000 readers.11

We acknowledge that the four aspects of the added value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship are interrelated and that their boundaries are not clear-cut. Yet, we believe, they highlight distinct benefits of this approach for academics that want to **tackle the challenges of today’s world via their research**.

**Scenario analysis is pedagogically valuable – enhances creativity and self-reflexivity, deconstructs cognitive biases and flawed ontological assumptions, and enables the imagination and creation of alternative futures.**

**Barma et al. 16** – (May 2016, [Advance Publication Online on 11/6/15], Naazneen Barma, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Brent Durbin, PhD in Political Science from UC-Berkeley, Professor of Government at Smith College, Eric Lorber, JD from UPenn and PhD in Political Science from Duke, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Rachel Whitlark, PhD in Political Science from GWU, Post-Doctoral Research Fellow with the Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program within the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, “‘Imagine a World in Which’: Using Scenarios in Political Science,” International Studies Perspectives 17 (2), pp. 1-19, <http://www.naazneenbarma.com/uploads/2/9/6/9/29695681/using_scenarios_in_political_science_isp_2015.pdf>)

Over the past decade, the “cult of irrelevance” in political science scholarship has been lamented by a growing chorus (Putnam 2003; Nye 2009; Walt 2009). Prominent scholars of international affairs have diagnosed the roots of the gap between academia and policymaking, made the case for why political science research is valuable for policymaking, and offered a number of ideas for enhancing the policy relevance of scholarship in international relations and comparative politics (Walt 2005,2011; Mead 2010; Van Evera 2010; Jentleson and Ratner 2011; Gallucci 2012; Avey and Desch 2014). Building on these insights, several initiatives have been formed in the attempt to “bridge the gap.”2 Many of the specific efforts put in place by these projects focus on providing scholars with the skills, platforms, and networks to better communicate the findings and implications of their research to the policymaking community, a necessary and worthwhile objective for a field in which theoretical debates, methodological training, and publishing norms tend more and more toward the abstract and esoteric.¶ Yet enhancing communication between scholars and policymakers is only one component of bridging the gap between international affairs theory and practice. Another crucial component of this bridge is the **generation of substantive research programs that are actually policy relevant**—a challenge to which less concerted attention has been paid. The dual challenges of bridging the gap are especially acute for graduate students, a particular irony since many enter the discipline with the explicit hope of informing policy. In a field that has an admirable devotion to pedagogical self-reflection, **strikingly little attention is paid to techniques for generating policy-relevant ideas** for dissertation and other research topics. Although numerous articles and conference workshops are devoted to the importance of experiential and problem-based learning, especially through techniques of simulation that emulate policymaking processes (Loggins 2009; Butcher 2012; Glasgow 2012; Rothman 2012; DiCicco 2014), little has been written about the use of such techniques for generating and developing innovative research ideas.¶ This article outlines an experiential and problem-based approach to developing a political science research program using scenario analysis. It focuses especially on illuminating the research generation and pedagogical benefits of this technique by describing the use of scenarios in the annual New Era Foreign Policy Conference (NEFPC), which brings together doctoral students of international and comparative affairs who share a demonstrated interest in policy-relevant scholarship.3 In the introductory section, the article outlines the practice of scenario analysis and considers the utility of the technique in political science. We argue that scenario analysis should be viewed as a tool to stimulate problem-based learning for doctoral students and discuss the broader scholarly benefits of using scenarios to help generate research ideas. The second section details the manner in which NEFPC deploys scenario analysis. The third section reflects upon some of the concrete scholarly benefits that have been realized from the scenario format. The fourth section offers insights on the pedagogical potential associated with using scenarios in the classroom across levels of study. A brief conclusion reflects on the importance of developing specific techniques to aid those who wish to generate political science scholarship of relevance to the policy world.¶ What Are Scenarios and Why Use Them in Political Science?¶ Scenario analysis is perceived most commonly as a technique for examining the robustness of strategy. It can immerse decision makers in future states that go beyond conventional extrapolations of current trends, preparing them to take advantage of unexpected opportunities and to protect themselves from adverse exogenous shocks. The global petroleum company Shell, a pioneer of the technique, characterizes scenario analysis as the art of considering “what if” questions about possible future worlds. Scenario analysis is thus **typically seen as serving the purposes of corporate planning or as a policy tool** to be used in combination with simulations of decision making. **Yet scenario analysis is not inherently limited to these uses**. This section provides a brief overview of the practice of scenario analysis and the motivations underpinning its uses. It then makes a case for the utility of the technique for political science scholarship and describes how the scenarios deployed at NEFPC were created.¶ The Art of Scenario Analysis¶ We characterize scenario analysis as the art of juxtaposing current trends in unexpected combinations in order to **articulate surprising and yet plausible futures**, often **referred to as “alternative worlds.”** Scenarios are thus **explicitly not forecasts or projections based on linear extrapolations of contemporary patterns**, and they are **not hypothesis-based expert predictions**. **Nor should they be equated with simulations**, which are best characterized as functional representations of **real institutions** or decision-making processes (Asal 2005). **Instead, they are depictions of possible future states of the world**, offered **together with a narrative of the driving causal forces** and potential exogenous shocks **that could lead to those futures**. Good scenarios thus rely on explicit causal propositions that, independent of one another, are plausible—yet, when combined, suggest surprising and sometimes controversial future worlds. For example, few predicted the dramatic fall in oil prices toward the end of 2014. Yet independent driving forces, such as the shale gas revolution in the United States, China’s slowing economic growth, and declining conflict in major Middle Eastern oil producers such as Libya, were all recognized secular trends that—combined with OPEC’s decision not to take concerted action as prices began to decline—came together in an unexpected way.¶ While scenario analysis played a role in war gaming and strategic planning during the Cold War, the real antecedents of the contemporary practice are found in corporate futures studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Raskin et al. 2005). Scenario analysis was essentially initiated at Royal Dutch Shell in 1965, with the realization that the usual forecasting techniques and models were not capturing the rapidly changing environment in which the company operated (Wack 1985; Schwartz 1991). In particular, it had become evident that straight-line extrapolations of past global trends were inadequate for anticipating the evolving business environment. Shell-style scenario planning “helped break the habit, ingrained in most corporate planning, of assuming that the future will look much like the present” (Wilkinson and Kupers 2013, 4). Using scenario thinking, Shell anticipated the possibility of two Arab-induced oil shocks in the 1970s and hence was able to position itself for major disruptions in the global petroleum sector.¶ Building on its corporate roots, scenario analysis has become a standard policymaking tool. For example, the Project on Forward Engagement advocates linking systematic foresight, which it defines as the disciplined analysis of alternative futures, to planning and feedback loops to better equip the United States to meet contemporary governance challenges (Fuerth 2011). Another prominent application of scenario thinking is found in the National Intelligence Council’s series of Global Trends reports, issued every four years to aid policymakers in anticipating and planning for future challenges. These reports present a handful of “alternative worlds” approximately twenty years into the future, carefully constructed on the basis of emerging global trends, risks, and opportunities, and intended to stimulate thinking about geopolitical change and its effects.4 As with corporate scenario analysis, the technique can be used in foreign policymaking for long-range general planning purposes as well as for anticipating and coping with more narrow and immediate challenges. An example of the latter is the German Marshall Fund’s EuroFutures project, which uses four scenarios to map the potential consequences of the Euro-area financial crisis (German Marshall Fund 2013).¶ Several features make scenario analysis particularly useful for policymaking.5 Long-term global trends across a number of different realms—social, technological, environmental, economic, and political—combine in often-unexpected ways to produce unforeseen challenges. Yet the ability of decision makers to imagine, let alone prepare for, discontinuities in the policy realm is constrained by their existing mental models and maps. This limitation is exacerbated by **well-known cognitive bias tendencies such as groupthink and confirmation bias** (Jervis 1976; Janis 1982; Tetlock 2005). The power of scenarios lies in their ability to help individuals **break out of conventional modes of thinking** and analysis by introducing unusual combinations of trends and deliberate discontinuities in narratives about the future. **Imagining alternative future worlds through a structured analytical process enables policymakers to envision and thereby adapt to something altogether different from the known present**.¶ Designing Scenarios for Political Science Inquiry¶ The characteristics of scenario analysis that commend its use to policymakers also make it well suited to helping political scientists generate and develop policy-relevant research programs. Scenarios are essentially textured, plausible, and relevant stories that help us imagine how the future political-economic world could be different from the past in a manner that highlights policy challenges and opportunities. For example, terrorist organizations are a known threat that have captured the attention of the policy community, yet our responses to them tend to be linear and reactive. Scenarios that explore how seemingly unrelated vectors of change—the rise of a new peer competitor in the East that diverts strategic attention, volatile commodity prices that empower and disempower various state and nonstate actors in surprising ways, and the destabilizing effects of climate change or infectious disease pandemics—can be useful for illuminating the nature and limits of the terrorist threat in ways that may be missed by a narrower focus on recognized states and groups. By illuminating the potential strategic significance of specific and yet poorly understood opportunities and threats, scenario analysis helps to identify crucial gaps in our collective understanding of global politicaleconomic trends and dynamics. The notion of “exogeneity”—so prevalent in social science scholarship—applies to models of reality, not to reality itself. Very simply, scenario analysis can throw into sharp relief often-overlooked yet pressing questions in international affairs that demand focused investigation.¶ Scenarios thus offer, in principle, an innovative tool for developing a political science research agenda. In practice, achieving this objective requires careful tailoring of the approach. The specific scenario analysis technique we outline below was designed and refined to provide a structured experiential process for generating problem-based research questions with contemporary international policy relevance.6 The first step in the process of creating the scenario set described here was to identify important causal forces in contemporary global affairs. Consensus was not the goal; on the contrary, some of these causal statements represented competing theories about global change (e.g., a resurgence of the nation-state vs. border-evading globalizing forces). A major principle underpinning the transformation of these causal drivers into possible future worlds was to “simplify, then exaggerate” them, before fleshing out the emerging story with more details.7 Thus, the contours of the future world were drawn first in the scenario, with details about the possible pathways to that point filled in second. It is entirely possible, indeed probable, that some of the causal claims that turned into parts of scenarios were exaggerated so much as to be implausible, and that an unavoidable degree of bias or our own form of groupthink went into construction of the scenarios. One of the great strengths of scenario analysis, however, is that the scenario discussions themselves, as described below, lay bare these especially implausible claims and systematic biases.8¶ An explicit methodological approach underlies the written scenarios themselves as well as the analytical process around them—that of case-centered, structured, focused comparison, intended especially to shed light on new causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005). The use of scenarios is similar to counterfactual analysis in that it modifies certain variables in a given situation in order to analyze the resulting effects (Fearon 1991). Whereas counterfactuals are traditionally retrospective in nature and explore events that did not actually occur in the context of known history, our **scenarios are deliberately forward-looking** and are designed to **explore potential futures** that could unfold. As such, counterfactual analysis is especially well suited to identifying how individual events might expand or shift the “funnel of choices” available to political actors and thus lead to different historical outcomes (Nye 2005, 68–69), while forward-looking scenario analysis can better illuminate surprising intersections and sociopolitical dynamics without the perceptual constraints imposed by fine-grained historical knowledge. We see scenarios as a complementary resource for exploring these dynamics in international affairs, rather than as a replacement for counterfactual analysis, historical case studies, or other methodological tools.¶ In the scenario process developed for NEFPC, three distinct scenarios are employed, acting as cases for analytical comparison. Each scenario, as detailed below, includes a set of explicit “driving forces” which represent hypotheses about causal mechanisms worth investigating in evolving international affairs. The scenario analysis process itself employs templates (discussed further below) to serve as a graphical representation of a structured, focused investigation and thereby as the research tool for conducting case-centered comparative analysis (George and Bennett 2005). In essence, these templates articulate key observable implications within the alternative worlds of the scenarios and serve as a framework for capturing the data that emerge (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Finally, this structured, focused comparison serves as the basis for the cross-case session emerging from the scenario analysis that leads directly to the articulation of new research agendas.¶ The scenario process described here has thus been carefully designed to offer some guidance to policy-oriented graduate students who are otherwise left to the relatively unstructured norms by which political science dissertation ideas are typically developed. The initial articulation of a dissertation project is generally an idiosyncratic and personal undertaking (Useem 1997; Rothman 2008), whereby students might choose topics based on their coursework, their own previous policy exposure, or the topics studied by their advisors. Research agendas are thus typically developed by looking for “puzzles” in existing research programs (Kuhn 1996). Doctoral students also, understandably, often choose topics that are particularly amenable to garnering research funding. Conventional grant programs typically base their funding priorities on extrapolations from what has been important in the recent past—leading to, for example, the prevalence of Japan and Soviet studies in the mid-1980s or terrorism studies in the 2000s—in the absence of any alternative method for identifying questions of likely future significance.¶ The scenario approach to generating research ideas is grounded in the belief that these traditional approaches can be complemented by identifying questions likely to be of great empirical importance in the real world, even if these **do not appear** as puzzles **in existing research programs** or as clear extrapolations from past events. The scenarios analyzed at NEFPC envision alternative worlds that could develop in the medium (five to seven year) term and are designed to **tease out issues scholars and policymakers may encounter in the relatively near future** so that they can **begin thinking critically about them now**. This timeframe offers a period distant enough from the present as to avoid falling into current events analysis, but not so far into the future as to seem like science fiction. In imagining the worlds in which these scenarios might come to pass, participants **learn strategies for avoiding failures of creativity** and for **overturning the assumptions that prevent scholars and analysts from anticipating and understanding** the pivotal junctures that arise in international affairs.

**Threat scenario-analysis is good.**

**Mahnken & Junio ’13** (Thomas; September 2013; Ph.D. and M.A. in International Affairs from Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in International Relations and History from the University of Southern California, Chair of Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College and a Visiting Scholar at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies; Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in International Studies from Johns Hopkins Univeristy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; International Studies Review, Vol. 15, Issue 3 “Conceiving of Future War: The Promise of Scenario Analysis for International Relations,” p. 374-395; RP)

This article introduces political scientists to scenarios—future counterfactuals—and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to **theory building** and development, identifying **new hypotheses**, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating **“world views,”** setting new research agendas, **avoiding cognitive biases**, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios. In his classic work on scenario and Duncan 1993; Leufkens, Haaijer-Ruskamp, Bakker, and Dukes 1994; Baker, Hulse, Gregory, White, Van Sickle, Berger, Dole, and Schumaker 2004; Sanderson, Scherbov, O'Neill, and Lutz 2004). Scenarios also are a **common tool** employed by the policymakers whom political scientists study. This article seeks to elevate the status of scenarios in political science by demonstrating their usefulness for theory building and **pedagogy**. Rather than constitute mere speculation regarding an unpredictable future, as critics might suggest, scenarios assist scholars with developing testable **hypotheses**, gathering data, and identifying a theory's upper and lower bounds. Additionally, scenarios are an **effective way to teach students** to apply theory to policy. In the pages below, a “best practices” guide is offered to advise scholars, practitioners, and students, and an argument is developed in favor of the use of scenarios. The article concludes with two examples of how political scientists have invoked the scenario method to improve the specifications of their theories, propose **falsifiable hypotheses**, and design new **empirical research** programs. Scenarios in the Discipline What do counterfactual narratives about the future look like? Scenarios may range in length from a few sentences to many pages. One of the most common uses of the scenario method, which will be referenced throughout this article, is to study the conditions under which **high-consequence, low-probability** events may occur. Perhaps the best example of this is **nuclear warfare**, a circumstance that has never resulted, but has captivated generations of political scientists. For an introductory illustration, let us consider a very simple scenario regarding how a first use of a nuclear weapon might occur: During the year 2023, the US military is ordered to launch air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait to aid in a crisis. These highly visible patrols disrupt trade off China's coast, and result in skyrocketing insurance rates for shipping companies. Several days into the contingency, which involves over ten thousand US military personnel, an intelligence estimate concludes that a Chinese conventional strike against US air patrols and naval assets is imminent. The United States conducts a preemptive strike against anti-air and anti-sea systems on the Chinese mainland. The US strike is far more successful than Chinese military leaders thought possible; a new source of intelligence to the United States—unknown to Chinese leadership—allowed the US military to severely degrade Chinese targeting and situational awareness capabilities. Many of the weapons that China relied on to dissuade escalatory US military action are now reduced to single-digit-percentage readiness. Estimates for repairs and replenishments are stated in terms of weeks, and China's confidence in readily available, but “dumber,” weapons is low due to the dispersion and mobility of US forces. Word of the successful US strike spreads among the Chinese and Taiwanese publics. The Chinese Government concludes that for the sake of preserving its domestic strength, and to signal resolve to the US and Taiwanese Governments while minimizing further economic disruption, it should escalate dramatically with the use of an extremely small-yield nuclear device against a stationary US military asset in the Pacific region. This short story reflects a future event that, while unlikely to occur and far too vague to be used for military planning, contains many **dimensions of political science** theory. These include the following: what leaders perceive as “limited,” “proportional,” or “escalatory” uses of force; the importance of private information about capabilities and commitment; audience costs in international politics; the relationship between **military** expediency **and political objectives** during war; and the role of compressed timelines for decision making, among others. The purpose of this article is to explain to scholars how such stories, and more rigorously developed narratives that specify variables of interest and draw on extant data, may **improve the study of IR**. An important starting point is to explain how future counterfactuals fit into the methodological canon of the discipline.

**2AC – Extinction First**

**The aff outweighs – extinction is the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely**

**Burns 17** (Elizabeth. Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction? http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that **billions of people would likely die painful deaths**. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, **the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation**. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. **It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost** A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. **Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths** Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, **if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account**, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. **Existing people could endure non-physical harms** I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst **this is by no means universal**, **it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction** and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

**Extinction outweighs.**

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In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be **extremely long** and **full of flourishing**, and would therefore have **extremely large value**. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing **the probability** that an action will prevent **an adverse event** against **the severity** of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is **so vast**, **even a tiny probability** of prevention has **huge expected value**.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of ***intergenerational equity*** according to which **future generations** ought to get **as much protection** as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to **existential risk**, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of **intergenerational equity**. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations **less than the current generations**; it would give them ***nothing***. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has **a quite low cost** for us in comparison with **the huge expected value** it has for future generations. In spite of this, **relatively little** is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of **intergenerational equity**, they give us **a strong case** for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives **less attention** than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is *a global public good*. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces **existential risk** gains **only a small portion** of the benefits but bears **the full brunt of the costs**. Countries thus have **strong incentives** to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, **existential risk reduction** is **an *intergenerational* public good**: most of the benefits are enjoyed by **future generations** who have **no say** in the political process. For these goods, the problem is ***temporal* free riding**: the current generation enjoys **the benefits of inaction** while future generations bear **the costs**. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. **Cognitive biases** also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been **any catastrophes** of this magnitude, these risks are **not salient** to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of **the *availability heuristic***, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important **only if** it can be **readily recalled**. **Another cognitive bias** affecting perceptions of existential risk is **scope neglect**. In **a seminal 1992 study**, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had **little effect** on the scale of the preferred response. People **become numbed** to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get **too large**. 74 Scope neglect is **a particularly acute problem** for existential risk because the numbers at stake are **so large**. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

**2AC – Fiat Good**

**Fiat is good -- foreign policy simulations teach students how allies and adversaries respond to U.S. policy -- fosters ideological reflexivity, accurate policy prediction, and argumentative agency.**

**Esberg and Sagan ’12** [Jane and Scott; 2012; Special assistant to the Director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation; Professor of Political Science and Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; *The Nonproliferation Review*, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” p. 95-96]

These government or quasi-government think tank **simulations** often provide very similar **lessons** for high-level players as are learned by **students** in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the **importance** of **understanding foreign perspectives**, the need to practice internal coordination, and the **necessity** to **compromise and coordinate** with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how **crisis exercises** and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict. The **skills of imagination** and the subsequent ability to predict **foreign interests and reactions** remain critical for **real-world foreign policy makers**. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to **predict accurately** how **other states**, both **allies and adversaries**, would behave **in response** to **US policy initiatives**.

By **university age**, students often have a **pre-defined view** of **international affairs**, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises **force students** to challenge **their assumptions** about how other governments **behave** and how their own government works. Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork. More broadly, **simulations** can deepen **understanding** by asking **students** to link **fact and theory**, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice. These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force **participants** to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from **a world in flux.** Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur. Role-playing exercises certainly encourage **students** to learn **political and technical facts**\* but they learn them in a **more active style**. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others. Acts can change quickly; **simulations** teach students how to **contextualize and act** on information.

**2AC – Debating Nuclear Risk Good**

**Debating nuclear risk is good.**

**Bernstein ’18** [Aron; September 21st; Emeritus Professor of Physics at MIT; The Bulletin, “Reducing the risk of nuclear war begins in the classroom,” https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/reducing-the-risk-of-nuclear-war-begins-in-the-classroom/]

The need for education on nuclear weapons. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the students of today have **less lived experience** to draw on than older generations. Today’s typical **college student** was born after the end of the Cold War and has no memory of a time when most Americans were deeply afraid of nuclear war (excluding, to an extent, the fiery exchange of threats between President Trump and Kim Jong-un last year). Perhaps as a result, these students also have very limited knowledge about nuclear weapons. The majority do not have a strong understanding of what **nuclear weapons** are, their destructive power, or their role in the international order, and even fewer have a sense of how many nuclear weapons exist. They are not aware of the $1.2 trillion nuclear **modernization program**, in which the majority of costs come from modernizing and improving delivery systems rather than performing the technically necessary maintenance of the nuclear warheads. History education on the Cold War often addresses the US-Soviet arms race of that time, but nuclear weapons issues in other regions—such as the tense situation between India and Pakistan—are rarely ever mentioned. The distant, but persistent, possibility of an **unintentional nuclear launch** due to unauthorized access, technical failure, or a cyberattack on warning systems, is also overlooked, as is general information about which states possess nuclear weapons today.

In short, students in the United States (and likely elsewhere) typically graduate from high school having received almost no information on nuclear weapons. It is generally **assumed** that today’s American public simply **doesn’t care** about the **complicated** and somewhat **abstract** issues of **nuclear weapons** and **deterrence** because they **rarely affect people’s lives directly**. However, an alternative explanation exists: The American public doesn’t know enough about nuclear weapons to have much political opinion on them, **but** if they had **more knowledge**, that could **change**. If so, educating students **on nuclear weapons** on a large scale could have the **long-term effect** of creating an American public that is **politically engaged** on the nuclear issue and **motivated to hold its elected leaders accountable** for implementing nuclear policy that **reduces the risk of nuclear war**.

For some students, education on nuclear issues may have an impact beyond just putting nuclear weapons on their radar (pun intended). Today’s **students** are the **next politicians, scientists, and journalists**, and some of them will inevitably be tasked with addressing the nuclear issue in their careers. For these students, early exposure to the issues of nuclear weapons in an educational context could be **useful preparation** for grappling with those issues professionally. Indeed, for some students, learning about **nuclear weapons** could have a **decisive impact** on their career trajectory and **inspire them** to dedicate themselves to solving **these problems**.

**IR Theory**

**Realism**

**Impact Turn - Realism is True and Accurate - COVID 19 Proves Security Dilemma amidst zero-sum competitions for international aid**

**Basrur** Rajaratnam School of International Studies, and **Kiliem** Nanyang Technological University, **21,**

[Rajesh and Frederick, “COVID - 19 and International Cooperation: IR Pradigms at Odds”, Nataional Library of Medicine, November 9th, 21, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/>, accessed 6/27/22, GDS - LJ]

Even in the world’s most integrated supranational organization, the European Union (EU), member states readily violate otherwise sacrosanct principles of cooperation, and realists would not be surprised by how quickly lofty European ideals and norms made way for national self-help once the Covid-19 crisis hit the continent. The outbreak was followed by immediate violation of many existing EU regulations: competition law, fiscal discipline, and freedom of movement. As countries closed their borders, EU capitals went into full nationalist gear (Guardian [2020a](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR32)). Without any EU-consultation process, a number of EU countries immediately closed their borders and decreed export bans. When Italy, one of the worst affected countries in the world, asked fellow EU members for emergency relief with critical medical supplies, for several weeks it was met with precisely what realism would expect: its neighbors violated the EU’s single-market spirit by decreeing export bans on pharmaceutical equipment (Braw [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR5); Reuters [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR25)).

Dismayed by the lack of European solidarity, Rome was happy to accept support from China, which, though itself badly affected, sent medical equipment and experts immediately. Far from being altruistic, however, Beijing aims to rewrite the Covid-19 narrative. It does not want to be seen as the point-of-origin of the Covid-19 virus and views the pandemic as an opportunity to come out ahead of the United States in a zero-sum competition for global primacy. In Italy and elsewhere, China’s “mask diplomacy” is a noteworthy public relations coup (Kliem and Chong [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR16)). Beijing wants to be recognized globally as a responsible provider of public health goods in the absence of US leadership, and thereby, progress towards its ultimate objective of comprehensive power accumulation relative to Washington.

Indeed, the US has not only been absent in terms of leadership, but has also actively engaged in nationalistic self-help at the expense of others. President Donald Trump of the United States, Europe’s closest non-EU ally and partner, tried to lure CureVac, a German firm that was developing a promising Covid-19 vaccine technology, to relocate its Covid-19 research and development division to the US and to guarantee exclusive American access to the firm’s products (Die Welt [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR11)). Similarly, Trump sought to block the sale of masks to Canada by a US-based firm (MacCharles and Ballingall [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR17)), though a compromise was arrived at later. The US (like other countries, e.g. Japan) has also sought to restructure global supply chains in order to bypass dependence on China (Pamuk and Shalal [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR22)), which—if it succeeds—will be a radical and long-term change.

**Realists also point out that international institutions do not enable states to concentrate on greater long-term gains for everyone. Instead, international anarchy forces states to treat international organizations and institutions essentially like the international system itself: as an arena for zero-sum competition.** Indeed, as realism predicts, the World Health Organization (WHO) has become highly politicized. For example, **because of the PRC’s refusal to accept Taiwan as a diplomatically independent, sovereign nation state, the WHO disregards Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19 as well as related research and development results.** Allegedly bowing to pressure from Beijing, the WHO does not recognize Taiwan and refuses to include Taipei’s very successful pandemic management strategies in its reports on global research efforts (Financial Times [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR14)). This also supports the neoclassical realists’ argument about domestic factors. It shows how domestic ideology shapes foreign policy decisions in China and hinders international cooperation.

If a severe transboundary global crisis cannot spur international cooperation, then what can? Realism reminds us that, because of the trust deficit systemically inherent in an international system characterized by anarchy, states hesitate to forgo their first instinct for self-help and zero-sum games, even amidst a common global challenge.

**Realism comes first—even if their theories come first, we win realism frames all underlying structures.**

**Bertucci et al. 18**  [Bertucci, Mariano E, et al. Constructivism Reconsidered Past, Present, and Future. Ann Arbor University Of Michigan Press, 2018, pp. 223–229. Senior Lecturer in International Security at the Strategy and Security Institute, Department of Politics, University of Exeter \ kaylan]

The previous section documented how social variables might be taken as having the potential to transform international politics. This section now turns to an explanation of why it is so hard to fulfill such seeming transformational promise. Running throughout is the argument that while playing a particular social role or expressing a particular cultural identity are certainly state interests, they are necessarily **subordinate to political survival** (as a sovereign entity with control over its own foreign policy), “**physiological” security** (the safety from death and harm of the state’s population), **and economic prosperity** (a baseline level of which is necessary to ensure physiological security). Put simply, if a state and its population do not exist, it cannot achieve anything else—such as fulfilling a social role or **expressing a cultural identity**—either.36 And since survival, security, and prosperity all have a material base—as Wendt recognizes via his “rump materialism” (he simply does not think the material base yields determinate outcomes)—so too must **states necessarily put the defense of such interests ahead of social role fulfillment** if they want to be in a position to play any sort of role in future.37 That is not to suggest that states do not sometimes—or, indeed, often—make ideationally driven foreign policy choices that are detrimental to their other interests. It is simply a description of states’ incentive structure, which much of the time they end up following. It is necessary at this point to defend the notion that there is, in fact, a material base independent of the social world and that characteristics of that material base can yield causal outcomes. After all, military technology does not descend as manna from heaven, but rather is created via human agency in response to perceived threats, and thus it necessarily contains a dose of military culture and broader social identity from the outset. The same goes for the overall share of national economic resources allocated to defense, and indeed, money itself is a socially constructed store of value, albeit one premised upon underlying materially underpinned wealth.38 Any assessment of strategic priorities is necessarily filtered through the strategic-cultural lens of the institution(s) doing the assessing; asking one’s navy for an analysis of the relative merits of sea denial versus power projection, for example, necessarily delivers an answer infused with that navy’s historical trajectory, its sense of its role in the nation and the world, its internal politics, and so forth. The broader question of whether the sea—like other geographical features—constitutes a strategic barrier or a highway similarly requires cultural interpretation. Even technologies with such seemingly self-evident destructive power as nuclear weapons are not self-evidently “good” or “bad,” either morally or strategically, absent social interpretation. One might see them as “bad” because of the potential humanitarian consequences of their use (or because of the constraints they impose on conventional military options), or “good” because of the casualties in conventional war they prevent (and deterrence that they enable at low relative cost). Their political meaning is thus socially constructed, even if the physiological effects on human bodies of their detonation have only one possible outcome. If military technology and resources require a social component to be both developed and meaningfully deployed, then Wendt’s contention that there is indeed a “rump” material base but that it is simply indeterminate—in the absence of a friend/enemy distinction—as a cause of international outcomes becomes alluring.39 Crucially, however, **each of these social choices involves a decisive material effect that is not open to interpretation.** It may be debatable whether nuclear weapons are “good” or “bad,” but the effect that one will have on the city and its population of frail, carbon-based human animals over which it detonates represents a single, determinate outcome—and **a state facing another state armed with them must therefore make certain necessary calculations based around that capability**.40 In the same vein, while the strategic threat/opportunity constituted by geographical features, such as the oceanic moats enjoyed by the United States and United Kingdom, may be a matter of interpretation, the underlying **material factor** —humans’ inability to cross water without spending resources on capital (ships) that could otherwise have been spent on further ground forces— yields certain necessary outcomes. Indeed, the very foundation of relations between major powers after 1945—secure second-strike nuclear deterrence and its disincentivization of conventional aggression41—**rests on a physical “fact**”: the relative impenetrability of water to the electro-magnetic spectrum and the associated survivability that it provides to ballistic missile submarines. The same goes for the decision over what share of national economic resources to allocate to defense. Choosing a proportion may indeed be a socially and ideationally informed political choice, but the underlying size of the resource pools—and the military potentiality that they underpin— rests on the total size of the state’s capital stock (both human and physical), which is not a matter of social interpretation. And while military technology is indeed developed in response to human agency, it is done so from within the technical bounds of the feasible. Such rebuttals apply more widely: while the balance of power, including resources and technology, is indeed necessarily interpreted through states’ social lenses, it nonetheless conditions the bounds of the possible even in the absence of social content. And when those possibilities include hostile use, certain behaviors are necessitated by prudent states seeking survival for their populations. Realists should indeed be castigated if they infer predictions solely from the balance of currently existing military hardware—a thin and intellectually impoverished understanding of relative power—and critics are correct to point out that a large stock of materiel is not the same as being able to compel another to do that which they would not otherwise have done, in line with the behavioral output understanding of power commonly associated with Dahl (as distinct from the input understanding).42 But viewing total state power in terms of overall assets, defined as the state’s total stock of physical,43 financial,44 and human capital,45 **does a better job** of first encompassing all the relevant resources—equipment, stores of value, human bodies and brains—**and, second, providing an effective measurable proxy for the underlying causes of behavioral power** (given that the latter can only be observed ex post, and is therefore not an effective predictor of outcomes). None of this is to deny that there is a social element to the construction of all these power resources, or indeed that the “material” itself involves a large dose of social input, and this chapter is therefore not attempting to “settle” the debate over the precise nature of the relationship. It is simply to point out, rather, that states’ power resources and their effects are not wholly socially constructed and that the nonsocial element produces certain effects. Turning to specific arguments over states’ pursuit of status, the notion that achieving a particular elevated status and thus fulfilling a certain international-social role might be a goal of states is relatively uncontentious.46 For instance, one insightful recent constructivist work on Britain’s pursuit of international status suggests at the outset that states’ social roles are not the same as their interests, ambitions, values, or capabilities.47 Yet the same work later asserts that social role actually produces national interests, thus implying that states cannot in fact have interests besides those constituted by identity.48 Such conceptual tensions are symptomatic of a theoretical dilemma: the more minimal former assertion is the harder to refute, yet the more ambitious latter claim is necessary if constructivists are to escape the realist retort that fulfilling a social role is merely an interest of states—and a subordinate one to materially underpinned survival at that—rather than the interest. Escaping this retort is in turn necessary if constructivists are to be able to claim that anarchy is indeed what states make of it socially, since transforming the prevailing culture of anarchy would require states to lower their guard against each other—and thus accept higher risk to their survival, at least **while the hoped-for transformation was taking place**—in pursuit of an international- social value. The less contentious point—that playing a particular social role is one of multiple interests—opens the way to conceding that the most fundamental state interests remain “political” survival (of state territory and institutions), “biological” security (of the citizenry’s bodies), and preserving some baseline level of economic prosperity, since **a state that cannot survive cannot achieve anything else**. But if that is the case, then from these materially underpinned vital interests follows a need to be capable of defending them against potential foes—and that, if it comes to it, **means accomplishing certain military missions**.49 Such military capability is necessarily underpinned by material resources, even as it also has a socially constructed dimension. Such capability can be provided independently (internal balancing), via allies (external balancing), or through some combination of the two—prudent strategy, including eschewing avoidable confrontation and aligning with the preferences of powerful allies, is a key aspect of state success50—but either way, it rests on some friendly actor’s underlying resources. And reliance on external balancing brings its own dangers, as recently experienced by European NATO, when one’s allies turn coercive.51 In short, such an analysis—while conceding that social role and status are important to states, all else held equal, and that such concerns sometimes drive them to act in imprudent ways—nonetheless suggests that hedging against abandonment, coercion, or outright destruction via balance-of- power positioning is likely to remain pervasive. This is not to say that there will not be variation in the extent and severity of such competition. All manner of ideational variables might exacerbate or reduce tensions, as discussed above, and even in the absence of such social forces, overt, intensive competition may yield self-destructive outcomes if it increases another side’s insecurity and causes them to adopt a more offensively capable strategic posture in response.52 The point, rather, is simply that conflict will never be a wholly absent possibility and that that reality must condition states’ calculations—often to the point of some level of defensive hedging, if the state has the resources and technology to make that feasible —**even in times of broadly cooperative relations**. A similar retort can be made against the claims that threat perception and military doctrine are both so fundamentally skewed by culture that they may be commonly and wholly disconnected from balance-of-power concerns, and which subsequently allow for an end to military balancing, mutual threat, and security competition. While this short chapter is clearly not the place for an extensive review, the success of many states— particularly resource-rich ones—in aping military technological and professional best practice would seem to suggest that much of the time states are able to achieve what Gray, borrowing from marketing theory, dubs “good enough” **force postures in the face of strategic uncertainty.**53 Similarly, when states do “die” in the face of foreign aggression—a rare occurrence in post-1945 international politics—**it is more often as a consequence of their relative military weakness** and geographical vulnerability than as a consequence of a failure to perceive a looming threat.54 Indeed, a key contribution of the neoclassical realist research program has been to demonstrate that while domestic-political variables may filter strategic behavior in multifarious and often nefarious ways, there are still underlying balance-of-power structural pressures at the international-systemic level that states usually respond to, even if they do so belatedly or imperfectly.55 In short, while Waltzian “socialization” toward accurately perceiving threats and formulating effective military doctrine may frequently be hindered—and sometimes terminally compromised—by cultural factors, as a description of the workings of the international system as a whole (as he intended his theory to be), realist predictions of enduring concern and possible competition over the distribution of material power are **not undermined** by this recognition.56 Tellingly, despite their strong ideational commitments toward democracy promotion and human rights enforcement under the banner of upholding international order, Western states have recently had the reprioritization of balancing against increasingly capable rivals forced upon them by developments in the balance of power, whether that be China’s rise in Asia for the United States or Russia’s (partial) resurgence in Europe for the rest of NATO.57 Finally, even national identity and the nationalism it engenders—the ideational “master variable” underpinning the nation-state system—is itself forged by the interaction of political group identity and the survival imperative under structural anarchy. To paraphrase Tilly, **war makes the state, and the state makes war.**58 Modern nation-states may have originated as political groups of individually weak human beings with some shared identity connection, but their choice to form states as protective war machines capable of generating the military power necessary to defend against similar political units, and the subsequent mutual reinforcement of national identity and state strength, **is very much consistent with realism’s predictions** of the consequences of international structural anarchy. Indeed, as noted earlier, Mearsheimer uses these grounds to argue that nationalism and realism are mutually supportive theories.59 In the post–Cold War world, moreover, mutually threatening political groups’ need to generate the military power necessary for security under anarchy—the security dilemma, in short—helps to explain the explosion of ferocious ethnonationalist and sectarian conflict within and between the new states emerging from the collapse of previously multiethnic communist federations, secular Middle Eastern autocracies, and so forth.60 Such conflict has in turn forged the identity of the states and state-like entities emerging from it. In short, while it is certainly not impossible for national identities to shift, as noted above, the process of their generation nonetheless suggests that they are endogenous to—rather than readily capable of exogenously shifting to transform—international systemic security competition and balance-of- power positioning, that they are as much a dependent variable as an independent variable

**2AC – Realism/Perm**

**Perm do both – IR is reflexive, constantly changing and can be re-appropriated**

**Abraham, 17**—Johns Hopkins University (Kavi Joseph, “Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” International Political Sociology (2017) 11, 221–238, dml)

This passage marks out one of the biggest obstacles to connecting realist and postcolonial thought: race. One would be hard pressed to find in realist theorizations anything resembling a supple understanding of race and racism (Vitalis 2015)— though Carr (2001b, 107) demonstrates a comparatively great deal of reflexivity on postcolonial liberation (see fn. 2 above). Even in Williams’s (2005) “wilful” realist tradition, there is scant discussion of how an embedded ethic of critical self-limitation fared in the context of racial or other forms of radical difference. Absent an engagement with the analytics of postcolonial thinking, or the diverse ways in which white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity inflect past and present liberal imperial formations, willful realism does not address the categories that threaten to push prudential skeptics toward violent responses, that pose limitations to an ethos of limits. As evidenced in Morgenthau, failure to think critically about race opens up the way for Morgenthau’s theoretical practice to be driven toward resentful rather than careful ends. It is at this juncture that those concerned with contemporary imperial formations are confronted with a number of possible responses: one is to **deem realism**, in all its **complex** and **contradictory manifestations**, as a **failed**, **unethical**, and **fundamentally racist/imperial project**. A second response is to politically align against liberalism, while holding this partnership at arm’s length. A third response, derived from Ayoob’s (2002) subaltern realism, is to work on an **epistemic register**, **selectively taking insights** from realist traditions that help better explain the neocolonial world. Morgenthau’s racist interjections should be critiqued and confronted—perhaps by outlining the innumerable non-Western contributions to the making of so-called Western modernity (Hobson 2004)—but this failing **does not delegitimize other realist insights**. What is important for Ayoob’s (2002) accommodationist stance is to combine plausible realist insights with other categories that can grasp the extent of global politics, including the dynamics of the postcolonial experience, better. The final response is the one I advance. To adopt a mode of argumentation concerned with building a counter-imperial machine is to neither **dismiss constituencies** that become caught up in imperial formations, nor merely to **tactically align with them**; rather, **establishing resonant connections** among postcolonial and realist lines of thought, **highlighting shared dispositions** to difference, is to push the latter toward **repositioning itself on new ethical lines** that **limit contemporary forms of violence**. To recover a minor position in realism is **not to accept all realist positions**, nor is it to synthesize or convert any theoretical line into a coherent framework. It is, however, to **amplify the shared spirituality** that informs both realist and postcolonial thinking, drawing constituencies toward **prudential** rather than **imperial defenses of difference**. It is to **furnish current research agendas** with an **anti-imperial focus**, to seek the **creative possibilities** that may arise when divergent constituencies meet, interfuse, and shift. Thus, our response to Morgenthau, as to other realists, is to cultivate the connections that do exist, not for epistemic reasons but for a political project that strengthens counter-imperial movements. Thinking from the Present By way of conclusion, it is important to reiterate the politics that motivates a theoretical project of linking realist and postcolonial thinking. If the ends of this project were to simply gather critiques of liberalism and its relationship to imperial practices, then certainly a return to classical realist thought adds little epistemic value over and above postcolonial approaches. However, the ends of this argument are to outline and energize a **counter-imperial machine**, to cultivate a shared spirituality that can **gather diverse** and **divergent constituencies** to confront dangerous practices. In my estimation, countering an imperial machine that operates in **complex ways** and at **complex sites** requires a political strategy as **unwieldy** and **diffuse**, linking constituencies that we **may otherwise dismiss**. That a tradition of realism **regularly circulates through halls of power** across the globe **should be reason not to reject righteously** but rather to **leverage its authorized status**. We can talk about **imperialism**, **knowledge production**, and **race** here, while they can talk about **anarchy**, **power**, and **self-interest** there—or we can theoretically work on the lines of thought that **reverberate among us**. To reiterate, building a countermachine is not driven to “pragmatic” reconciliation or consensus and, thus, remains distinct from the “eclecticism” of other plural approaches popular in IR today. While the combinatory logic of paradigmatic synthesis has its place, the connections between realist and postcolonial thought articulated here are made in a far more agonistic manner. Rather than produce something like a “postcolonial-realism,” this argument involves pushing contemporary realist scholarship toward **new research agendas** and **new forms of critique** that both capture a spirit internal to its own traditions while confronting the realities of contemporary global politics. It engages with minor positions along the realist canon to orient today’s realism away from the logic of great power politics operating under anarchy toward an understanding of how the logic of liberal order permits forms of imperial intervention. Needless to say, drawing together realist and postcolonial thought, as this essay has done, can be met with **analytical skepticism** and **political hostility**. A mode of argumentation that **refuses comparisons** of theoretical cores or non-truncated readings of select theorists strikes a note of **analytical evasion**. To this there is no defense—other than that already discussed at length. On the other hand, if the expressly political purpose of this work is accepted, the argument anticipates **strong political reservations**: why align the project of postcolonial theory with realism, an **unethical tradition of militarism** and **realpolitik**? To this I would respond that while a kind of strategic essentialism has its place, **reducing** “realists” to a coherent body of thought not only **obscures the complexity** of their thinking (see never-ending interpretations of Machiavelli as an example) but **reproduces the narrative of transhistorical unity** that some realists use to **authorize unethical policy programs** in the first place. More critically, however, in embodying an **unproductive ahistoricism**, it poses conventional realist categories of **anarchy**, **selfinterest**, and **military power** as the **political problem to confront** whereas the present historical context **demands attunement** to how some of these drives (militarism, national interest) **connect with discrete problems** of liberalism and imperial practices. In fact, there are good reasons to think that the dominance of (neo)realism in IR is overstated (Walker and Morton 2005; Maliniak et al. 2011) and that the ascension of liberal IR theory is sociologically tied up with the present hegemony of a US liberal world order (Sterling-Folker 2015). In other words, while realism may have been a productive foil in Cold War bipolarity, we must theorize from the present. In doing so, we may find that countering imperial formations **may benefit from resonances established** not just **among** postcolonial, feminist, poststructural, and other “critical” theorists but **contemporary realists** who identify links between liberalism and imperialism (Walt 2013). Indeed, if realism as a policy program defending the national interest is **entangled with current militaristic** and **imperial interventions**, we should **push the premise** of this statement, that **difference should be defended**, in **anti-imperial** and **prudential directions**. Doing so may allow **new openings to emerge** in the present sense of closure, **new strategies to think** and **defend alternative politics**. In this way, we may more fully embody postcoloniality by not being satisfied with either narrow critique or brash conversion but rather attentive translation.

**Liberalism**

**Economic Liberalism Key - Interdependance through economic incentives ensures cooperation and democracy to preserve international peace - COVID + numerous pandemics prove**

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[Rajesh and Frederick, “COVID - 19 and International Cooperation: IR Pradigms at Odds”, Nataional Library of Medicine, November 9th, 21, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/>, accessed 6/27/22, GDS - LJ]

When the fates of states are bound together, liberals claim, they must cooperate or pay a very high price. The global economy, for instance, is a complex network of trade, finance and manufacturing that places a premium on cooperation. From this perspective, states must cooperate to stem pandemics that flow seamlessly across the world and impose high costs on all societies. They must share knowledge and material resources to counter a scourge that harms them all. They certainly do so, for example, in US-led efforts to ensure the reliable availability of equipment to combat pandemics (Tribune [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR34)). But they do not cooperate consistently. The United States has sought to corner scarce medical supplies (Bradley [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR4)), European states have failed to coordinate policy (The Guardian [2020a](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR32)), and China and the United States are squabbling over responsibility (Shi and Wu [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR29)). In short, the pattern is much as in another arena of contest between interdependent states: the as yet unfinished “trade war.”

Why? Interdependence does not automatically produce cooperation. It is only when the breakdown of interdependence raises the prospect of serious catastrophe that states cooperate. When nuclear-armed states are on the verge of war, for instance, they engage in tacit cooperation by practicing extreme caution and often seek explicit accommodation through talks, as was the case in Cold War crises. Even so, they continue to compete through arms racing, alliance building and occasional brinkmanship. Comparatively low levels of interdependence amidst the Covid-19 outbreak are unlikely to generate high levels of cooperation as the threat to national survival is limited.

The onset of pandemics has certainly produced unprecedented cooperation among epistemic communities, such as virologists, in a transnationalized world. Scientists from many countries have worked together to manage the threat of a viral outbreak ever since the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002. The appearance of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012 quickly led to the activation of a scientific network that has been dubbed the “SARS club” (Butler [2012](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR6)). More broadly, the onset of MERS spurred global research, producing as many as 883 scientific papers in 92 countries between 2012 and 2015 (Zyoud [2016](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR37)). Likewise, as the New York Times has noted, the Covid-19 outbreak has galvanized unparalleled cooperative research in which scientists have bypassed standard protocols and competitive secrecy to engage in shared efforts (Apuzzo and Kirkpatrick [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR1)). But, not for the first time, politics has trumped cooperation. The possibility of a quantum leap in global scientific collaboration has been stymied by the China-US spat, which has reduced the prospects of shared funding and finance to fight the virus. The US, for instance, stopped funding of a critical coronavirus-related training program for Chinese and other scientists even before the current outbreak. National priorities have overridden collective action, which is entirely in accord with realist expectations (Baumgaertner and Rainey [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR3)).

The same malaise afflicts international institutions, which liberals see as fostering high levels of cooperation. The Group of 7 major economies (G7) failed to organize a summit meeting in March 2020, while a subsequent meeting of their foreign ministers came up with no more than an anodyne statement seeking to foster research cooperation and do “whatever is necessary” to counter the economic fallout of the crisis even as they disagreed on whether China was to blame for the onset of the crisis (Schult [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR28)). The G20 did not do much better. It did support debt relief for poor countries, but its announced $5 trillion injection into the global economy was in fact no more than the sum of moneys already committed by its individual members for themselves (Chodor [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR7)). The institution at the center of the crisis, the WHO, has been acknowledged as critical to the information flow relating to the crisis. But the WHO has also been dogged by controversy for announcing the onset of the pandemic late (on 11 March, by which time it had already spread to 113 countries) and for apparently deferring to China in doing so (Basrur [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR2)). Such failings have brought much criticism and calls for its reform (South China Morning Post [2020](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7649056/#CR31)).

**Absent the U.S, power vacuums through competing security interests cause Russian heg [retag lol]**

**Erkan 22** [Erkan, Mariya. “A Neoclassical Realist Perspective on Russian Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Putin Era.” International Relations and International Law Journal, vol. 97, no. 1, Mar. 2022, 10.26577/irilj.2022.v97.i1.07. Accessed 28 June 2022. <creds, PhD candidate lols> \ kaylan]

Considering Eastern Mediterranean as a regional subsystem, one can see that it reflects the global arena presenting its mini projection but adding some regional actors. This is explained 67 Mariya Erkan by the interdependence of global and regional fluctuations as mutually influencing components of one whole, that is, the regional subsystem is a part of the global international system. Indeed, the Eastern Mediterranean is part of the Mediterranean region, which is adjacent to Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, which can be considered as separate subsystems, and which also provides the opportunity to enter the World Ocean. Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is opposed to the active actions of the United States and its Western allies in the face of the European Union in the region. Moreover, the last decade has been marked by the increasing activity of both regional (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey) and global actors (China). The discovered reserves of energy resources in recent years are of strategic importance and can affect the distribution of power both in the region and undermine Russia’s position in the international arena. Therefore, controlling its extraction and transportation in the region allows Moscow to keep dominant position in the supply of energy resources to Europe. Another important aspect of Russian interest in the region is security. Before considering these factors, it is worth paying special attention to the structural modifiers that play a role in shaping Russian foreign policy towards Eastern Mediterranean. Russia’s geographic location relative to the Eastern Mediterranean region has predetermined its policy for centuries. The vast territory of Russia has no access to warm seas, which naturally impeded its trade and economic development, as a result of which Russia has historically sought to find a way to the shores of warm seas expanding its defensive territory to the south. The events of the Arab Spring provided an opportunity to strengthen Russian position in the region, which culminated in Russia’s engagement into the Syrian Civil War. Providing significant military and diplomatic support to the Assad regime, Russia got under its control the naval base in Tartus, the strategic port of Latakia and the Khmeimim air base in Syria, which allow Moscow to project its influence and power not only in the Middle East, but also in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Two of these military bases, namely a naval base in Tartus and an air base in Khmeimim ensure Russia’s presence in the region in the extended time frame for 49 years (long-term) starting from 2017 (Legucka, 2020: 2). This region is a “south key” to open the “door” to the World Ocean and project Russian power globally. Thus, the Eastern Mediterranean, which is located at the intersection of the Middle East, Europe and North Africa and provides access to the World Ocean, is an important communications and transmission route, thereby, representing a strategically significant region for Russia in terms of projecting its influence and power. Another structural modifier that affects the way actors interact and behave towards each other is the offense-defense balance in military technologies, which intensifies the security dilemma in the relevant region. Russia got access to naval and air facilities in Syria that has expanded its operational capabilities throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as beyond. Thus, for example, a naval base in Tartus has the potential to accommodate eleven warships. As Russia’s case shows, its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean are largely built on the perception of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union and NATO, and their immediate proximity to the borders of Russia, thereby exacerbating the feeling of a “besieged fortress” (Delanoë, 2014:24). Thus, Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is primarily conditioned by its national security requirements. Nevertheless, the consistent development of the European Union in the process of enlargement has institutionally complicated its foreign policy decision making, which impeded the European Council “to reach a clear consensus on the EU’s policy in Syria, Libya, or Turkey” (Pierini, 2020: 104). Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2020 has created uncertainty and further **distracted** the European Union from the Eastern Mediterranean affairs (Pierini, 2020: 104). Furthermore, there has been a relative weakening of the US role in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, which **led to a power vacuum** (Dalay, 2021: I). This, in its turn, **contributed to the opening of a window of opportunity for other actors**, and, as a consequence, led to Moscow’s decisive actions in this region. As noted by Dario Cristiani, Russia’s approach is “exploiting strategic vacuums,” (Cristiani, 2020: 2) which is recently being traced in its foreign policy. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to claim that Washington is completely leaving the Eastern Mediterranean, reorienting itself to the Asia-Pacific region. As the former US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta noted, the ratio of American naval power between the Pacific and the Atlantic would change by 60/40, in contrast to the previous 50/50 (Perlez, 2012). Despite this shift, the Eastern Mediterranean remains a strategically important region for the United States, allowing it to project its power. This 68 A neoclassical realist perspective on Russian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in the Putin era region is a kind of ‘springboard’ for exerting US influence in a number of directions, mainly in Africa and deep into Eurasia, reaching Central Asia, which is of interest to Washington in the geo-political confrontation with China above all (Nopens, 2013: 3-4). These were external systemic incentives, which influenced Russia to tailor its foreign policy in accordance with the circumstances designed by the international system. Russian foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is also closely linked to its Middle Eastern policy, as its posture in the Eastern Mediterranean is intended to preserve its gains in Syria. Thus, Russia’s policy in the region is dictated by a defensive position and a simultaneous desire to assert itself as a great power within the international system, a power, which is **capable to transform the existing rules of the world order**. However, there is another point of view. Some researchers believe that the main driver for Russia’s activity in the region is not its desire to establish itself as a great power due to the lack of the necessary means for this, but the pragmatic task of ensuring the security of its southern flank in the event of a possible conflict with NATO (Rumer, 2021: 1). As it was mentioned above, the Arab Spring and subsequent events in Libya and Syria provided Russia with opportunities to expand its participation in the region. Representing itself as a great power and being at the same time an external actor in the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia took its place in the complex equilibrium of interests of external and regional actors. It has managed to forge relations with all the key regional powers. The power structure of the Eastern Mediterranean is characterized by the involvement of major powers (China, European Union, Russia and the United States), regional powers with direct access to the Mediterranean (Israel and Turkey), and Middle Eastern regional powers (Iran, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia). In addition, there is a de facto divided Cyprus that is facing off against Turkish pressure. In their dispute over energy resources, Russia also plays an important role, influencing the balance of power. Kremlin seizes every opportunity to exert its influence on any crisis situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, which would make it possible to freeze competitive projects for the extraction of energy resources and their transportation to Europe continuing to keep a dominant position in the supply of energy resources. Indeed, the destabilized situation in the Eastern Mediterranean causes concern in the ranks of the EU and NATO, thereby distracting them directly from Russia itself. For example, Russia has offered its mediation services between Cyprus and Greece with Turkey on the maritime delimitation and division of Eastern Mediterranean energy resources accordingly, which could potentially expand its influence on the southern borders of the EU and NATO taking in consideration their indispensable geopolitical significance for Western allies’ positioning in the region. In addition, by doing so, it would displace Germany, which is the preferred intermediary in this dispute (Madeira, 2020). Another leverage of Russia’s influence on the extraction and supply of energy resources is its striving to participate in regional energy projects. For example, in 2017, a 30% stake in the Egyptian Zohr gas field, which is the largest gas field in the Mediterranean Sea, was acquired by the Russian state-owned company Rosneft (Rosneft Information Division, 2017). Besides that, other Russian companies got energy contracts in Libya and Syria (Legucka, 2020: 2). Russia used its military position in the Eastern Mediterranean to strike at ISIS positions in Syria, thereby demonstrating its power and establishing itself once again as a great power in the transforming international system. The United States acted similarly during the Gulf Wars, striking Iraq with long-range missiles deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, Russia is leaning more towards internal balancing, rearming its forces and emulating the successful security behavior and the military practice of its rival. Vladimir Putin, expressing his sympathy to the foreign policy of Imperial Russia, is guided by Alexander III principle that “Russia has only two allies - its army and its navy.” The Domestic Level: Variables Constraining Foreign Policy The difference between neoclassical realism and earlier versions of realism is its taking into account a number of domestic factors that affect the likelihood and form of the state’s response to certain international systemic imperatives. Type III neoclassical realist theory considers four categories of intervening variables, namely leader images, strategic culture, state-society relations and domestic institutions (Ripsman, 2016: 58-59). It is apparent that the figure of Vladimir Putin in power plays an important role in the activation of Moscow on its southern flank. This is especially true in contrast to the foreign policy course pursued by the previous President of Russia Boris Yeltsin, when Russia withdrew from a number of regions, including 69 Mariya Erkan the Eastern Mediterranean, and focused its attention mainly on the western direction. Russian foreign policy under Vladimir Putin stepped up its efforts to return from abandoned regions and develop new ties and directions. As mentioned earlier, from the very beginning of his tenure in power, he declared the need to strengthen Russia’s military presence in the Mediterranean. His assertive foreign policy in the region serves as a justification of its imperial nature for the Russian society, as well as provides access to profitable agreements, including energy and military sectors, for his close teammates (i.e. Gennady Timchenko and Yevgeny Prigozhin) (Legucka, 2020: 1). As is known, one of the continuities of the Soviet period in the shaping of modern Russian foreign policy is its ‘over-centralization’ and the role of personal ties within the circle of political elites (Chernyshev, 2014: 19). The place of the Eastern Mediterranean in Russian strategic culture is mainly seen as a part of the larger Mediterranean region, which is adjacent to Europe. Therefore, Russian Eastern Mediterranean policy is inextricably linked with Moscow’s foreign policy towards Europe. However, the events taking place in the Middle East over the past decade have given even more weight to the Eastern Mediterranean in the foreign policy of many states, including Russia. Back in 1996, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, the famous Arabist Yevgeny Primakov, noted the importance of this region for Russia as providing direct access to the strategically important region of the Middle East (Delanoë, 2014: 28). At that time, the degree of significance was determined by the instability of the southern borders of Russia itself. Today, the threat comes directly from the Middle East region and threatens to revive the separatist and extremist sentiments of the so-called “soft underbelly” of Russia. This term was used by Primakov to designate Russian southern flank (Kreutz, 2007: 11). What is more, the so-called concept of the “Greater Mediterranean” in Russia’s strategy towards the region, reflected in the Memorandum on Russian Policy in the Mediterranean of 1995 (Memorandum o politike Rossii v Sredizemnomor’ye , 1995), implies partnership relations between the countries of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which shows its strategic importance as one of the parts (subsystem) of a single whole (international system). As for the perception of the need for Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is due to the fact that Russian elites, like Russian society as a whole, perceive the idea of Russia’s greatness and do not agree only on defining its role as a regional power (Lukyanov, 2016: 34). Thus, Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean **meets its national interests in ensuring economic interests**, primarily in the energy sector, and **security**. The weak economic and political situation is certainly a limiting factor. The budget allocated for the military maintenance of Russian troops and foreign military bases could be distributed to solve domestic socio- economic problems, and this causes discontent in society. However, the perception of systemic incentives through the prism of the leader, as well as the established strategic culture, make their own adjustments to Moscow’s foreign policy decisions. Conclusion **Russian foreign policy** in the Eastern Mediterranean **has become assertive** in the Putin era. This is due to Russia’s geopolitical, economic and military interests both in the region itself and in other regions adjacent to it. A number of systemic factors, such as American declining role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, regional rivalries, disputes over maritime delimitation and energy resources, inconsistent Western policy, and the outbreak of military conflicts open up opportunities for Russia to strengthen its position in the region and exercise its influence. Together with systemic factors (independent variable), domestic factors (intervening variables) such as leader image and strategic culture play an important role in how the Kremlin processes and responds to systemic pressures. For more than two decades, Vladimir Putin has been consistently expanding the scope of cooperation with remote regions and deepening it in various areas, from trade and economic to military issues. Moscow perceives the Eastern Mediterranean as its southern flank and strategically important region located at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and providing access to the open ocean. Russia’s strategy in the region is aimed at ensuring security and preventing the spread of influence of other actors in the international system. It maintains the balance of power in the region

**Heg good**

**US hegemony actually benefits smaller states**

Zachary **Selden**, **ND** (Reviewing *America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation* by Carla Norrlof, UChicago Press Journals, accessed 6/28/2022, [https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1017/S0022381611000211#](https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1017/S0022381611000211)) //lrap

\*\* this would be a good book to read if you foresee having to go for this argument! unfortunately i did not have the time so maybe later lol

In America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation, Carla Norrlof argues that the American hegemony is likely to endure because of the United States’ dominance in three areas: currency, trade and security. It is a highly relevant work given the current degree of speculation about the decline of the United States and the rise of China. Norrlof, however, explicitly avoids any normative implications regarding American hegemony and focuses on how those three factors interact to produce an enduring hegemonic position for the United States as well as disproportionate gains relative to the gains to smaller states. In this regard, the author challenges one of the basic propositions of hegemonic stability theory.  
Norrlof bases her theory on **the interlocking aspects** of the dollar’s primacy, the commercial power of the United States and its military predominance. The dollar’s status as the key currency grants the United States material gains as well as policy flexibility. At the same time, its massive commercial role helps to insulate it from the effects of long-term trade deficits and pushes the costs of adjustment across the international financial system. American military predominance cements those gains by protecting American commercial interests, protecting a widespread range of allies with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, and acting as a guarantor of the United States’ role as a safe haven for investment.  
Norrlof’s argument in some ways boils down to one of size; the United States’ economy is so large that its deficits help rather than hinder the maintenance of its hegemonic status. Smaller states need the hegemon to absorb goods and capital and the negative effects of large deficits that would affect smaller states do not apply to same degree to the hegemon. American hegemony is thus neither altruistic nor exploitative; **it benefits smaller states but also generates disproportionately large benefits for the United States**. With this point, Norrlof takes on one of the basic propositions of hegemonic stability theory which is that the hegemon provides public goods at a cost to itself that smaller states enjoy as free riders. Norrlof makes a convincing case that in fact the hegemon can derive disproportionate gains by threatening to exclude some states by offering “club” goods rather than public goods.  
It is natural that some speculation about how American hegemony could end would be a part of a work of this nature. Norrlof’s argues that American hegemony is relatively stable because another state or group of states would have to be willing and able to challenge the existing order, which means forgoing the security and economic benefits they currently enjoy. She identifies two possible challengers: East Asia and the European Union. Norrlof devotes a fair amount of consideration to the possibility of the Euro becoming a replacement for the dollar, but this seems already somewhat dated given the Greek debt crisis and its effects on the common currency. Although talk of the Euro’s demise is probably greatly overstated, there is certainly little chance that it will become a replacement for the dollar in the foreseeable future. This book was obviously in press before Athens’ fiscal situation became clear so this is not a criticism of the work, but it is worth noting that Norrlof’s main candidate for a challenger to American financial hegemony appears to have taken a significant step backwards. This only strengthens the author’s basic conclusion regarding the endurance of American hegemony.  
One area that could use additional consideration in a work of this nature is the potential for the sudden collapse of American hegemony. The U.S. Treasury’s gross borrowing has been running as high as $1.9 trillion a year to finance a $1.5 trillion federal deficit. It is difficult to imagine that the federal government can continue to borrow more than 40% of its annual budget into the indefinite future without significant consequences. If U.S. debt levels combined with a lack of growth and rapidly rising entitlement spending leads to a collapse in investor confidence, there could be a sudden and dramatic fall in the value of the dollar and, in turn, the ability of the United States to act as the dominant importer. This would inevitably lead to a dramatic scaling back of American defense commitments and the subsequent decline of the ability of the United States to act as the guarantor of the security of allies or as the safe haven for investment. In other words, it may not take a challenger to American hegemony to bring it to an end; the United States may do so on its own.  
Overall, however, this is a notable work that builds a strong case that American hegemony is likely to endure for the foreseeable future. The tone is refreshingly dispassionate and, for a relatively short work, it marshals an impressive amount of empirical evidence to support the author’s contentions. It is likely to fuel debates both on a practical and theoretical level as to the nature of hegemony in the current international environment.

**NATO is flexible, meaning that it can easily be adapted and changed to fit the current purposes**

Mike **Sweeney**, January 6, **2020** (“What Is NATO Good For?”, The Strategy Bridge, accessed 6/28/2022, <https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/6/what-is-nato-good-for>) //lrap

What is NATO good for? This is a question that gets asked a lot these days, and there is an increasing tendency among many to mimic 1960s rocker Edwin Starr and shout, “Nothing!” Indeed, the run-up to the alliance’s 70th anniversary was accompanied by an outpouring of doubts about NATO’s future and usefulness. At War on the Rocks, the alliance was said to be both endangering American lives and overflowing with strategic liabilities as a result of expansion.[1] The Wall Street Journal asserted that the alliance was effectively deceased.[2] Writing in The National Review, Douglas MacGregor found “dead” insufficient, instead declaring NATO to be a zombie, while Gil Barndollar merely called for the alliance to retire at 70.[3] MIT’s Barry Posen beat everyone to the punch with his OpEd in The New York Times in March calling for a major reassessment of America’s role in the alliance.[4]  
Of course, NATO’s obituary has been written many times before. In the opening to Why NATO Endures, quietly one of the best books on the alliance, Wallace J. Thies wryly notes that Henry Kissinger owns the unique distinction of having declared the alliance to be in serious peril in each of the first six decades of NATO’s existence.[5] For the time being, better policies on how NATO is used should be the focus, rather than scrapping it altogether or withdrawing U.S. support. Key to this will be working to enhance strategic stability between the alliance and Russia.   
DE-MYSTIFYING THE PAST  
To some extent, NATO is a victim of its own myth-making. Support for the alliance is often couched in somber testaments to the wisdom of the founders and odes to the selfless nobility of collective defense. The reality is quite different.  
Interestingly, the main strategic rationale for NATO that emerges in the pages of Thies’ book is as a complement to the Marshall Plan: just as funds from that initiative would allow the Europeans to rebuild their economies, NATO would remove the burden from the European allies of having to devote scarce money to their militaries. It would also provide psychological reinforcement to nations still traumatized by the Second World War, living in Stalin’s long shadow. Once the West European economies had stabilized and rebounded, they could—in theory—take on a greater share of their defense and the United States could recede.[6]   
Thus, in the late 1940s, many U.S. officials didn’t expect to base American troops in Europe indefinitely.[7] Nor did they necessarily expect them to have to fight. While the Soviets might attempt mischief within their own sphere of influence—as seen in the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia and the blockade of West Berlin—their ability and willingness to go beyond that was considered limited by key thinkers such as George Kennan, who believed the Soviet military and people too spent from the Second World War to threaten Western Europe.[8] Moreover, Stalin was seen as distinct from Hitler in terms of his willingness to pursue risk. While the Soviet leader might try to capitalize on existing chaos and weakness, he wasn’t disposed to the outright aggression that characterized the Nazi regime.[9]   
But in a prescient prelude to the defensibility issues surrounding the admission of the Baltic states, not a great deal of thought was given to how Western Europe would actually be defended when the alliance was formed—at least in terms of conventional forces. Of course, in April 1949, America still had a nuclear monopoly.  
The Soviet detonation of its own atomic device in August 1949 changed the U.S. calculus somewhat, but it was events around the world a year later that truly focused America’s mind on what it had signed up for in NATO. The conventional defeats suffered by the U.S. military in the opening stage of the Korean War ,  as much as any development, led to a realistic discussion of what collective defense would really look like in Europe—almost eighteen months after the alliance’s inception.[10] It was only then that planners on both sides of the Atlantic began to take seriously the practical questions of defensibility and to set up integrated military structures—such as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE—to coordinate those efforts.[11] Subsequently, NATO’s role as an institution and U.S. force deployments in Europe would both take on permanence.   
The ad hoc nature of this process is the point worth underscoring. NATO was not formed by strategic gods implementing their divine wisdom; it was the result of hardworking government officials and political leaders doing their best to deal with the security challenges of the day using the means at their disposal. That is all the alliance has ever been, and we exalt its past at the risk of its future.  
NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT, NOT A THEOLOGY   
Understanding that NATO outlasted its original purpose—to allow the Europeans to focus on rebuilding their economies in tandem with the Marshall Plan—well before the end of the Cold War illustrates that **the alliance has always been an adaptable instrument**. It is true that some twentieth-century luminaries such as Kennan and Dwight Eisenhower didn’t foresee NATO evolving into a permanent fixture in European security at its inception.[12] But should that have stopped the alliance from becoming an effective military bulwark against the Soviets as the Cold War developed and demands on the alliance evolved?   
Just as it adapted and changed throughout its early history, NATO’s purpose now can be whatever is required. This doesn’t mean that NATO should do everything—or be everywhere. The past thirty years have shown that there are some things the alliance does better than others and also that there are questionable benefits to unending expansion of its membership. President George W. Bush’s support for Georgian and Ukrainian membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit is the most prominent example of this and likely contributed to both the August War in Georgia and Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.[13]  
But here, too, perspective is needed. Because the alliance should consider ending expansion doesn’t mean previous rounds were inherently mistakes. Enlargement permanently settled the Polish Question—which provided grist for a century and a half of European wars—and also has on balance contributed to stability between Russia and the Baltic states. Likewise, being realistic about the failure of the Libya intervention doesn’t mean the 1995 operation to stop ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was also a mistake. The 1999 Kosovo intervention probably falls somewhere in the middle.[14]   
NATO frankly does its best work when no one hears about it. Its strength lies in the day-to-day military cooperation it fosters and the general sense of deterrence and stability it promotes. These contributions are neither as dramatic as facing off against the Red Army at the height of the Cold War, nor as controversial as the Libyan intervention, but they would be glaring in their absence.   
Why arbitrarily remove the structure that provides that stability—both with Russia and also among NATO’s many disparate members? Withdrawing NATO protection from the Baltic states or the smaller Balkan members, for example, will not preclude the possibility of their becoming involved in a war with Russia or Serbia; just the opposite, it could make it more likely. Once such a conflict begins, is it certain the United States will not be entangled or affected even if it is no longer actively participating in NATO?   
Again, it is worth reiterating that NATO is an instrument. Many of the alliance’s opponents may actually be opposed to the way the United States and its partners have employed force since the end of the Cold War—especially in the case of operations falling under the rubric of regime change. The argument, implicit in Posen’s OpEd, for example, is that NATO needs to be taken away from reckless U.S. policymakers to prevent them from future adventures.   
This argument is backwards. Yes, the consequences of three decades of continuous military operations should be examined. But increasing national restraint and making better strategic decisions seems like a smarter path than summarily scrapping an effective, tested tool that could play an essential role in a wiser foreign policy.  
STABILIZING THE PRESENT  
NATO’s advocates are also prone to hyperbole, but one word that is not an overstatement is irreplaceable. It would be difficult—if not impossible—to recreate NATO or something like it from scratch. Still, even irreplaceable doesn’t imply permanence if the alliance’s value cannot readily be established and sold to the populations of its constituent members, especially Americans.   
…SHARED HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OR EVEN SIMPLE NOSTALGIA WILL NOT BE ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE ALLIANCE THROUGH THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY.  
Demography is not on the alliance’s side. Should NATO survive to celebrate its centennial, the generation being born at that time will be as far removed from the end of the Second World War as someone born in 1969 was from the conclusion of the American Civil War. Even the September 11th attacks—and NATO’s ensuing invocation of Article 5—will be a half century in the past. In short, shared historical experience or even simple nostalgia will not be enough to sustain the alliance through the twenty-first century. NATO needs to show that it is not just relevant, but crucial to continued security in Europe and, to be blunt, the broader interests of its essential member, the United States.  
The most effective way of doing that is reinforcing the image of NATO as a vehicle for stability, something which has been recently diminished. There are legitimate arguments to be made that NATO now endangers American security by having antagonized Russia through enlargement and increased the likelihood of confrontation, possibly a nuclear one, rather than decreasing it.[15] That relations between America and Russia—and overall stability in Eastern Europe—might be far worse without the alliance is also true, but is a difficult sell in trying to promote the alliance’s relevance. NATO needs to be an active participant in visibly promoting stability, beyond the important day-to-day but low-key role it plays in this regard.   
Some potential steps are obvious, the most high profile of which would be a public declaration on closing the alliance to further expansion after the current candidacy of North Macedonia is vetted. To be clear, such a move need not be taken in a vacuum. In general, NATO must engage with Russia and some sort of quid pro quo shouldn’t be ruled out on ending further expansion of the alliance. Cessation of Moscow’s support for separatist activities in Transnistria and the Donbass certainly should be on the table as should guarantees from Russia that Belarus and Ukraine would be free to pursue their own independent relationships with the West, perhaps to someday include the possibility of membership in the European Union if either state wants it.[16]   
Even the taboo question of recognizing Russian annexation of Crimea shouldn’t be off limits, though again strong concessions and actions by Russia to promote security in Central and Eastern Europe must be exacted in return. There exists a real danger that, in time, the annexation of Crimea will more-or-less be accepted by the international community, producing a de facto recognition of Russian adventurism. Would it not be better to address the question head-on and elicit a price from Moscow—ideally one that benefits overall regional stability?   
All of this might well be too much to ask. But by pursuing negotiations along these lines, it would at least have the effect of engaging Russia in a strategic dialogue—one that could eventually yield results while also serving as an outlet for regional stress before it metastasizes into genuine crises. Such a dialogue would also publicly bolster the image of NATO as a force working to diffuse tension—both in Central and Eastern Europe and between Russia and the United States more broadly—rather than being an aggravating factor in those relationships.   
A more workmanlike complement to this higher-level discussion could be to resuscitate serious arms control discussions between Russia and NATO. Unfortunately, the most obvious candidate for attention—the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty—is probably a non-starter at this point and also an issue that has extended out of NATO’s purview given American concerns over Chinese intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Pacific. But discussion on conventional force deployments is something that the alliance could lead on, perhaps mimicking the useful negotiations that took place in the late 1980s, ultimately resulting in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.[17] NATO could either attempt such talks directly or channel them through a third-party organization, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). While new efforts to improve transparency and, possibly, impose limits on force deployments need not be an exact replica of the CFE process, or even lead to a formal treaty, they could be a further step both in burnishing the alliance’s public role as a stabilizing entity and yet another means of engaging Russia in a dialogue that, in itself, could contribute to a reduction in tensions.  
A first step to consider in this regard, might be talks between NATO and Russia on reducing—or even halting—major exercises in close proximity to one another’s territory. As one informed observer has noted, military exercises are an important part of “the larger geopolitical discourse.”[18] Effectively, the conduct of exercises—and their timing and locale—is a language unto itself. A negotiated moratorium on large-scale maneuvers, like NATO’s Saber Strike and Russia’s Zapad exercises, could be one way for NATO and Russia to say hello to one another again.   
SEEING RUSSIA CLEARLY  
In all of these efforts, it is important for NATO to see Russia as it is and not as it was. To be clear, there is no question that Russia meddles in the affairs of its neighbors; its annexation of Crimea and support to the Donbass insurgency speak plainly to this. But Russia, like any power, is bound by the limits of its capabilities and they are not infinite.   
Russian economic resources are, at best, those of a middle power. In 2018, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranked eleventh after the likes of Canada; price-adjusted GDP is slightly more impressive at sixth overall globally, but still leaves Russia trailing Germany, India, Japan, the United States, and China.[19] Russia has chosen to expend these limited resources on an at least half a dozen neo-imperial projects in Abkhazia, Chechnya, Crimea, the Donbass, Transnistria, and South Ossetia. There is also Russia’s open-ended military commitment in Syria. Each of these adventures costs money, limiting Moscow’s ability to placate its population through social programs. That Vladimir Putin’s popularity took perhaps its worst hit after he was forced to raise the retirement age speaks to the long-term risks inherent in supporting what are essentially six mini-client states.[20]   
Militarily, Russia has steadily rebuilt itself since the nadir of the early 1990s. In particular, Russia took pains to learn from its shaky performance during the 2008 war with Georgia and implement needed reforms.[21] That said, Russia of today is nowhere near the menace that the Red Army once was believed to be. And while it would be wrong to say that funds aren’t available for Russian military modernization, planned investments reflect modest improvements rather than transformative capabilities.[22]  
NATO’s strategic depth has also radically changed since the Cold War, through both the inclusion of Poland and the territory of East Germany. Russian forces must now also traverse either Belarus or Ukraine before even touching the edge of NATO’s main territory. There is, obviously, the important exception of the Baltic states which will be examined later. For all the understandable concern over Russian aggression in the wake of the Crimean annexation, it is essential to remember that the overall military situation and balance of forces has improved remarkably for NATO in the past thirty years.  
Russia’s overall conventional threat to NATO is thus extremely limited. Would Russia have the wherewithal to occupy Belarus and Ukraine and then still successfully invade Poland, let alone to enter German territory? It seems extremely unlikely. Forcibly placating Belarus and/or Ukraine alone might stretch Russian capabilities to their limits and there still is the question of economically supporting a prolonged occupation of those territories.   
…WHEN DEALING WITH RUSSIA, NATO CAN AFFORD TO BE BOTH PATIENT AND PERHAPS EVEN GENEROUS…  
In sum, when dealing with Russia, NATO can afford to be both patient and perhaps even generous; after all, the alliance won the Cold War and maintains a much stronger strategic position in its aftermath. This doesn’t mean that Russia still can’t be dangerous, but its diminished capabilities limit the damage it can do conventionally. Russia can and does intimidate its immediate neighbors and—especially in the case of Ukraine—actively undermines their security. But if NATO wants this to stop and is unwilling to use military force to end the incursions in Crimea and the Donbass, the only alternative is some kind of negotiated settlement. That means NATO has to talk to Russia—despite its bad behavior—just as it once spoke to the Soviets, in spite of their own serious transgressions.   
MUST NATO NUKE?  
There are, of course, two obvious caveats to the preceding discussion about Russia’s capacity to inflict damage on NATO. The first is that Russia does pose a very real threat to the territory of the Baltic states, inarguably the portion of alliance territory most susceptible to conventional attack. Second, Russia retains the ability to devastate all NATO territory, in both Europe and North America, through its strategic forces. The intersection of these two issues—Baltic vulnerability and the potency of the Russian nuclear arsenal—remains at the heart of many arguments by NATO detractors in America: that the alliance could entangle the United States in an unnecessary war in northeast Europe, one that would likely escalate to a suicidal strategic exchange.  
Two corrections are needed to this argument. The first is that Russian dominance in a war for the Baltics is not absolutely assured. To a large degree this has become the popularly accepted view following RAND’s 2016 wargame series that established Russia could overrun the Baltic states in as little as 60 hours.[23] This does not discount these exercises wholesale; no doubt, they were an important contribution to the debate on the viability of NATO’s security guarantee to the Baltics and helped to focus thinking on defensibility in northeast Europe. But it was a single set of exercises conducted by one organization and one set of analysts, respected though they might be. Would it not be useful to replicate conflict scenarios with other planners and analysts who might bring a different set of assumptions to the gaming table?   
Perhaps the results would be exactly the same, but it is worth asking if Russia’s ability to seize the Baltics is being overestimated—or at least the speed with which they would do so—and the price Russia might pay to achieve its objectives. There are a host of variables that come into play including the actions of other regional actors—such as Belarus—that are often taken for granted.[24] The scope of such games should also be extended to the essential question of what it would cost Russia to operate a prolonged occupation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, both militarily and economically. Additional assessments and a broader lens to examine the second- and third-order consequences of Russian actions might yield a different perspective on how easy it would be for Russia to take the Baltic states.  
The second, and perhaps even more important, correction that needs to be made is challenging the assumption that NATO must resort to nuclear use if it is unable to win conventionally. This is simply unrealistic in the current setting and it is essentially a mental hangover from Cold War-era policies. Nuclear escalation after conventional loss was a by-product of the perceived conventional weakness of NATO during the Cold War vis-à-vis Warsaw Pact forces. It should not somehow, three decades after the conflict’s end, be seen as the current de facto response.   
Yes, it would be difficult and painful to alliance cohesion and reliability—to say nothing of the Baltic states themselves—if Russia won a conventional conflict in northeast Europe. But the idea that preventing that eventuality must lead NATO to use nuclear weapons is discordant, at best, with the current strategic environment. Moving away from any discussion of a nuclear response in a Baltic conflict would be an essential step toward reducing the criticism that NATO endangers American security more than helping it.   
Moreover, removing the possibility of a nuclear response in a Baltic contingency would not inherently mean that the alliance was surrendering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; there remain viable strategies for deterring Russia with conventional forces, as seen in the success of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups.[25] Even if Baltic territory were lost in a war with Russia tactical nuclear forces are unlikely to save it—not least because they would possibly be employed on said territory. Win or lose, nuclear forces should thus have no role in NATO’s response to aggression against the Baltics and the alliance needs to consider declaring that policy publicly.   
Taking this argument a step further, would it boost regional security—to say nothing of NATO’s image as a force for stability—if the alliance finally relinquished its remaining tactical nuclear weapons? A definitive answer is beyond the scope of this paper, but it demands more attention than it has received.[26] What is the scenario where tactical nuclear weapons are somehow deployed to stem a conventional attack without leading to dangerous escalation? How, for example, could they be used in a Baltic conflict without sparking a strategic exchange with Russia and/or decimating large portions of the territory NATO is supposed to be defending? And if there is no reasonable applicability for these weapons in a Baltic conflict, why keep them at all?  
There has been an understandable and necessary debate over the question of what was and was not promised to Soviet and then-Russian leaders regarding NATO enlargement at the end of the Cold War.[27] This is an important subject that needs to be examined, but the discussion over what happened and its subsequent impact on relations between Russia and the West have, to a degree, obscured another equally prominent move at the end of the Cold War. In September 1991, President George H.W. Bush announced the United States would unilaterally withdraw from the field all of its tactical nuclear weapons, except for a small force of B61 gravity bombs left in NATO Europe.[28] Bringing those weapons home now— along with a public declaration on a cessation of further expansion of the alliance’s membership—would do much to reset NATO’s image as a force for stability. It would undercut many of the arguments that the alliance is ultimately a liability for broader American security interests.   
To reiterate, NATO is an instrument, one that has shown it can be adapted to different tasks and goals as the strategic setting changes. Those adaptations have not always been swift or graceful, yet the alliance’s endurance speaks to the fact that it eventually does meet its members’ needs. If NATO can reassert itself in the current environment as **an engine of stability** and not just a provider of military security it has a much stronger chance of persevering, even as its origins in the aftermath of World War II and the early years of the Cold War recede further into history

**Securitization Good**

**Turn—the alt leads to war—only the affs securitized structures to address revisionism solves.**

**Goddard 22** [Goddard, Stacie. “How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia.” Heinonline.org, May 2022, heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora101&div=56&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals. Accessed 27 June 2022. Stacie E. Goddard is an American political scientist. She is the Mildred Lane Kemper Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Goddard is known for her research on international order, grand strategy, and global power politics \ kaylan]

The Outsiders How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia Stacie Goddard In late February, as Russian forces moved into Ukraine, Vladimir Putin declared that his offensive was aimed not just at bringing Russia's neighbor to heel but also at repudiating the U.S.-led liberal international order. "Where the West comes to establish its own order," the Russian president railed, "the result is bloody, unhealed wounds, ulcers of international terrorism and extremism." Moscow would now seek to roll back the expanding order as "a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a people." Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine is only the most recent act in a years-long effort to overturn the existing status quo, one that has featured cyber- attacks, assassinations, a war against Georgia, meddling in U.S. elections, military involvement in Syria, and the annexation of Crimea. As Putin's troops neared Kyiv, many observers kept an eye on China, the other authoritarian power busy rejecting the U.S.-led order. Over the last decade, Beijing has contested territorial norms in the South China Sea and built new international economic institutions. 28 FOREIGN AFFAIRS as the Asian Infrastructure Invest- ment Bank, to compete with Western- dominated ones, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Beijing and Moscow seem to have joined forces in their effort to undermine the order. Just weeks before Russia's invasion, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin promised to place "no limits" on the two countries' cooperation as they seek to redefine norms of democracy, push back against universal definitions of human rights, and secure their "core interests." It was not supposed to be like this. After the Cold War, the United States relied on a strategy of luring into the order would-be revisionist powers-that is, countries that have both the means and the motivation to challenge the status quo. U.S. leaders argued that by cooperating with China and Russia and incorporating them into international institutions, they could curb those countries' ambitions and perhaps even push them onto a path of progressive liberalization. Both countries joined economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization; security institu- tions, such as the nuclear nonprolifera- tion regime; and even human rights treaties, such as the International Cov- enant on Civil and Political Rights. As U.S. President Bill Clinton's 2000 National Security Strategy argued, although the United States must be "mindful of threats to peace," it should seize "on the desire of both countries to participate in the global economy and global institutions, insisting that both accept the obligations as well as the benefits of integration." What went wrong? Some blame poor U.S. leadership. After four years of the Trump administration, the argument Stacie Goddard runs, liberal institutions were left rudderless, providing an opening for revisionist powers. The Biden adminis- tration's chaotic withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan confirmed that the United States was weakened and in retreat. Others, by contrast, contend that the strategy was futile from the start. According to this view, it was hopelessly optimistic to expect that China and Russia would embrace liberal values and accept the idea that the United States should maintain its position at the top of the international order. Both of these views are problematic. There is very little Washington could have done to stave off challenges to the liberal order. Historically, integration into international institutions has not restrained countries hoping to challenge the status quo. To the contrary, it has enhanced their ability to mobilize allies, secure leverage over their trading partners, and gain legitimacy for their normative visions. It is not simply that international institutions were unlikely to check China's and Russia's revision- ism; their membership in fact assisted their efforts to transform world politics. On the other hand, it is a mistake to dismiss institutional integration as a complete failure. If judged by the high ambitions set by U.S. **policymakers**, who thought that incorporating expansionist powers into international institutions would temper their ambitions, then it **has not** lived up to its promise. But judged by a more reasonable standard, it has succeeded: although institutional integration can't prevent revisionism, it can shape the strategies revisionists use. Although Russia's invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that **countries bent on expansionism will charge ahead regard- less,** on the whole, **international institu- tions can channel this aggression** **so** that **it doesn't devolve into bloodshed.** Rather than giving up on institutions, then, Western policymakers should adopt a **realistic approach** to them. While they may not lead to completely harmonious relations, they can be **a potent tool for preventing war**. A strategy of institutional realpolitik would also recognize that for all their coordination, China and Russia are very different types of revisionists. China's assaults have been less violent but in many ways more consequential; where Moscow has relied on strategies of disruption and violence, Beijing has preferred to exert influence through growing networks and its position within international institutions. That is why the one-size-fits-all strategy of the past fell short-and why a new approach is called for. To that end, the United States needs to see international institutions not as a way to transform the funda- mental nature of its rivals **but as places that can become better forums for communicating preferences**, resolving disputes, and **establishing clear redlines**. That, not lofty plans to change China and Russia or a wholesale abandonment of institutions, should help keep the revisionists in check.

**Future and past wars are not a reflection of securitization, yet a demonstration of how the affs systems prevented bloodshed and structured coordination**

**Goddard 22** [Goddard, Stacie. “How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia.” Heinonline.org, May 2022, heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora101&div=56&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals. Accessed 27 June 2022. Stacie E. Goddard is an American political scientist. She is the Mildred Lane Kemper Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Goddard is known for her research on international order, grand strategy, and global power politics \ kaylan]

By the mid-1990s, China had emerged as one of the world's fastest-growing economies. In a 1999 speech, Clinton outlined the challenge of a rising China for American foreign policy, noting that "if it chooses to do so, China could .. . pour much more of its wealth into military might and into traditional great-power geopolitics." In contrast to China, post-Soviet Russia was a declining power, so there was little concern that the country would emerge as a global competitor to the United States. Still, Russia had the potential to become a serious revisionist. Many feared the rise of a Russian nationalist right, one that would reestablish authori- tarian government at home and attempt to reassert Russian imperial dominance over the former Soviet states. U.S. officials turned to multilateral institutions to deal with these incipient threats. These policymakers believed that membership in liberal institutions would make China and Russia more liberal themselves and thus less inclined to buck the existing international order. Clinton's top goal was to help Russia become a consolidated democracy, one firmly embedded in Western institu- tions. As for China, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright explained the United States' position in 1997: "It is our hope that the trend toward greater economic and social integration of China will have a liberalizing effect on political and human rights practices"-although she also acknowledged that "given the nature of China's government, that progress will be gradual, at best, and is by no means inevitable." Although recent critics of institu- tional integration have focused on the failure of international institutions to liberalize China and Russia, this wasn't the only-or even the primary-way integration was supposed to prevent revisionism. Even if the two countries remained illiberal at home, admitting them into existing institutions was supposed to encourage good behavior abroad. Free trade and foreign direct investment would make them rich. Participation in international institutions would grant them status and prestige. And if such carrots were not enough to make China and Russia play by the rules, institutional membership would also pro- vide the United States and its allies with sticks they could use to increase the costs of revisionism. The more Beijing and Moscow came to depend on interna- tional institutions for their wealth, power, and influence, the easier it would be to punish them if they decided to break the rules. Integrating them into global financial markets, for example, would not only help unlock economic growth; it could also make the two countries more vulnerable to sanctions. Finally, institutions were supposed to bind China and Russia more closely to the status quo. When countries join international institutions, their wealth and power become tied to these organi- zations in ways that are hard to change down the road. This was the logic behind incorporating Germany into Western May/June 2022 31 Stacie Goddard security institutions, such as NATO, after World War II. And it was the premise of France's decision to rope Germany into the French economy through the Euro- pean Coal and Steel Community: in doing so, France ensured that it would retain a voice in German affairs and that any attempt by Germany to increase its power would be channeled through institutional pathways. THE RETURN OF REVISIONISM At first, **integration seemed to work.** The speed and extent of China's entry into international institutions, especially economic ones, during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations were nothing short of astonishing. Throughout the Chinese leader Mao Zedong's rule, the country remained isolated from international institutions, even after joining the UN, where it had inherited Taiwan's seat in 1971. After its opening in 1979, China was still slow to join interna- tional organizations. But by 2000, it had become a member of over 50 of them. It signed both the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In 2001, China entered the wTO with the Clinton administra- tion's enthusiastic support, and despite vocal protest from American protection- ists on both the left and the right. Russia faced a rockier road to integra- tion. Urged on by U.S. economists, Russian President Boris Yeltsin launched a 13-month plan of "shock therapy," designed to rapidly privatize the Russian economy. Instead of economic growth, Russia's economy saw its GDP fall by almost half, and poverty increased from two percent to 40 percent of the popula- tion. Former Soviet elites took advantage of their position to monopolize owner- ship over newly privatized petroleum and gas resources. Talks of bringing Russia into the European security order stalled in 1994, when the United States abandoned its plans for the so-called Partnership for Peace, which would have brought eastern European states and Russia into a security umbrella frame- work, and chose instead to expand the NATO alliance into eastern Europe. By the end of the decade, however, Russia seemed to be turning a corner. The country's new president, Vladimir Putin, was no democrat, but he appeared to be introducing legal and economic reforms that could liberalize the country in the long run. To support economic privatization, the United States per- suaded the G-7 countries to pledge $28 billion of collective aid for Russia. In 1998, Russia joined the newly created G-8. In 2012, Russia's accession to the wTO concluded after 18 years of negotia- tions. The 9/11 attacks brought the United States and Russia closer, and the two cooperated on counterterrorism and arms control initiatives. At first, the optimism of those who favored institutional integration seemed warranted. At the turn of the millen- nium, both China and Russia appeared eager to act as "responsible stakeholders," as Robert Zoellick put it in 2005, when he served as U.S. deputy secretary of state. Soon, however, concerning signs emerged. By 2009, some political scien- tists began pointing to China's "artificial- island-building spree" and saber rattling in the South China Sea as harbingers of territorial expansion. In 2013, China launched both the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a massive program investing in infrastructure projects in the 32 developing world. China's leaders claimed that these initiatives comple- mented existing institutions and filled gaps in the current economic order. Many in Washington, however, sus- pected that China was seeking to con- struct an alternative economic order devoid of liberal values. Meanwhile, in 2008, Russia launched its first violent attempt to redraw the borders of the post-Cold War world when its troops invaded two breakaway territories in Georgia. It went further in 2014, invading eastern Ukraine and annexing the Crimean Peninsula. In. 2015, against vocal Western opposition, the Russian military intervened in the Syrian civil war to buttress President Bashar al-Assad's fragile regime, provid- ing critical-and often indiscriminate- air support for Syrian government forces, which with this assistance began to retake contested territory. At the time, advocates of institutional integration dismissed these revisionist moves as insignificant and unsustainable. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry, for example, insisted in these pages in 2014 that despite these transgressions, "Russia and, especially, China are deeply integrated into the world economy and its governing institutions." At most they were "spoilers," he concluded: "They do not have the interests-let alone the ideas, capacities, or allies-to lead them to upend existing global rules and institutions." Policymakers in Washing- ton echoed these confident assessments. In a 2014 speech at West Point, President Barack Obama recognized that "Russia's aggression toward former Soviet states unnerves capitals in Europe, while China's economic rise and military reach worries its neighbors." But he expressed optimism that international institutions would continue to "reduce the need for unilateral American action and increase restraint among other nations." In hindsight, it is easy to see that this confidence was misplaced. A **better understanding of the intersection of international institutions and great- power revisionism might have tempered such expectations.** Historically, the **constraining** **effects** **of** **international** **institutions** **on** **revisionism** have been **inconsistent** at best. Even when revi- sionist states were brought into the institutional order, they were **still able to pursue their** **aims**. When Prussia launched a war in 1864 that would set the stage for German unification, it was considered a core member of the Concert of Europe, the order estab- lished after the Napoleonic Wars to help keep the peace. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, it was a member in good standing of the League of Nations and the so-called Washing- ton system, which maintained limits on great-power shipbuilding. Both Nazi Germany and fascist Italy were mem- bers of the League of Nations when they began their efforts to conquer Europe. In short, history gave the lie to the theory that institutional integration alone could restrain revisionism. NOT ALL REVISIONISTS Given the mixed record of institutional integration, it is **tempting** **to** **dismiss** **Washington's** **embrace** of this approach as not only futile but also naive. Indeed, this is precisely what the harshest critics of U.S. grand strategy are saying. Bringing China into international institutions, the political scientist John Mearsheimer wrote in these pages in 34 Io REIGN AFFAIRS The Outsiders 2021, "may have been the worst strategic blunder any country has made in recent history: there is no comparable example of a great power actively fostering the rise of a peer competitor." But **such criticism overlooks the fact that international institutions change how revisionists choose to disrupt the international** **order**. Institutions may not have eliminated revisionist ambitions, but they have shaped the way China and Russia have pursued their aims. Even with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its past military action in Crimea and Chechnya, the country has embraced force **much less** than similar states in history; current events are so shocking in part because they have become so rare, a testament at least to some extent to the effects of integration. Witness how, in the past, a common way to change the status quo was to mount an aggressive attack. Napoleon's France conquered wide swaths of Europe as it sought to obliterate the last vestiges of the eighteenth-century dynastic order. When imperial Japanese leaders decided to break clean of the League of Nations and the Washington system, they relied on brute force to expand their influence and wrest economic resources, first in China and then in Southeast Asia. Ultimately, both France's and Japan's revisionist campaigns brought nothing but disaster for their leaders. With this historical antecedent, it is easy to see why institutionalists of the 1990s be- lieved revisionism was unlikely. Regard- less of their ambitions, countries will often decide to content themselves with the existing international order. The costs of major-power wars were stagger- ing in previous centuries; they would be catastrophic in the present day. But revisionists do not always need to use force to upend the status quo. In fact, the most transformative revisionists engage in rules-based revolutions. These revisionists start out looking like reform- ers, working within existing institutions to achieve their aims. Over time, how- ever, their "salami slicing" of existing rules and norms can **create significant weaknesses** in international institutions that undermine the broader institutional order. When Russia sought to expand its influence in the Ottoman Empire after the Greek Revolution of 1821, it used the forums established by the Concert of Europe to push its allies to recognize Russian rights in Ottoman territories. By using available diplomatic resources, Russia slowly fragmented the boundaries of the existing territorial order until it shattered them in the Crimean War, in the mid-nineteenth century. Prussia provides another example of this approach, with even more trans- formative results. From 1864 to 1871, it unified the German states under its rule at little cost and with limited use of force. German unification not only upended European boundaries; it also laid the groundwork for the Industrial Revolution in Germany, which would vault the country into the top tier of great powers by the end of the cen- tury. Ideologically, Prussia mobilized new forces of German nationalism, ripping apart the conservative founda- tions of European institutions. Yet Prussia achieved this revolution without sacrificing its position as a core member of European security and economic institutions. In this way, the country undermined the foundations of the European order from both within and without. May/June 2022 35 Stacie Goddard To challenge existing institutions, other revisionists created alternative institutional systems to establish their own spheres of influence and attract new supporters to their cause. In the years following World War II, especially after the United States launched the Marshall Plan in 1948, the Soviet Union withdrew from various Western institu- tions. Joseph Stalin hoped to increase Soviet power not by overtly challenging Western alliances but through political purges in eastern European states. When Moscow would challenge institu- tions, it would do so either covertly or in areas geographically outside the core of the dominant order. Looking at the varied historical record of revisionism, three things stand out.

**2AC – AT - IR Racist**

**IR isn't anti-black -- it's a minimalist theory to explain the occurrence of interstate war -- purity in scholastic exercises have zero concrete solvency.**

**Wæver &** **Buzan ’20** [Ole and Barry; May 15th; Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen; Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics; KU, “Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit,” Racism and Responsibility -- The Critical Limits of Deep-Fake Methodology in Security Studies: A reply to Howell and Richter-Montpetit; GR]

Racism is a powerful, malignant force in world politics, and our discipline, IR, has deeply problematic entanglements with it. It is a serious matter both to come intellectually to grips with this and to find the most effective strategies to act on it. We worry that more serious **problems** and **possibilities** are **marginalised** by an ultimately very **inward-looking** and **scholastic exercise** where a particular definition of racism and a specific theoretical perspective makes it possible to deem the vast majority of scholarship in IR ‘racist’, ‘methodologically white’ and ‘antiblack’- every work that does not explicitly follow one exact version of anti-racist scholarship. Especially, the role played in H&RM’s argumentation by our **sins of omission** does ultimately seem to rest on the premise that **only** their **distinct form** of scholarship can be redeemed, because even post-colonial scholarship and critiques of euro-centrism are not enough; you are a racist if you do not follow exactly this particular route. It is not important whether your scholarship actually supports or hinders anti-racist analysis or political engagement; it is all about **who you cite** and what **declarations you make**. **Here**, a theory is not judged by **what can be done with it**, but by the question whether **self-appointed anti-racists** can find **supposedly problematic sentences** somewhere in its key texts. In this section, we will first point out that the H&RM article is a personal attack on us for racism, despite their reassurances about the opposite. Then, we discuss what an analysis of structural racism (systems of power) could amount to, given that they claim to do one but utterly fail to do so, resorting instead to a pretend examination of the foundations of ST. Next, we discuss what could be methodological guidelines for actually proving whether or not a theory like ST is racist.

H&RM’s usage of the term racism for all scholarship that does not foreground race as the primary theme, means that **99% of IR will be ‘racist’**. There will be **no room** for any other scholarship (unless you will live with the moniker of being racist). Not only does this seem **very unproductive** in terms of disciplinary conversations, not to talk of **diversity** and **pluralism**, it also means that it becomes **very hard** to use the category of ‘racism’ for **critical purposes** for those cases where it **actually is at stake** in a sense closer to what the rest of the discipline, and indeed the public discourse, means by it. It has been **watered down** by the fact that everyone but those in critical whiteness studies have been deemed racist, one by one, where we just happened to get the special honour of being among the first. H&RM might protest that this is not their plan, but we **fail to see how this can be avoided** when the logic they apply is that the term racist can be based primarily on **sins of omission** in the sense of a theory being focused around other categories.

As documented above, they claim numerous times that ST ‘occludes’ or ‘refuses’ various dynamics relating to race that they find important, but they never offer any basis for concluding that the theory makes it harder to see these things, only that it does not as such zoom in on them. This does not have to do with a choice particularly regarding race but the structure and nature of the theory as a general analytical apparatus that can be applied to all instances where actors try to securitize or desecuritize something, and the user is free then to include race more or less in this analysis, just as the theory is not deciding how important nationalism is or gender51, but it enables the analysis of the way different categories and distinctions become politically mobilised in security struggles.

H&RM will probably argue that if you do not mention race in these contexts, you ‘**hide’ it**. **Three answers**: 1) **no**, there is a difference between **not mentioning** and **hiding**, it takes a step more of the critic to show that the theory **prevents** something from being articulated or that it uses abstractions that stand in the way of articulating race; that certainly is the case for some theories, so it is a legitimate avenue of critique, but they haven’t shown this, 2) the theory is **intentionally** (as we have explained numerous times) **minimalist** in having a clear conceptual core and then not putting all kinds of factors like the role of media or populism into the theory -- **not** because we haven’t noticed these factors but because they **belong in applications**, and the theory exactly allows you to study these phenomena, 3) we are very explicit that one of the **advantages of a minimalist theory** is the ability to **combine it** with other theories especially general theories about the nature and structures of society; one should not build out ST to become a general theory of society or international relations, better in any specific usage of the theory combine it with the theories one finds productive for the particular research project. (Wæver 2011, 2015) The latter point has come up in replies to the ‘sociological’ version of ST (Balzacq), which has more of a tendency to add all relevant factors to the theory, while the classical Copenhagen version is tight and invites combination with theories that complement it, which could exactly be theories of race and racism. Our ultimate concern here is: how do we actually get to study racism in world politics in a practically and politically helpful way?

When developing our own framework, ST, we took **care** to make sure it could do critical work in concrete analyses, in our view on racism as well, and H&RM fail to show that this is not the case. In addition, we have then on a more mundane, human level engaged ourselves in various ways to foster non-Western scholarship and theories in IR (Tickner & Wæver 2009; Acharya & Buzan 2010, 2019). One has for instance co-founded a book-series with the aim to identify “alternatives for thinking about the ‘international’ that are more in tune with local concerns and traditions outside the West” and “provincializing the West” (quoting from the Routledge homepage of the book series); the other has amongst many other things re-written this history of the IR discipline to show both that it has ignored non-Western contributions and that the Western part of it is indebted to ‘scientific racism’ (Buzan & Lawson 2015; Acharya and Buzan 2019). Closer to ST, the project in Buzan & Wæver 2003 was to a large extent to challenge the euro-centrism enshrined in dominant conceptions of polarity and of the relationship between global and regional, to enable theories to be more attentive to actual security dynamics in ‘most of the world’.

Surely, all of these efforts can be critically assessed as to what has been helpful and what hasn’t. But we find it strange that H&RM choose to ignore completely the possibility of assessing the ability of ST to form the basis for helpful analyses of racism. They neither look at those analyses that have actually been done, nor do they show systematically why it would be impossible to do so. On the contrary, they limit themselves to highly abstract and indirect attributions of racism to the theory as such through various unconvincing routes. From this they deduce (without any discussion) that ST can’t inform studies of racism (and when it has actually done it, they presumably are able to magically make those publications go away) (see section 6 below).

H&RM offer **no explanation** as to how their type of analysis helps in combating racism. It is **unclear** if it is a kind of **ground clearing operation** to be followed up by new and better theories after getting us out of the way. Or whether they believe that we are so much a part of the oppressive structures that attacking us is in itself liberating. Or -- as we will consider below in more detail -- the whole exercise is more about making universities more inclusive and hospitable to students and scholars of colour. Closely linked to the latter option, their rationale could be that the attack is meant more as a kind of ‘happening’ drawing attention to the question of race. Especially in the latter case, it would be intentional that the article plays ambiguously with making a very personal attack while pretending not to.

**IR scholarship regarding the liberal order is not irredeemably racist**

Gideon **Rose 16**, editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2016, “Review of, ‘White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations,’” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2016-02-16/white-world-order-black-power-politics-birth-american

In this interesting and important yet flawed book, Vitalis seeks to bridge the “vast gulf divid[ing] international relations from Africana studies,” bringing the “racism [of the discipline of **i**nternational **r**elations] to light.” Conventional narratives of the field’s history, he argues, trace it to the rise of realism and national security concerns in the years around World War II, adding a few historical thinkers, such as Thucydides, to claim a timeless intellectual pedigree. But this ignores both the **extensive mainstream scholarship** of the first decades of the twentieth century that dealt with colonialism and racial issues and the pioneering work of African American writers in what he calls “the Howard School.” Consigning both to the memory hole, he says, paints a distorted picture of the discipline’s origins and nature, obscuring the role that international relations scholarship has played in the construction and perpetuation of white Western dominance. These are major claims, and some of them hold up better than others. Vitalis is correct to shine a spotlight on the forgotten academic work of the first third of the twentieth century and offers a timely reminder of just how prevalent racialized thinking was and how central a role imperialism—**as opposed to straightforward great-power relations**—played in global affairs. Back then, for example, “policy relevance” in political science often meant figuring out how to train good colonial administrators. Vitalis also provides a service by telling the story of scholars such as Alain Locke, Ralph Bunche, and Rayford Logan, enriching readers’ understanding of midcentury intellectual debates over U.S. foreign policy and tracing how racism operated inside various professional institutions. Vitalis is **less convincing**, however, in casting his analysis as an indictment of the postwar discipline of international relations, let alone **its contemporary incarnation**. To get there, one has to share his politics. Vitalis sees a project of U.S. imperial domination playing out over the course of the past century, with the “subjection” continuing today, “through new-old policies of intervention, tutelage, and targeted killings in new-old zones of anarchy and civilization deficit.” Given such a reading of U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that he believes “the history of ideas, institutions, and practices [in the field] has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions”—or that he sees today’s mainstream international relations scholars as handmaidens of an evil national security state and as the direct descendants of their racist predecessors of a century ago. Scorning the notion that the postwar liberal international order represents anything particularly new or admirable, Vitalis scores a few points in noting how long it took for some earlier social and racial hierarchies, both international and domestic, to erode. But he refuses to accept the fact that they have indeed **eroded**. One is left wanting more analysis of how and why the attitudes and **patterns of domination** Vitalis describes gave way over time, and how the midcentury theorists and practitioners of the liberal international order understood and handled the paradoxes of its **halting and inconsistent implementation.**

**There is no monolithic IR – the field is reflexive and effective – its track record of prediction proves. AND, sweeping criticisms of a fragmented field of research don’t answer the specificity of our studies.**

Dan **Reiter 15**. Professor of Political Science at Emory University. “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools.” War on the Rocks. 8-27-2015. <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign **policy choices** are **not sui generis**, there are patterns across space and time that **inform decision-making**. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, **broader scholarship** can **improve** foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of **IR academics** to build on their own work to **predict outcomes**, including for example **forecasting** the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s. But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether: Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants. This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective. A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a **danger** in **not appreciating** the **importance** of **rigorous research design**, including sophisticated **quantitative techniques**, for **crafting effective policy**. **Sophisticated research design** is not the enemy of effective policy, it is **critically necessary** for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome. Or, put differently, **bad research** designs make for **bad public policy**. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets. Sophisticated **technical methods** can improve our ability to make **causal inferences**, and can help solve other **empirical problems**. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians? Certainly, **other areas** of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as **microfinance**, **gender empowerment**, and **foreign aid**, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings. Or consider public health policy. **Lives are literally on the line** as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as **vaccinations**, **nutritional recommendations**, and **air quality**. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies. Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the **technical components** of the work **need to be there**. Stripping them out **directly undermines** the ability of the research to give the **right** kinds of policy **recommendations**. Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. **IR academics** have the potential to **make real contributions** to big picture **debates**, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions. Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. **Rigorous IR research** is the **only way to evaluate them effectively**.

**2AC – Eurocentric**

**IR’s not intrinsically Eurocentric – they need to indict our specific studies, or their vague theoretical cards just don’t apply**

Audrey **Alejandro 19**, Assistant Professor at the Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and Political Science, “Western Dominance in International Relations?”, Routledge Publishing, forthcoming

Since the **1970s**, a ‘critical’ movement has been developing in the humanities and social sciences denouncing the existence of ‘**Western dominance’** over the worldwide production and circulation of knowledge. **However**, thirty years after the emergence of this promising agenda in International Relations (IR), this discipline has **not** experienced a major shift. This volume offers a counter-intuitive and original contribution to the understanding of the global circulation of knowledge. **In contrast to the literature**, it argues that the internationalisation of social sciences in the designated ‘Global South’ **is not conditioned** by the existence of a presumably ‘Western dominance’. Indeed, although discriminative practices such as Eurocentrism and gatekeeping **exist**, their existence **does not lead to a unipolar structuration of IR internationalisation** around ‘the West’. Based on these empirical results, this book reflexively questions the role of critique in the **(re)production of the social and political order.** Paradoxically, the anti-Eurocentric critical discourses **reproduce the very Eurocentrism they criticise**. This book offers methodological support to address this paradox by demonstrating how one can use discourse analysis and reflexivity to produce innovative results and decentre oneself from the vision of the world one has been socialised into.

**IR scholarship is not American-centric – it’s a complex field with people from backgrounds all over the world**

**MEARSHEIMER 16**-R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science @ University of Chicago, member of the Committee of International Relations @ U. of Chicago, PhD in government/international relations @ Cornell, M.A. in International Relations @ USC, fellow @ Harvard’s Center for International Affairs, Whitney H. Shepardson fellow @ The Council on Foreign Relation [John, “A GLOBAL DISCIPLINE OF IR? Benign Hegemony,” International Studies Review (2016) 18, 147–169, DKP]

It is often said that the international relations (IR) scholarly community is too American-centric and needs to broaden its horizons**. I disagree.** In the mid-1970s, Stanley Hoffmann called IR an “American social science.” That label was appropriate then, and it is still appropriate today especially with regard to the all important ideas and theories that dominate discourse in our discipline. **This situation is not likely to change** significantly anytime soon and **for entirely legitimate and defensible reasons.** To be clear, the issue here is not about the makeup of the IR scholarly community as there is an abundance of scholars from outside the borders of the United States who study world politics. It is clear from just perusing the program for the International Studies Association’s annual conference that **IR scholars live in a global village.** This diversity—which is all for the good—is likely to grow with time as increasing numbers of young people from around the world go to college and study IR. In short, American scholars do not have great influence because of their numbers. Nor do Americans dominate the field because the subjects that concern them are privileged over the interests of scholars from other countries. In fact, **the issues that concern IR students are the same** almost **everywhere.** Nuclear proliferation, democracy promotion, and economic interdependence—to pick just three topics among many—hardly concern the United States alone or even just the great powers. Virtually every country cares about those subjects and countless others, although they might approach them in different ways. North Korea and the United States, for example, might think differently about the virtues of nuclear proliferation, but both care greatly about the issue. It is in the realm of methods, and especially theory, where US scholars dominate the study of IR. The analytical frameworks and causal stories that researchers from other countries employ in their work are associated in large part with American academia. For instance, the key names associated with the three most important bodies of IR theory—constructivism, liberalism, and realism—are closely tied to scholars at American universities. And the few influential IR theorists who do not teach at US universities are mostly British or are at least associated with British schools. Thus, one could argue that it is really Anglo-Saxon scholars who dominate the IR discourse. The importance of theory for studying international politics cannot be underestimated as there is no way we can make sense of the infinitely complicated world around us without theories. The fact that the United States is home to the world’s leading theorists is what allows its IR community to control the commanding heights of the field. The dominance of American-based scholars is reinforced by the fact that they have developed a rich variety of theories that are very useful for comprehending the politics of the international system. This means, however, there is not a lot of room for new theories or even major twists on existing theories. To be sure, this is not to say that there is no room for new theories, especially when it comes to middle-range theories. Plus, there is always room to refine existing theories. Still, there are limited opportunities in 2015 for scholars outside the United States—as well inside it—to develop wholly new theories. If this were 1945, the situation would be markedly different. The extent to which American theories cast a giant shadow over the IR field is reflected in how undergraduate and graduate students outside of the United States talk and think about international politics. Wherever I speak abroad— regardless of the subject—the comments and questions from students are virtually the same ones I get when I talk on American campuses. Indeed, students inside and outside of the United States seem to read the same articles and books and for the most part employ the same concepts and arguments. I might add that as a realist, **I feel** intellectually **more at home in Beijing than Washington** because Chinese scholars and policymakers tend to be more sympathetic to realism than their American counterparts. So, **when I speak in China**— where there is a deep fascination with American IR theories—**I** sometimes **start my talks by saying, “It is good to be back among my people.”** And I do not speak one word of Chinese, although I do speak the same language as my Chinese interlocutors when we talk about the basic realities of international politics. American dominance in IR is reinforced by the fact that many talented undergraduates from around the world come to the United States for graduate training, where they are taught that the theories and methods that dominate the intellectual landscape on American campuses are essential tools for being a first-rate scholar. Most of them go on to have successful careers—often not only in the United States but also in other countries—where they purvey the ideas they learned in graduate school. **One sometimes hears the argument that there is a hegemonic discourse** in IR and that the Americans who control it actively work to suppress new ideas generated by outsiders. In other words, there would be a richer and more diverse menu of IR theories were it not for **American gatekeepers** policing the discourse. **This claim is wrong and easy to refute.** For starters, just ask yourself: where are the ideas that are being suppressed? **Where is the evidence** that American academics have prevented others from pushing forward new ideas about international politics? **In fact, there is none.** And please remember that **we live in the age of the Internet**, where it is almost impossible to stop new ideas—particularly good ones—from reaching a wide audience. Beside, the scholarly world places a high premium on creating innovative arguments, especially if they challenge conventional wisdoms and even if they make prominent scholars angry. Finally, the American IR community is international and liberal at its core, which makes it hard to believe serious scholars in that world would be interested in protecting a hegemonic discourse, much less be capable of organizing to achieve that end. Even if a few scholars played politics and attempted to marginalize a novel idea they disliked, other scholars would intervene to promote and engage with it, particularly if it shed new light on an important problem. One might argue that focusing on culture, as an explanatory variable, would allow non-Americans to offer new theories and broaden horizons within IR. For example, a number of scholars and public intellectuals have claimed that China has a Confucian culture, which they maintain has had a profound influence on its past foreign policy and will continue to do so in the future. For example, this is a key element in Henry Kissinger’s 2011 book On China, and it is clearly a legitimate argument. But cultural arguments of this sort have been swishing around in American academia for decades. During the Cold War, for instance, more than a few American scholars maintained that there was a Soviet strategic culture that mattered greatly for explaining Moscow’s behavior. All this is to say that cultural arguments do not offer a new way of broadening our intellectual vista in IR. American dominance of the IR discourse is likely to diminish somewhat in the decades ahead as scholars from other countries become increasingly engaged in trying to develop new theories and refine existing ones. After all, Americans do not have a special aptitude for doing theory, and the United States has not always ruled the theoretical roost. Britain and Germany dominated intellectual discourse in IR before World War II, and US preeminence did not emerge until after 1945. Moreover, when Americans got seriously involved in IR scholarship, their theories bore a remarkable resemblance to those developed in Europe. Just think of the profound influence of Immanuel Kant and Hans Morgenthau—both Germans— on IR theory in the United States. What this tells us is that those **non-American IR scholars** who become leading theorists at some future point **will stand on the shoulders of American academics**, much the way America’s leading lights have stood on the shoulders of their European predecessors. This is the way scholarship advances.

**2AC – Nation State Good**

**Analysis through nation-states and security is good.**

Robin **Luckham 17**, an Emeritus fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, where he has been based since 1974. Following the publication of his book The Nigerian Military in 1971, he has researched and published extensively on civil-military relations, militarism, political violence, democratisation, security and development, security sector governance, security ‘from below’ and peacebuilding. Whose violence, whose security? Can violence reduction and security work for poor, excluded and vulnerable people? 2017.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277009

6. The two faces of security – and of peace Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested **political authority**. Often it is enacted through **violent power**, rebranded as legitimate force. Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But **although** security is a **deeply disputed** idea, it is also a **highly necessary** one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, as a **frame for policy** and as a **moral narrative**. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as **essential** to the preservation of **peace**. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency to slide from **global**, to **national**, to **citizen** and to human security and back again, without enough serious reflection on how they **interconnect** and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong. The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with eachother. On the **one hand**, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily **transforming the conditions** giving rise to this violence or attending to the **quality** of the **subsequent peace**. In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative nonstate or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most acute. For in practice it protects **socially embedded power**, established property relations and **social privilege** – and reinforces global, national and local **inequalities**. On the **other hand**, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an **entitlement of citizens** and more widely human beings to **social peace** and **protection from violence**, abuses of **rights** and **social injustice**, along with other **existential risks** such as **famine** or **disease**. It connects to the idea of ‘**positive peace’**, including **transformations** in the social conditions giving rise to violence and deepening the **relationships between states and** their **citizens**. The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people **fall back** upon their **social identities** – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to **respond to insecurity** and violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these **identities** are **written into** the **structures of power and inequality**, being deployed to **establish hierarchies of citizenship** and **patterns of exclusion**. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘**Security in the vernacular’** paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as an **entitlement**, which can be **actively claimed** by those who **challenge** the **deeply rooted legacies** of **insecurity**, **exclusion** and **injustice**. Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 The **deformations** of **security in the vernacular** tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of **popular justice** that **violate the rights**, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or a region or locality is considered to be secure. Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they **should be**. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of **social order**, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both **affairs of governance** and **vital concerns** for **everyone** who lives under the **leaky umbrella** of **political authority**. **Political stability**, **durable institutions**, the **rule of law**, and **effective and accountable security apparatuses** **are** not just **desirable attributes of states** but are also in many respects conditions of the security of people. However, they **come at a price**, not just in taxes, but also because of the need for **constant vigilance** to ensure that those charged with delivering security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to protect.

**AT – Links**

**AT: L – China**

**Empirically disproven.**

Tenzin **Dorjee 21**. Senior researcher at Tibet Action Institute and a PhD candidate in the political science department at Columbia University. "Opinion: Anti-China is not anti-Asian". Washington Post. 4-6-2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/04/06/anti-china-is-not-anti-asian/

However, some commentators are arguing that the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s criticism of the Chinese government is to blame for the domestic problem of anti-Asian violence. This specious claim, which China’s state-run media quickly exploited, has been most prominently advanced in the mainstream Western media by distinguished novelist Viet Thanh Nguyen and political scientist Janelle Wong, who claim that “bipartisan political rhetoric about Asia” and successive administrations’ “critical takes” on China fuel anti-Asian violence. This narrative, which weaponizes Asian American vulnerability to shield Beijing from international criticism, is as dangerous as it is fraudulent.

First of all, let’s be clear that there is no bipartisan political rhetoric targeting Asia, a continent of nearly 50 nations. Conflating Asia with China is the geopolitical equivalent of assuming all Asians are Chinese, precisely the **kind of racial lumping that the writers themselves sensibly caution against**.

To be sure, criticism of the Chinese government by policymakers in Washington has escalated in recent years. But the overwhelming volume of the rhetoric targeting Beijing has been prompted not by abstract geopolitical competition but by tangible grievances, including China’s **genocide in Xinjiang**, intensifying **repression in Tibet, dismantling of democracy in Hong Kong and sweeping crackdown on Chinese civil society**. Some of Beijing’s harshest critics are Asian Americans. Uyghur refugees, Hong Kong democrats, Chinese dissidents and Tibetan exiles such as myself, whose communities back home reel under Beijing’s boot, are **urging Congress to censure China for its crimes**. Asking lawmakers of conscience to hold their tongue on Beijing’s genocide to supposedly prevent racial violence here is to set up a **false trade-off between Asian American safety and Uyghur lives**, both of which should be treated as **nonnegotiable**.

Moreover, **there is no research-based evidence that American lawmakers’ legitimate criticism of Beijing has a causal effect on violence against Asians**. In fact, Washington’s political rhetoric has been rising steadily over the past half decade, during which Beijing built the **Uyghur internment camps**, demolished **Hong Kong’s democracy** and chipped away at the **liberal international order**. **Anti-Asian attacks remained rare** during this whole period, soaring only when the pandemic hit. If China had contained covid-19 within its borders, or if the United States had succeeded in keeping it out, no amount of congressional criticism against Beijing would have made us afraid to ride the subway at night.

market reforms, the Chinese people **experienced the fastest increase so far in their standard of living.**

**No mutual exclusivity---the perm solves because we can criticize the Chinese government AND combat racism.**

Josh **Rogin 21**. Columnist covering foreign policy and national security. George Washington University, BA in International Affairs 2001; Sophia University, Tokyo "Opinion: The United States must confront the Chinese Communist Party and racism at the same time". Washington Post. 3-25-2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-united-states-must-confront-the-chinese-communist-party-and-racism-at-the-same-time/2021/03/25/63fe8308-8d9c-11eb-9423-04079921c915\_story.html

The United States **must compete with China** and **confront the Chinese government** on a range of issues while simultaneously **combating the rise of anti-Asian racism** at home. These two missions are **not at odds with each other**, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would have you believe. In fact, they must go **hand in hand**. In Alaska last weekend, Chinese government leaders sought to stoke our country’s racial divisions, accusing the United States of having “slaughtered” African Americans, to deflect criticism over Beijing’s mass atrocities against its Uyghur Muslim population. Meanwhile, CCP propaganda outlets have been using the killing last week in the Atlanta area of eight innocent people (six of them Asian) to cast aspersions on those who are condemning the Chinese government’s atrocities. Beijing’s goal is to **conflate and confuse** two **related but distinct issues**: challenging the Chinese government and the need to fight racism in the United States. But their gambit amounts to **presenting a false choice** between doing one or the other. “It is part of a broader strategy that the Chinese Communist Party is enacting to **undermine our democracy**,” Rep. Stephanie Murphy (D-Fla.) told me in an interview. “So when you see them creating that **false equivalency** . . . it is their way to **sow discord** in our society, because they understand when we are not united, we are weaker in leading the world in confronting their bad behavior.” Murphy, a former Pentagon official who came to the United States as a child refugee from Vietnam, said that the use of racist language by former president Donald Trump and other GOP officials plays into the CCP’s hands. Yet at the same she emphasized that U.S. leaders have to be able to **speak** honestly and **critically about the CCP’s negative behaviors**, including its mishandling of the covid-19 pandemic. The rise of racism against Asian Americans not only hurts the United States’ ability to deal with China, but also it harms efforts to make common cause with our regional allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. Those governments’ ability to join the United States in confronting China is hurt when members of their diaspora communities are mistreated in the United States. “We have to be able to make a **very clear distinction** that our adversary and competitor is the **Chinese Communist Party, not the Chinese people**, and certainly **not** the **Asian Americans** who live here and who have contributed so much to this country,” Murphy said. “When we attack Americans of Asian descent, we attack ourselves.” Some American commentators argue that the effort to confront the Chinese government’s behavior has fueled the staggering rise in hate and violence directed at Asians and Asian Americans in the United States. It’s certainly true that Trump’s racist rhetoric regarding the coronavirus fueled hate and conflated the two issues, tragically. And U.S. government efforts to confront CCP influence operations in our country have at times unfairly targeted people of Chinese origins. Such targeting of Asians and Asian Americans makes us weaker at home and abroad. **We must** learn from, **not repeat, examples** from history when U.S. foreign policy negatively affected American minorities, including the mass internment of U.S. citizens and noncitizens of Japanese descent during World War II and the mistreatment of Arab and Muslim Americans after 9/11. Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), the son of Indian immigrants, told me that **the United States has to out-compete China without replicating the paradigms** of the Cold War. But, he said, we must also **stand up to the authoritarian and repressive model the Chinese government** is putting forward without ceding our moral authority. “That has to be the balance, enhance America’s strategic interest but **clearly reject provocative rhetoric** that’s intended to play to a base,” he said. “There’s a way to **frame our moral position as a liberal democracy** . . . without coming off as demonizing an entire civilization in a way that hurts Chinese or Chinese Americans.” Khanna and Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) have co-sponsored a bill, the Endless Frontier Act, to revamp the National Science Foundation to **try to out-compete China through technological innovation**. Senate Majority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) and Sen. Todd C. Young (R-Ind.) are cooperating on companion legislation in the Senate. These efforts will be a major test of whether bipartisan cooperation on the China challenge is possible. **It’s not the drive to confront China that is fueling hate and racism** against Asians in America. Political opportunists are abusing that effort by fueling bigotry to score political points. This makes a unified strategy to confront the Chinese government only more difficult to achieve. In fact, addressing racism at home is crucial to winning the competition with China in the long run. “We have to be aggressive in our policies and working with our allies to combat the violations the Chinese are making, but at the same time, **we can hold the CCP accountable without scapegoating Asian Americans**,” Murphy said. “And we have a responsibility to do that.”

**AT: L – NATO**

**Securitizing via NATO good—only deterrence through our systems avoids extinction**

**Goddard 22** [ Goddard, Stacie. “How the International System Can Still Check China and Russia.” Heinonline.org, May 2022, heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora101&div=6&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals. Accessed 27 June 2022. Stacie E. Goddard is an American political scientist. She is the Mildred Lane Kemper Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Goddard is known for her research on international order, grand strategy, and global power politics \ kaylan]

First, it is not simply that interna- tional institutions fail to restrain revi- sionists. In fact, membership in interna- tional institutions can give countries resources with which to challenge the status quo. Second, how a revisionist decides to challenge those institutions depends on how it is positioned within them. Only revisionists that are mem- bers in good standing can use the strat- egy of working within institutions to advance their ambitions. Finally, con- trary to the conventional wisdom, violent revisionism is not the norm in interna- tional politics. Indeed, when revisionists unleash military attacks, it is often a last resort. Only when imperial Japan failed to achieve its expansionist aims within existing institutions did it turn to military force. Military aggression is a sign not of strength but of weakness. LASHING OUT Russia, of course, has taken the path of military aggression in its war against Ukraine. That brutal attack against democratization and liberalism has demonstrated how-despite their recent declaration of unity-China and Russia are in very different institutional posi- tions and are therefore pursuing distinct revisionist strategies. Putin's Russia may be disruptive in the short term, but it is **ultimately too weak** to build an alterna- tive institutional order. Although Russia has sought access to liberal international institutions, the country was always a bit player within them. **As a result, it could not rely on the existing order to negoti- ate its demands.** Nor does Russia have many resources outside the U.S.-led institutions that make up the dominant liberal order that would allow it to exit the system. For all the talk about Russia building its own sphere of influence, the country has been outflanked by NATO and the European Union in eastern Europe, and China is competing with it for influence in Central Asia. Lacking the resources to effectively challenge the existing order or build its own, Russia has resorted to disruption and violence. It launches violent military actions against its neighbors and uses political interference, propaganda, and economic coercion-for example, funding right-wing populist parties in Austria and France, banning agricultural imports from the Eu, and threatening gas cutoffs-to sow division in Western polities and drive wedges between NATO allies. Far from signaling some grand scheme, **Russia's violence is best viewed as a strategy of last resort.** China is different. The good news is that Beijing has little need to use vio- lence, because its participation in the international order has strengthened its ability to challenge the status quo 36 without resorting to force. The resources provided by membership in institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the wTO, and the UN Security Council have allowed China to expand its global footprint, even though they **also constrain Beijing's ambitions.** For supporters of the liberal order, however, the bad news is that China has member- ship in institutions both inside and outside that order, and it is precisely this type of position that allows states to pursue transformative revisionism. The growing alarm about China's and Russia's revisionism has amplified calls for the United States to abandon its institutionalist strategy and instead embrace traditional realpolitik. The goal is no longer integration; it is **deterrence**: the United States must ensure that its military and alliances **are strong enough to dissuade China and Russia from using force** to achieve their aims. This was the stated approach of the Trump adminis- tration. Its 2017 National Security Strategy argued that while the United States would still "seek areas of coopera- tion with competitors," its primary aim would be to "deter and if necessary, defeat aggression against U.S. interests and increase the likelihood of managing competitions without violent conflict." **But turning away from institutional engagement with revisionist powers would be a mistake**. Although military instruments remain important, the United States already holds a sizable advantage in military power over all its rivals, and any increased investment would matter only on the margins. And given that no major power today wants to engage in a large-scale conventional or nuclear war, it is doubtful that military power would be the weapon of choice in direct international political rivalries. Revisionists will continue to use force, but only in places where they believe the United States and its allies are unlikely to directly counter their vio- lence. Washington was unable to deter Russia's invasion of Ukraine, **but** it remains improbable that Putin will directly attack a NATO member. Even in Taiwan, Beijing is not liable to turn to force if it can avoid it. **There is no reason to risk escalation** with the United States and its Asian allies if economic and diplomatic instruments are just as likely to secure Chinese aims. BETTER INSIDE THE TENT Instead of abandoning institutional integration in favor of saber rattling, Washington needs to make better use of institutions to exert its influence and limit that of its rivals. Even the most hardened proponents of realpolitik concede that institutional cooperation is **necessary** **to deal with existential threats** such as climate change, nuclear prolifera- tion, and pandemic disease. Ensuring that all the great powers remain firmly inte- grated in institutions that address these collective dangers-such as the Paris climate accord and the Nuclear Nonpro- liferation Treaty-should be the goal. Beyond this, **the United States needs to embrace a strategy of institu- tional realpolitik.** To begin with, it should abandon the idea that the purpose of international institutions is to eliminate revisionism or expand liberal global governance. Rather, international institutions are a tool to manage power politics. The most straightforward and significant aim should be to channel revisionist ambitions toward institutional forums May/June 2022 37 Stacie Goddard and away from more violent and destructive behavior. International institutions could be designed not to stop competition through power politics but to direct it and make it more predictable by providing chan- nels of communication, forums for negotiation, and clear rules about what counts as appropriate behavior. In Ukraine, this may seem like too little, too late. But at some point, the war will be over, and it is important to consider what will come next. This is not to advocate another "reset" or a substan- tive partnership with Russia, which must not be permitted to subjugate its neigh- bors. The goal, instead, should be to redirect a hostile relationship back into more predictable forums-of the kind that stabilized U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. Some might decry this as tantamount to appeasement. To be clear, the United States and its allies including those of Ukraine. The United States should support similar institutions to modify China's actions in the South China Sea. At a minimum, Washington should ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to give it more legitimacy in pushing back against illegal Chinese behavior. The United States should also try to outflank its rivals by thinking strategi- cally about where revisionists could mobilize support for an alternative and more illiberal international order in the future. This is particularly important in the coming long contest with China, in which Washington, so far, seems to be largely on the defensive. AUKUS, the trilateral security pact with Australia and the United Kingdom; the G-7; and the Five Eyes partnership with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are all designed to shore up the United States' security relationships. But Washington remains strangely reluctant to engage in offensive institution build- ing. Biden has yet to reverse his prede- cessor's decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, whose succes- sor institution, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, established a free-trade zone stretching from Vietnam to Australia and encompassing around 40 percent of global GDP. The United States is also excluded from the Regional Comprehen- sive Economic Partnership, a regional free-trade pact that is likely to build stronger ties between China and South- east Asian countries. Finding a way to interact with these new institutions is critical if Washington wishes to bind itself to its allies and partners in mean- ingful, credible, and durable ways. Moreover, China has significantly expanded its footprint in areas that the United States has treated as peripheral. Although originally Chinese officials portrayed the infrastructure projects of the BRI as a complement to the liberal economic order, Beijing has since begun to frame them as steps in building an alternative order, or a "community of common destiny." Reforming interna- tional economic institutions to make them more attentive to the needs of aid-recipient countries could help outflank the BRI, which has experienced its own difficulties. For example, the United States could use its own existing institutions-the Millennium Challenge Corporation or the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation-to invest in infrastructure that would 38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS buttress the efforts of the new African Continental Free Trade Area and stymie China's influence. KEEP THEM CLOSE Such reforms would not represent a return to the order building of the 1990s. The United States has neither the power nor the will to go back to that approach. Indeed, institutional realpolitik should involve selective retrenchment. Wash- ington should be willing to identify places where it overextended at the height of U.S. primacy. It may make sense to pull back from the globally oriented, hyper-legalized institutional structure of the wTO, which has ben- efited countries that are not playing by its rules, such as China. Washington should also be willing to let its regional allies and partners take the lead in institution building. Strong regional institutions, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the EU, are critical to halting revisionist projects, even if they sometimes act against the United States' interests. The next era of great-power competi- tion is already here, but this is not the time to be ramping up military confron- tations and shutting down or pulling away from international institutions. U.S. policymakers should reject the false dichotomy that suggests that Washing- ton must choose between realpolitik and institution building. Seeking to reinvigo- rate international alliances and institu- tions is not evidence of a lack of imagi- nation or a naive faith in multilateralism. Rather, it is a tried-and-true way to play the game of great-power politics.Z' "Nguyen Ba Thanh wonders if death by old age is civilisation's destiny." - Philosophy Now "A gripping reflection of the murky future of Homo Sapiens." - Kirkus Reviews If all else-your body and memories, stars, the entire universe itself-has an inevitable life cycle, is population aging on Earth the final stage of such a life cycle for technological civilizations? A stirring fusion of sociology and philosophy, The Demogra-Fate Hypothesis envisions the demographic future of our primate species through a unique lens- both sobering and wryly entertaining. Ebook and paperback are available on Amazon 39

**AT: L – Nukes**

**Nuclear war turns the K.**

**Thompson, 18** – Chicago-based creative writer. (Nicole Akoukou Thompson, "Why I will not allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed", *RaceBaitr*, 4-6-2018, https://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/#)//ILake-MO

I couldn’t spare empathy for a white woman whose biggest fear was something that hadn’t happened yet and might not. Meanwhile, my most significant fears were in motion: women and men **dying in cells** after being wrongly imprisoned, **choked out** for peddling cigarettes, or **shot to death** during ‘routine’ traffic stops. I twitch when my partner is late, worried that a cantankerous cop has brutalized or shot him because he wouldn’t prostrate himself.

As a woman of color, I am aware of the multiple types of violence that threaten me **currently**—**not theoretically.** Street harassment, excessively affecting me as a Black woman, has blindsided me since I was eleven. A premature body meant being catcalled before I’d discussed the birds and the bees. It meant being followed, whistled at, or groped. As an adult, while navigating through neighborhoods with extinguished street lights, I noticed the correlation between women’s safety and street lighting—as well as the fact that Black and brown neighborhoods were never as brightly lit as those with a more significant white population.

I move quickly through those unlit spaces, never comforted by the inevitable whirl of red and blue sirens. In fact, it’s always been the contrary. Ever so often, cops approach me in their vehicle’s encouraging me to “Hurry along,” “Stay on the sidewalk,” or “Have a good night.” My spine stiffening, I never believed they endorsed my safety. Instead, I worried that I’d be accused of an unnamed accusation, corned by a cop who preys on Black women, or worse.

A majority of my 50-minute bus ride from the southside of Chicago to the north to join these women for the birthday celebration was spent reading articles about citywide shootings. I began with a Chicago Tribute piece titled “33 people shot, seven fatally, in 13 hours,” then toppled into a barrage of RIP posts on Facebook and ended with angry posts about police brutality on Tumblr. You might guess, by the time I arrived to dinner I wasn’t in the mood for the “I can’t believe we’re all going to die because Trump is an idiot” shit.

I shook my head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, I departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just some white shit.”

Sadly, that thought would not last long.

I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black people have lived under the specter of having our **existence erased** on a white man’s whim since we stepped onto the shore at Jamestown Landing.” However, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: nuclear strike would **disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals.**

North Korea won’t target the plain sight **racists** of Portland, Oregon, the violently microaggressive **liberals** of the rural Northwest, or the white-hooded **klansmen** of Diamondhead, Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike **densely populated urban areas,** such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. These locations stand-out as targets for a nuclear strike because they are densely populated U.S. population centers. Attacking the heart of the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me that the most populous cities **in** the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more plainly put: **Black populations.**

This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart. The practice of preparing for a nuclear holocaust sometimes feels comical, particularly when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country.

Blackness is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We are stuck by rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard.

The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.”

In light of this homecoming, we now flirt with a **new, larger fear of** a **Black genocide.** America has always worked towards **Black eradication** through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality, but **nuclear war** on American soil **would be swift.** And for this reason I’ve grown tired of whiteness being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false.

“The Day After,” the iconic, highest-rated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the devastation from the attack is completely white-washed, leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas.

Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and brown folks would **outpace that** number, due to placement and poverty. That number would be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle Black and brown communities and would mark us **for generations.** It’s for that reason that we have to do more to foster disaster preparedness among Black people where we can. Black people deserve the space to explore **nuclear unease,** even if we have competing threats, anxieties, and worries.

**AT: L – Cyber**

**Cyber Threats are real and the root cause is lack of security - Cyber Espionage, Crime, and attacks inflict trillions of dollars in damage - securitization key to deter**

**McGraw,** PhD and Chief Technology Officer of Cigital, and author of Software Security along with ten other software security books, **13**

[Gary, “Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 1, pg. 109-119, February 6, 2013, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013>, accessed 6/27/22, GDS - LJ]

The inevitable slide towards cyber war is accelerated by the systemic vulnerability of modern systems. Technical security vulnerabilities and exploits are the common root of cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber crime. Distinguishing cyber war from other sorts of cyber attack is thus an important first step in any treatment of the problem. Cyber war is over-hyped, especially in the United States, but **it is also a very real phenomenon**. The potential for cyber conflict is growing in tandem with our dependence on vulnerable technology.

Stuxnet provides a prime example of a cyber weapon, not only because of its impact but because of the relative simplicity of its attack payload. The problem is that Stuxnet ‘hype’ exaggerated the capabilities required to create an effective cyber weapon. Consequently, non-technical policymakers may assume that relatively unsophisticated actors will not be able to participate in offensive cyber war. That is wrong. **Modern systems are so riddled with security vulnerabilities that conducting a spectacular attack is relatively easy.** On the average day there are thousands of exploitable vulnerabilities not yet made public or patched. These so-called ‘0day’ vulnerabilities are exploited by attackers around the world.[1](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013) The only way to address the security problem and slow the accelerating slide into cyber war is to build security into our systems when they are created. Software security is a relatively new discipline that takes on the challenge of building security in, and has seen real success among multinational corporations. In general, software-security progress is more advanced among private corporations (including multinational banks and independent software vendors) than in the public sector, which lags years behind.

The conceptual conflation of cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber crime into a three-headed cyber Cerberus perpetuates fear, uncertainty and doubt. This has made the already gaping policy vacuum on cyber security more obvious than ever before.

Of the three major cyber security concerns in the public eye, cyber crime is far more pervasive than cyber war or espionage. And yet it is the least commonly discussed among policymakers. Cyber crime is already commonplace and is growing: 285 million digital records were breached in 2008 and 2011 boasted the second-highest data loss total since 2004.[2](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013)

**Though economic calculations vary widely and are difficult to make, cyber crime and data loss have been estimated to cost the global economy at least $1.0 trillion dollars annually**.[3](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013) Even if this estimate is an order of magnitude too high, cyber crime is still an important problem that needs addressing. Just as consumers flock to the Internet, so do criminals. Why did Willie Sutton, the notorious Depression-era gangster, rob banks? As he famously (and perhaps apocryphally) put it: ‘That's where the money is.’ Criminals flock to the Internet for the same reason.

Cyber espionage is another prominent problem that captivates the imagination, and is much more common than cyber war. The highly distributed, massively interconnected nature of modern information systems makes keeping secrets difficult. It is easier than ever before to transfer, store and hide information, while more information than ever before is stored and manipulated on networked machines. A pen drive the size of a little finger can store more information than the super computers of a decade ago.

Cyber war, cyber espionage, and cyber crime all share the same root cause: our dependence on insecure networked computer systems. The bad news about this dependency is that cyber war appears to be dominating the conversation among policy-makers even though cyber crime is the largest and most pervasive problem. When pundits and policymakers focus only on cyber war, the most threats emanating from cyber crime and espionage are relegated to the background. Interestingly, building systems properly from a security perspective will address the cyber crime and espionage problems just as effectively as it will address cyber war. By building security into our systems in the first place we can lessen the possibility of cyber war, take a bite out of cyber crime, and deter cyber espionage all at the same time.

**Malware threats are often underestimated - effective payloads of Stux-Esque cyberattacks are unsophisticated and easily built**

**McGraw,** PhD and Chief Technology Officer of Cigital, and author of Software Security along with ten other software security books, **13**

[Gary, “Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In)”, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 1, pg. 109-119, February 6, 2013, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013>, accessed 6/27/22, GDS - LJ]

To bring this all home, imagine the timer controlling the spin velocity of a centrifuge working incorrectly. Centrifuge systems require careful balance and exacting technical control when used to enrich uranium. Stuxnet sabotaged this control, resulting in the destruction or disabling of thousands of centrifuge units. Though the delivery mechanism for Stuxnet involved a number of previously unknown 0day vulnerabilities, stolen crypto credentials, and other arcana, ***the action part of the payload itself was not very technically sophisticated*.** DLL interpositioning of the type explained above was well known in 1997. It is easy to carry out, and is so elementary that it is ineffective as an attack against today's online gaming systems.[20](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2012.742013) Put another way, most modern control systems are so poorly designed from a security perspective that they are vulnerable to attacks devised over 15 years ago.

Why is cyber war therefore inevitable? Because effective payloads of the Stuxnet variety are easily built. It **does not take nation-state resources to create an effective cyber war payload.** Unless and until we eradicate systemic security vulnerabilities in the systems we depend on, they will continue to be attacked. The relative ease with which an attack can be made levels the cyber playing field, allowing even cyber activists to do real and permanent damage.

**Even if our threats are inflated, that’s good, securitizing them is the best way to build trust and avoid extinction—otherwise, governmental collapse**

**Schneider 22** [Schneider, Jacquelyn. “A World without Trust: The Insidious Cyberthreat.” Heinonline.org, June 2022, heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/fora101&id=24&collection=journals&index=. Accessed 27 June 2022. Jacquelyn Schneider is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Her research focuses on the intersection of technology, national security, and political psychology with a special interest in cybersecurity, unmanned technologies, and Northeast Asia. \ kaylan]

When sounding the alarm over cyberthreats, policymakers and analysts have typically employed a vocabulary of conflict and catastrophe. As early as 2001, James Adams, a co-founder of the cybersecu- rity firm iDefense, warned in these pages that cyberspace was "a new inter- national battlefield," where future military campaigns would be won or lost. In subsequent years, U.S. defense officials warned of a "cyber-Pearl Harbor," in the words of then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, and a "cyber 9/11," according to then Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano. In 2015, James Clapper, then the director of national intelligence, said the United States must prepare for a "cyber Arma- geddon" but acknowledged it was not the most likely scenario. In response to the threat, officials argued that cyberspace should be understood as a "domain" of conflict, with "key terrain" that the United States needed to take or defend. The 20 years since Adams's warning have revealed that **cyberthreats and cyberattacks are hugely consequential**- but not in the way most predictions suggested. Spying and theft in cyber- JACQUELYN SCHNEIDER is a Hoover Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. 22 FOREIGN AFFAIRS space have garnered peta-, exa-, even zettabytes of sensitive and proprietary data. Cyber-enabled information opera- tions have **threatened elections** and incited mass social movements. Cyberat- tacks on businesses have cost hundreds of **billions** of dollars. But while the cyberthreat is real and growing, expecta- tions that cyberattacks would create large-scale physical effects akin to those caused by surprise bombings on U.S. soil, or that they would hurtle states into violent conflict, or even that what happened in the domain of cyberspace would define who won or lost on the battlefield haven't been borne out. In trying to analogize the cyberthreat to the world of physical warfare, policymakers missed the far more insidious danger that cyber-operations pose: how they erode the trust people place in markets, governments, and even **national power**. Correctly **diagnosing the threat is essential**, in part because it shapes how states invest in cybersecurity. Focusing on single, potentially catastrophic events, and thinking mostly about the possible physical effects of cyberattacks, unduly prioritizes capabilities that will protect against "the big one": large-scale re- sponses to disastrous cyberattacks, offensive measures that produce physical violence, or punishments only for the kinds of attacks that cross a strategic threshold. Such capabilities and responses are mostly ineffective at protecting against the way cyberattacks undermine the trust that undergirds modern economies, societies, governments, and militaries. If trust is what's at stake-and it has already been deeply eroded-then the steps states must take to survive and operate in this new world are different. The solution to a "cyber-Pearl Harbor" t AN- 410 , .r , 40 Jacquelyn Schneider is to do everything possible to ensure it doesn't happen, but the way to retain trust in a digital world despite the inevitability of cyberattacks is to build resilience and thereby promote confi- dence in today's systems of commerce, governance, military power, and interna- tional cooperation. States can develop this resilience by restoring links be- tween humans and within networks, by strategically distributing analog systems where needed, and by investing in processes that allow for manual and human intervention. The key to success in cyberspace over the long term is not finding a way to defeat all cyberattacks but learning how to survive despite the disruption and destruction they cause. The United States has not so far experienced a "cyber 9/11," and a cyber- attack that causes immediate cata- strophic physical effects isn't likely in the future, either. But Americans' trust in their government, their institutions, and even their fellow citizens is declin- ing rapidly-weakening the very foun- dations of society. Cyberattacks prey on these weak points, sowing distrust in information, creating confusion and anxiety, and exacerbating hatred and misinformation. As people's digital dependencies grow and the links among technologies, people, and institutions become more tenuous, this cyberthreat to trust will only **become more existen- tial**. It is this creeping dystopian future that policymakers should worry about- and **do everything possible to avert**. THE TIES THAT BIND Trust, defined as "the firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something," plays a central role in economies, societies, and the international system. It allows individu- als, organizations, and states to delegate tasks or responsibilities, thereby freeing up time and resources to accomplish other jobs, or to cooperate instead of acting alone. It is the glue that allows complex relationships to survive-per- mitting markets to become more com- plex, governance to extend over a broader population or set of issues, and states to trade, cooperate, and exist within more complicated alliance relationships. "Extensions of trust ... enable coordina- tion of actions over large domains of space and time, which in turn permits the benefits of more complex, differentiated, and diverse societies," explains the political scientist Mark Warren. Those extensions of trust have played an essential role in human progress across all dimensions. Primitive, iso- lated, and autocratic societies function with what sociologists call "particular- ized trust"-a trust of only known others. Modern and interconnected states require what's called "generalized trust," which extends beyond known circles and allows actors to delegate trust relationships to individuals, organizations, and processes with whom the truster is not intimately familiar. Particularized trust leads to allegiance within small groups, distrust of others, and wariness of unfamiliar processes or institutions; generalized trust enables complicated market interactions, com- munity involvement, and trade and cooperation among states. The modern market, for example, could not exist without the trust that allows for the delegation of responsibil- ity to another entity. People trust that currencies have value, that banks can secure and safeguard assets, and that 24 FOREIGN AFFAIRS A World Without Trust 1ous in the form of checks, credit cards, or loans will be fulfilled. When individu- als and entities have trust in a financial system, wages, profits, and employment increase. Trust in laws about property rights facilitates trade and economic prosperity. The digital economy makes this generalized trust even more impor- tant. No longer do people deposit gold in a bank vault. Instead, modern econo- mies consist of complicated sets of digital transactions in which users must trust not only that banks are securing and safeguarding their assets but also that the digital medium-a series of ones and zeros linked together in code- translates to an actual value that can be used to buy goods and services. Trust is a basic ingredient of social capital-the shared norms and intercon- nected networks that, as the political scientist Robert Putnam has famously argued, lead to more peaceful and prosperous communities. The general- ized trust at the heart of social capital allows voters to delegate responsibility to proxies and institutions to represent their interests. Voters must trust that a repre- sentative will promote their interests, that votes will be logged and counted properly, and that the institutions that write and uphold laws will do so fairly. Finally, trust is at the heart of how states generate national power and, ultimately, how they interact within the international system. It allows civilian heads of state to delegate command of armed forces to military leaders and enables those military leaders to execute decentralized control of lower- level military operations and tactics. States characterized by civil-military distrust are less likely to win wars, partly because of how trust affects a regime's willingness to give control to lower levels of military units in war- fare. For example, the political scientist Caitlin Talmadge notes how Saddam Hussein's efforts to coup-proof his military through the frequent cycling of officers through assignments, the restriction of foreign travel and train- ing, and perverse regime loyalty pro- motion incentives handicapped the otherwise well-equipped Iraqi military. Trust also enables militaries to experi- ment and train with new technologies, making them more likely to innovate and develop revolutionary advance- ments in military power. Trust also dictates the stability of the international system. States rely on it to build trade and arms control agreements and, most important, to feel confident that other states will not launch a surprise attack or invasion. It enables international cooperation and thwarts arms races by creating the conditions to share information-thus defeating the suboptimal outcome of a prisoner's dilemma, wherein states choose conflict because they are unable to share the information required for cooperation. The Russian proverb "Doveryai, no proveryai"-"Trust, but verify"-has guided arms control negotiations and agreements since the Cold War. In short, the world today is more dependent on trust than ever before. This is, in large part, because of the way information and digital technologies have proliferated across modern economies, societies, governments, and militaries, their virtual nature amplifying the role that trust plays in daily activities. This occurs in a few ways. First, the rise of automation and autonomous technolo- gies-whether in traffic systems, finan- January/February 2022 25 Jacquelyn Schneider cial markets, health care, or military weapons-necessitates a delegation of trust whereby the user is trusting that the machine can accomplish a task safely and appropriately. Second, digital informa- tion requires the user to trust that data are stored in the right place, that their values are what the user believes them to be, and that the data won't be manipu- lated. Additionally, digital social media platforms create new trust dynamics around identity, privacy, and validity. How do you trust the creators of infor- mation or that your social interactions are with an actual person? How do you trust that the information you provide others will be kept private? These are relatively complex relationships with trust, all the result of users' dependence on digital technologies and information in the modern world. SUSPICION SPREADS All the trust that is needed to carry out these online interactions and exchanges creates an enormous target. In the most dramatic way, cyber-operations generate distrust in how or whether a system operates. For instance, an exploit, which is a cyberattack that takes advantage of a security flaw in a computer system, can hack and control a pacemaker, causing distrust on the part of the patient using the device. Or a micro- chip backdoor can allow bad actors to access smart weapons, sowing distrust about who is in control of those weap- ons. Cyber-operations can lead to distrust in the integrity of data or the algorithms that make sense of data. Are voter logs accurate? Is that artificial- intelligence-enabled strategic warning system showing a real missile launch, or is it **a blip** in the computer code? Additionally, operating in a digital world can produce distrust in owner- ship or control of information: Are your photos private? Is your company's intellectual property secure? **Did government secrets about nuclear weapons make it into an adversary's hands**? Finally, cyber-operations create distrust by manipulating social net- works and relationships and ultimately deteriorating social capital. Online personas, bots, and disinformation campaigns all complicate whether individuals can trust both information and one another. All these cyberthreats have implications that can erode the **foundations** on which markets, socie- ties, governments, and the international system were built. The digitally dependent economy is particularly vulnerable to degradations of trust. As the modern market has become more interconnected online, cyberthreats have grown more sophisticated and ubiquitous. Yearly estimates of the total economic cost of cyberattacks range from hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars. But it isn't the financial cost of these attacks alone that threatens the modern economy. Instead, it is how these **persistent attacks create distrust in the integrity** of the system as a whole. Nowhere was this more evident than in the public's response to the ransom- ware attack on the American oil pro- vider Colonial Pipeline. In May 2021, a criminal gang known as DarkSide shut down the pipeline, which provides about 45 percent of the fuel to the East Coast of the United States, and demanded a ransom, which the company ultimately paid. Despite the limited impact of the attack on the company's ability to provide oil to its customers, people 26 FOREIGN AFFAIRS A World Without Trust panicked and flocked to gas stations with oil tanks and plastic bags to stock up on gas, leading to an artificial shortage at the pump. This kind of distrust, and the chaos it causes, threatens the founda- tions not just of the digital economy but also **of the entire economy**. The inability to safeguard intellectual property from cybertheft is similarly consequential. The practice of stealing intellectual property or trade secrets by hacking into a company's network and taking sensitive data has become a lucrative criminal enterprise-one that states including China and North Korea use to catch up with the United States and other countries that have the most innovative technology. North Korea famously hacked the pharmaceutical company Pfizer in an attempt to steal its covID-19 vaccine technology, and Chinese exfiltrations of U.S. defense industrial base research has led to copycat technological advances in aircraft and missile development. The more extensive and sophisticated such attacks become, the less companies can trust that their investments in research and development will lead to profit-ul- timately destroying knowledge-based economies. And nowhere are the threats to trust more existential than in online banking. If users no longer trust that their digital data and their money can be safeguarded, then the entire compli- cated modern financial system could collapse. Perversely, the turn toward cryptocurrencies, most of which are not backed by government guarantees, makes trust in the value of digital information all the more critical. Societies and governments are also vulnerable to attacks on trust. Schools, courts, and municipal governments have all become ransomware targets- whereby systems are taken offline or rendered useless until the victim pays up. In the cross hairs are virtual class- rooms, access to judicial records, and local emergency services. And while the immediate impact of these attacks can temporarily degrade some governance and social functions, the greater danger is that over the long term, a lack of faith in the integrity of data stored by gov- ernments-whether marriage records, birth certificates, criminal records, or property divisions-can erode trust in the basic functions of a society. Democ- racy's reliance on information and social capital to build trust in institutions has proved remarkably vulnerable to cyber- enabled information operations. State- sponsored campaigns that provoke questions about the integrity of gover- nance data (such as vote tallies) or that fracture communities into small groups of particularized trust give rise to the kind of forces that foment civil unrest and threaten democracy. Cyber-operations can also **jeopardize military power**, by attacking trust in modern weapons. With the rise of digital capabilities, starting with the **microprocessor**, states began to rely on smart weapons, networked sensors, and autonomous platforms for their militar- ies. As those militaries became more digitally capable, they also became susceptible to cyber-operations that threatened the reliability and functional- ity of these smart weapons systems. Whereas a previous focus on cyber- threats fixated on how cyber-operations could act like a bomb**, the true danger occurs when cyberattacks make it difficult to trust that actual bombs will work as expected**. As militaries move January/February 2022 27 Jacquelyn Schneider farther away from the battlefield through remote operations and com- manders delegate responsibility to autonomous systems, this trust becomes all the more important. Can militaries have faith that cyberattacks on autono- mous systems will not render them ineffective or, worse, cause fratricide or kill civilians? Furthermore, for highly networked militaries (such as that of the United States), lessons taken from the early information age led to doctrines, campaigns, and weapons that rely on complex distributions of information. Absent trust in information or the means by which it is being disseminated, militaries will be stymied-awaiting new orders, unsure of how to proceed. Together, these factors threaten the fragile systems of trust that facilitate peace and stability within the interna- tional system. They make trade less likely, arms control more difficult, and states more uncertain about one anoth- er's intentions. The introduction of cybertools for spying, attacks, and theft has only exacerbated the effects of distrust. **Offensive cyber-capabilities** are difficult to monitor, and the **lack of norms about the appropriate uses of cyber-operations makes it difficult for states to trust that others will use restraint.** Are Russian hackers exploring U.S. power networks to launch an imminent cyberattack, or are they merely probing for vulnerabilities, with no future plans to use them? **Are U.S. "defend forward" cyber-operations truly to prevent attacks on U.S. networks or instead a guise to justify offensive cyberattacks on Chinese or Russian command-and-control systems**? Mean- while, the use of mercenaries, interme- diaries, and gray-zone operations in cyberspace makes attribution and determining intent harder, further threatening trust and cooperation in the international system. For example, Israeli spyware aiding Saudi govern- ment efforts to repress dissent, off-duty Chinese military hacktivists, criminal organizations the Russian state allows but does not officially sponsor-all make it difficult to establish a clear chain of attribution for an intentional state action. Such intermediaries also threaten the usefulness of official agreements among states about what is appropriate behavior in cyberspace. LIVING WITH FAILURE To date, U.S. solutions to dangers in cyberspace have focused on the cyber- space part of the question-deterring, defending against, and defeating cyber- threats as they attack their targets. But these cyber-focused strategies have struggled and even failed: cyberattacks are on the rise, the efficacy of deterrence is questionable, and offensive ap- proaches cannot stem the tide of small- scale attacks that threaten the world's modern, digital foundations. Massive exploits-such as the recent hacks of SolarWinds' network management software and Microsoft Exchange Server's email software-are less a failure of U.S. cyberdefenses than a symptom of how the targeted systems were conceived and constructed in the first place. The goal should be not to stop all cyber-intrusions but to build systems that are able to withstand incoming attacks. This is not a new lesson. When cannons and gunpowder debuted in Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, cities struggled to survive the onslaught of the new 28 FOREIGN AFFAIRS A World Without Trust firepower. So states adapted their fortifications-dug ditches, built bas- tions, organized cavaliers, constructed extensive polygonal edifices-all with the idea of creating cities that could survive a siege, not stop the cannon fire from ever occurring. The best fortifica- tions were designed to enable active defense, wearing the attackers down until a counterattack could defeat the forces remaining outside the city. The fortification analogy invites an alternative cyberstrategy in which the focus is on the system itself-whether that's a smart weapon, an electric grid, or the mind of an American voter. How does one build systems that can con- tinue to operate in a world of degraded trust? Here, network theory-the study of how networks succeed, fail, and survive-offers guidance. Studies on network robustness find that the strongest networks are those with a high density of small nodes and mul- tiple pathways between nodes. Highly resilient networks can withstand the removal of multiple nodes and linkages without decomposing, whereas less resilient, centralized networks, with few pathways and sparser nodes, have a much lower critical threshold for degradation and failure. If economies, societies, governments, and the interna- tional system are going to survive serious erosions of trust, they will need more bonds and links, fewer dependen- cies on central nodes, and new ways to reconstitute network components even as they are under attack. Together, these qualities will lead to generalized trust in the integrity of the systems. How can states build such networks? First, at the technical level, networks and data structures that undergird the economy, critical infrastructure, and military power must prioritize resil- ience. This requires decentralized and dense networks, hybrid cloud struc- tures, redundant applications, and backup processes. It implies planning and training for network failure so that individuals can adapt and continue to provide services even in the midst of an offensive cyber-campaign. It means relying on physical backups for the most important data (such as votes) and manual options for operating systems when digital capabilities are unavail- able. For some highly sensitive systems (for instance, nuclear command and control), it may be that analog options, even when less efficient, produce remarkable resilience. Users need to trust that digital capabilities and net- works have been designed to gracefully degrade, as opposed to catastrophically fail: the distinction between binary trust (that is, trusting the system will work perfectly or not trusting the system at all) and a continuum of trust (trusting the system to function at some percentage between zero and 100 percent) should drive the design of digital capabilities and networks. These design choices will not only increase users' trust but also decrease the incen- tives for criminal and state-based actors to launch cyberattacks. Making critical infrastructure and military power more resilient to cyber- attacks would have positive effects on international stability. More resilient infrastructure and populations are less susceptible to systemic and long-lasting effects from cyberattacks because they can bounce back quickly. This resilience, in turn, decreases the incentives for states to preemptively strike an adver- January/February 2022 29 Jacquelyn Schneider sary online, since they would question the efficacy of their cyberattacks and their ability to coerce the target popula- tion. Faced with a difficult, costly, and potentially ineffective attack, aggressors are less likely to see the benefits of chancing the cyberattack in the first place. Furthermore, states that focus on building resilience and perseverance in their digitally enabled military forces are less likely to double down on first-strike or offensive operations, such as long-range missile strikes or cam- paigns of preemption. The security dilemma-when states that would otherwise not go to war with each other find themselves in conflict because they are uncertain about each other's inten- tions-suggests that when states focus more on defense than offense, they are **less likely to spiral into conflicts** caused by distrust and uncertainty. HUMAN RESOURCES Solving the technical side, however, is only part of the solution. The most important trust relationships that cyberspace threatens are society's human networks-that is, the bonds and links that people have as individuals, neigh- bors, and citizens so that they can work together to solve problems. Solutions for making these human networks more durable are even more complicated and difficult than any technical fixes. Cyber- enabled information operations target the links that build trust between people and communities. They undermine these broader connections by creating incen- tives to form clustered networks of particularized trust-for example, social media platforms that organize groups of like-minded individuals or disinforma- tion campaigns that promote in-group and out-group divisions. Algorithms and clickbait designed to promote outrage only galvanize these divisions and decrease trust of those outside the group. Governments can try to regulate these forces on social media, but those virtual enclaves reflect actual divisions within society. And there's a feedback loop: the distrust that is building online leaks out into the real world, separating people further into groups of "us" and "them." Combating this requires education and civic engage- ment-the bowling leagues that Put- nam said were necessary to rebuild Americans' social capital (Putnam's book Bowling Alone, coincidentally, came out in 2000, just as the Internet was beginning to take off). After two years of a global pandemic and a further splintering of Americans into virtual enclaves, it is time to reenergize physical communities, time for neigh- borhoods, school districts, and towns to come together to rebuild the links and bonds that were severed to save lives during the pandemic. The fact is that these divisions were festering in American communities even before the pandemic or the Internet accelerated their consolidation and amplified their power. The solution, therefore, the way to do this kind of rebuilding, will not come from social media, the cEos of those platforms, or digital tools. In- stead, it will take courageous local leaders who can rebuild trust from the ground up, finding ways to bring together communities that have been driven apart. It will take more frequent disconnecting from the Internet, and from the synthetic groups of particular- ized trust that were formed there, in order to reconnect in person. Civic 30 FOREIGN AFFAIRS A World Without Trust education could help by reminding communities of their commonalities and shared goals and by creating critical thinkers who can work for change within democratic institutions. BOWLING TOGETHER There's a saying that cyber-operations lead to death by a thousand cuts, but perhaps a better analogy is termites, hidden in the recesses of foundations, that gradually **eat away at the very structures designed to support people's lives.** The previous strategic focus on one-off, large-scale cyber-operations led to bigger and better cyber-capabilities, but it never addressed the fragility within the foundations and networks themselves. Will cyberattacks ever cause the kind of serious physical effects that were feared over the last two decades? Will a strategy focused more on trust and resilience leave states uniquely vulner- able to this? It is of course impossible to say that no cyberattack will ever pro- duce large-scale physical effects similar to those that resulted from the bombing of Pearl Harbor. But it is unlikely-be- cause the nature of cyberspace, its virtual, transient, and ever-changing character, makes it difficult for attacks on it to create lasting physical effects. Strategies that focus on trust and resilience by investing in networks and relationships make these kinds of attacks yet more difficult. Therefore, focusing on building networks that can survive incessant, smaller attacks has a fortuitous byproduct: additional resil- ience against one-off, large-scale at- tacks. But this isn't easy, and there is a significant tradeoff in both efficiency and cost for strategies that focus on resilience, redundancy, and persever- ance over convenience or deterring and defeating cyberthreats. And the initial cost of these measures to foster trust falls disproportionately on democracies, which must cultivate generalized trust, as opposed to the particularized trust that autocracies rely on for power. This can seem like a tough pill to swallow, especially as China and the United States appear to be racing toward an increasingly competitive relationship. Despite the difficulties and the cost, democracies and modern economies (such as the United States) must prioritize building trust in the systems that make societies run-whether that's the electric grid, banks, schools, voting machines, or the media. That means creating backup plans and fail-safes, making strategic decisions about what should be online or digital and what needs to stay analog or physical, and building networks-both online and in society-that can survive even when one node is attacked. If a stolen pass- word can still take out an oil pipeline or a fake social media account can con- tinue to sway the political opinions of thousands of voters, then cyberattacks will remain too lucrative for autocracies and criminal actors to resist. Failing to build in more resilience-both technical and human-will mean that the cycle of cyberattacks and the distrust they give rise to will **continue to threaten the foundations of democratic society.**

**Impact Defense**

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**Reps don’t shape reality and there’s no impact**

**Van Rythoven 19** – Researcher at the Journal of Global Security Studies, PhD in Political Science from Carleton University

Eric Van Rythoven, “The Securitization Dilemma,” Journal of Global Security Studies, 7-16-2019, https://academic.oup.com/jogss/article-abstract/5/3/478/5532523?redirectedFrom=fulltext#137694797

Tragedy is largely absent from the existing normative debate on securitization. Instead, the debate has become organized around whether securitization is a “negative” or “positive” concept. In the classic formulation, the Copenhagen School points to how “[n]ational security should not be idealized. It works to silence opposition and has given power-holders many opportunities to exploit ‘threats’ for domestic purposes” (Buzan et al. 1998, 29; Williams 2003). Securitization has negative effects when it functions as “a political technology that consistently favors the interests of the powerful and enables violence and exclusion” (McDonald 2015, 154). Correspondingly, Wæver admits a “‘bias’ for desecuritization” or de-escalation, although he quickly notes that this is “not always better than securitization” (Wæver 2011, 469). At the same time, a number of approaches point to cases where securitization is ethically desirable. In her compelling consequentialist argument, for example, Floyd asks “whether the consequences of, and the gains from, the securitization are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicization” (2007, 338). Relatedly, Roe contends that “the extent to which securitization necessitates a lack of openness and deliberation has been overexaggerated” and suggests it may even elicit unappreciated forms of cooperation (2012, 250).

The problem with the negative/positive debate is that it appears to impose moral certitude where there often is none. Registering securitizing moves as clearly positive or negative can be difficult because their effects can be mixed and temporally distant. The difficulty in making this determination may also be an indicator of the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves. In the end, because the outcomes of security claims are uncertain, we cannot know in advance whether they will lead to positive or negative consequences. Instead, we should entertain a distinctly tragic vision of securitization that councils an ethic of self-limitation. The core of this tragic vision is a recognition that the powerful allure of using security talk to “gain control” over a situation will always be present (Wæver 1995, 54). However, we should also recognize that this control is always illusory because it presumes all of its effects can be predetermined. The tragedy of securitization is that the failure to recognize how contingency imposes limits on action lures political actors into a false sense of certainty and the conviction that they can determine the future. This leads to a hubristic adoption of “misplaced certainty,” such as when Vice President Dick Cheney declared in August of 2002 that “there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction” (quoted in Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 3). A similar situation emerged when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld subsequently claimed in November that the Iraq conflict could be “[f]ive days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that” (Esterbrook 2002). A similarly misplaced certainty is evident in US General Stanley McChrystal’s assurances to the Obama administration in 2009 that a surge in troops and resources were critical to stave off American defeat in Afghanistan (Woodward 2009). More recently, it is visible in President Donald Trump’s 2018 assertion that he was “100 percent right” on the weaknesses of the Iran nuclear deal (CNN 2018).

Yet, tragedy cuts both ways. Blanket opposition to securitizing moves can also have unanticipated effects. Ironically, the desecuritization of an issue may not just result in its repoliticization, but in its disappearance from public view (Floyd 2010, 57–58). Viewing security discourse as negative also underplays how the management of threats can serve as a focal point for democratic cooperation among different political actors (Roe 2012, 250, 257–58). The point is not that every security discourse and the practices it justifies has catastrophically perverse consequences. Instead, the goal is to highlight a sensible restraint over the limits of seeing into the future, how this shapes choice, and the dangers of hubris that follow. When properly adapted to this constructivist context, the tragic vision of securitization can be an important tool in cultivating prudence and restraint (cf. Lebow 2003, 364).

The problem with this tragic vision is that it points to processes that are never entirely in our possession. Whether in the form of background knowledge (Pouliot 2008), habits (Hopf 2010), or routines (Mitzen 2006), much of social life occurs without conscious deliberation and reflection. These forms of unthinking action impair reflexivity and limit actors’ ability to see how the world might be different and thus how outcomes can be uncertain. In some cases, this can be benign, such as the unreflexive amity between Canada and the United States that allows these countries to “escape” from the traditional security dilemma (Collins 2014, 572–73). But just as practices of amity can be habitual, so too can enmity. The hawkish US senator may designate Iran’s nuclear program as threatening because that is what hawkish US senators do, and there is no perceived way to be hawkish otherwise. The result is that the uncertainty surrounding securitizing moves becomes concealed under an unthinking veil of common sense. The tragedy of securitization then is not only that political figures often exceed their limitations by ignoring how contingency can derail securitizing moves—it is that these limitations often never even register

This means overcoming the tragedy of securitization require a certain degree self-reflexivity. This is similar to what Booth and Wheeler describe as the “security dilemma sensibility,” or an actor’s ability and willingness to reflect upon their actions, including one’s own role in provoking insecurity in others (2008, 7). By sensitizing leaders to how uncertainty is an endemic feature of political life, and how their actions can be interpreted in unintended ways, security competition can be mitigated, at least in part (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 265). Yet, these moments of self-awareness and reflection are difficult precisely because there are powerful forces that demand simplicity and closure: namely our desire for a stable sense of self or what is widely referred to as ontological security (Mitzen 2006). Reflecting on the uncertainty of international politics can erode one’s sense of identity and agency, ultimately leading to a “deep, incapacitating state of not knowing how to get by in the world” (Mitzen and Schweller 2011, 29). Booth and Wheeler’s security dilemma sensibility may have the laudable goal of alerting leaders to the role of uncertainty in political life, but this confronts the problem that many would prefer that it remain hidden.

The consequence is that this tragic aspect of the securitization dilemma takes on an intractable character. Either unwilling or unable to “know one’s limits,” as Herz would say (1950, 179), the role of uncertainty becomes hidden and security claims appear as a reliable strategy for control and influence. Like the classic realist dilemma, the securitization dilemma is pervasive because it is often invisible. The compelling need for a logic of selflimitation—of a careful and reflective use of security language and how it can be derailed by contingency— is obscured because of an aversion to recognizinguncertainty. It is this specter of a need for reflection and restraint that may not be realized, I suggest, which demands that we rethink the role of the analyst in provoking reflexivity among power-holders.

Conclusion: Rethinking the Role of the Analyst

Motivated by the absence of unintended and perverse consequences in constructivist theorizing of security, this article has pursued a reconceptualization of the security dilemma. Viewing the dilemma as a logic of limitation shaped by choice, uncertainty, and tragedy, the argument focuses on transposing this logic to the constructivist context of securitization theory. By showing how the choice to engage in the social construction of threats is complicated by uncertainty and the tragic failure to recognize one’s own limits, the dilemma analytic helps us to understand how securitization can be both a potent instrument for mobilization, as well as a volatile source of unpredictability. Moreover, this conceptual lens lays the foundation for an ethical imperative of self-limitation among securitizing actors—albeit one made difficult given the desire for simplicity and closure. Far from a rebuke of constructivist theorizing, the argument shows that taking the social character of security seriously means appreciating how political claims are always vulnerable to being derailed by different types of contingency.

This reconstructive move has important implications for studying the social construction of security. First, while the initial influence of realism on securitization theory is well-documented (Floyd 2010; Gad and Peterson 2011), few attempts have been made to show how engaging with these realist roots can yield new insights.22 Here, the reconstruction of the security dilemma demonstrates how returning to realist themes can yield a fresh insights. Second, the argument pushes scholars studying securitization to expand their universe of outcomes beyond the reductive binary of success and failure and to consider cases of perverse and unintended consequences. Not only are these outcomes relatively common, they undercut the prevailing image of securitization as a reliable technology of control. Third, the securitization dilemma shows why uncertainty is more of an enduring problem for social action than constructivists typically acknowledge. Contra earlier arguments where learning and socialization effectively mitigate the problem of uncertainty (Wendt 2006, 208–9), this perspective stresses how contingency means that social acts like securitizing moves can have unpredictable effects.

The most important result of this reconstruction, however, may be in how taking the tragic element of the dilemma seriously reorders the political role of the analyst. Rather than assessing the validity of a particular security discourse, or exposing its socially constructed nature, this perspective asks the analyst to provoke reflexivity on behalf of power-holders over the risks associated with securitization. While this entails a bias toward deescalation and desecuritization, unlike other approaches this is not achieved through overt references to any liberal, democratic, or emancipatory ideal. Instead, it is packaged for power-holders as a strategy of self-preservation. Here, the analyst presents the move to securitize as a risk-laden and potentially self-defeating strategy. The analyst points to a series of precedents showing how such a strategy can produce perverse consequences: how today's tough talk can become tomorrow's liability; how audiences can interpret threatening messages in unexpected ways; and how today's framing of security can lead to perverse consequences tomorrow. By foregrounding the problem of uncertainty, the analyst works to accentuate and impress upon actors the dilemmatic quality of securitizing moves.

Yet, the problem with presenting the move to securitize as a risk is that it may become accepted. Ironically, framing an escalation in enmity as possible but dangerous is precisely what may legitimize such a move in the eyes of risk-insensitive actors. This is Huysmans’ (2002) now familiar normative dilemma of writing security. The indeterminacy of language means that political actors may interpret advice in unpredictable ways. Frustratingly, this may include the precise opposite of the analyst's intention. This situation is likely inescapable, but it may be mitigated. What I suggest is that analysts should strive to cultivate a deeper subjectivity of risk sensitivity, comparable to Booth and Wheeler's security-dilemma sensibility, among political actors.

Key to this argument is how visions of the future satisfy the human desire for certainty. As Berenskoetter argues, “visions depicting the self in an imagined future order serve as anxiety controlling mechanisms” (2011, 654). Visions of the future inoculate actors against the anxiety of uncertainty by providing a narrative of where they are going and how to get there. Indeed, normative debates on securitization are already loaded with such visions. The impulse to securitize is underpinned by a utopian future where the security frame can finally mobilize a response to an otherwise intractable problem. Conversely, the impulse to desecuritize is sustained by a dystopian future defined by unrestrained authoritarian politics. A tragic vision of the future does something different: it presents a future where the only thing we can know decisively is that it is indeterminate and attempts to conclusively control it are vulnerable to failure. The very recognition of fundamental limits on human freedom (Steele 2007, 281–82) becomes transformed into a source of ontological security. This tempers the human need for cognitive closure by reconfiguring it into what Herz understood as a “fundamentally humble posture toward the value and precariousness of life” (Sylvest 2008, 442). An actor with a greater sensitivity to indeterminacy may still pursue securitizing moves, but with a cautious awareness that they are volatile acts best pursued sparingly. The analyst does not simply educate political leaders by pointing to the indeterminacy of the world; she seeks to make political subjects more sensitive toward it by crafting visions of a precarious future.

Finally, this tragic vision cannot, and should not, escape its own need for reflexivity. Its scholarly proponents need to engage in their own process of self-reflection, focusing on how their knowledge and interests are themselves historically situated. The ethic of restraint is a value, and not necessarily the value for all historical circumstances. A recognition of the social construction of security “facts” must be sobered by a recognition of the social construction of security “values” (Hamati-Ataya 2012, 685).

**1AR---No ! to Reps**

**Securitization theory is wrong — other factors outweigh representations.**

**Baysal 20** – Postdoctoral Research Fellow and Faculty of International, Political, and Urban Studies at the Universidad Del Rosario

Basar Baysal, “20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework,” Uluslararasi Iliskiler, 7-1-2020, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1228409

Despite its strengths and popularity in the last 20 years, Securitization Theory has **several limitations**, some of which have already been identified by different scholars. The most criticized aspect is its focus on speech acts.16 According to McDonald, the theory over-emphasizes speech acts while neglecting other processes or means for communication, such as images and other visual representations like videos, which also play a significant role in the process.17 As Möller notes, “language is only one of the (albeit the most central) means, through which meaning is communicated”. 18 Moreover, Williams emphasizes the importance of images by stating that: “Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics.” 19 Addressing these criticisms, several studies have examined the impact of other means of communication during the securitization process. 20 In line with this, the dual framework that is introduced in this article also takes different means of communication into account in addition to speech acts.

In addition to images and other visual representations, Paris School scholars also emphasize the role of the practices of security professionals,21 arguing that these play a more crucial role than **discursive practices** in constructing security issues.22 That is, rather than the magical power of speech acts, it is the institutionalizations and routinizations through repetitions of security practices that produce security issues. 23 Moreover, unlike the Copenhagen School, scholars of the Paris School also focus on the insecuritizing consequences of the process of securitization by asking what security does rather than what security is.24 In this way, they also inquire and focus on the threats that ordinary people face, like the Welsh School does, with its Emancipatory Security approach.25 However, the Paris School is also limited since it overemphasizes micro-level practices and ignores macro-level decisionmaking with its bottom-up framework.26 My dual framework borrows insights from the approach of the Paris School as it takes the practices of security professionals into account without ignoring the discursive impact of speech acts of macro-level decision-makers. Moreover, it also focuses on the insecuritizing consequences of securitization.

Another significant limitation of Securitization Theory is the **inadequate analysis** of the audience. According to Thierry Balzacq, the role of the audience is underspecified because of Wæver’s reliance on John L. Austin’s language theory.27 I additionally argue that the overemphasis on speech acts and under-analysis of the audience(s) in the framework of Securitization Theory derives from the tendency of the Copenhagen School scholars to see securitization as a **universal phenomenon**. According to Balzacq, however, “the success of securitization is highly contingent upon the securitizing actor’s ability to identify the audience’s feelings, needs, and interests…To persuade the audience, the speaker has to tune his/her language to the audience’s experience.”28

Securitization Theory also **fails to adequately analyze** contextual issues. Balzacq, for example, claims that whereas Securitization Theory claims that securitization modifies the external context, the opposite is also true: the contextual issues and audience characteristics also influence the process and success of securitization.29 According to Matt McDonald, “in developing a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through speech acts, the Securitization Theory ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors.”30 Attention to these two related limitations, concerning audience and context, is essential to the dual securitization framework too. However, I do not elaborate on these in this article since they have already been discussed by various scholars, and many empirical studies have already been conducted with a focus on these issues.31

**2AC/1AR---AT: Endless War**

**No impact to endless war.**

**Chandler 9** – Professor of IR at the University of Westminster

David Chandler, "Liberal War and Foucaultian Metaphysics," Review of Dillon and Reid’s The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, www.research.kobe-u.ac.jp/gsics-publication/jics/chandler\_18-1.pdf

This is a book about the ‘liberal way of war’. But the liberal referred to in the title remains under theorized. On several occasions the authors highlight the distinction between the liberal way of war and the general framing of war in the modern liberal era as a geo-strategic contestation, taking the territorial state as its referent object. For Dillon and Reid, ‘liberalism never fitted this model of modern politics and the modern problematization of war very well’（p.83). They therefore seek to define liberalism and the liberal way of war as distinct from war in the liberal era. **The liberal way of war refers not to real wars and conflicts but to an abstract model of conflict**, defined as a desire to‘remove war from the life of humanity’which‘derives from the way in which liberalism takes the life of the species as its referent object of politics ─ biopolitics’（p.84）. In this framing, the liberal nature of war very much depends on the self-description of the conflict by its proponents: these range from Gladstone’s occupation of Egypt in the cause of‘suffering humanity’, to US liberal ideological constructions of the cause of‘freedom’in the Cold War struggle against the Soviet Union up to Bush and Blair’s war on Iraq in the cause of humanity（p.6）. As the authors state, of course, wars may be fought on other grounds than universal humanity: ‘liberal states may…also act as geopolitical sovereign actors as well…and may also have geopolitical motives for the wars they wage’（p.84）.¶ **It is clear from the beginning that the distinctiveness of ‘the liberal way of war’ which they seek to explore cannot be more than a fool’s quest**. They assert that they will critically uncover the paradox of liberal war: why it is that Realist or geostrategic war accepts the necessity of war but attempts to limit it, while liberals wish to end war but, to do so, are willing to fight unlimited wars. Yet, they admit that **this starting point is already an ideological dead end** ─ the wars of the twentieth century give the lie to the idea that there is some distinction between ‘unending crusades’ and ‘limited jousts between rationally calculative political subjects’: war has its own dynamic（p.7). Nevertheless, Dillon and Reid press on and seek to go beyond a Schmittian critique to ground this paradox in the biopolitical‘driver’of the liberal way of rule ─ biopolitics: wars waged under the banner of the human（against humans）are liberal and, allegedly biopolitical, as human life is declared to be the referent in need of being secured. These wars are alleged to be fought differently to geo-political wars for territory, because the ‘drivers’ of war are not territorialized interests but the biopolitical framings of the needs of the human, how human life can and should be lived. Inevitably there are **insuperable methodological hurdles** to this Sisyphusian task. Already, there occurs the first fundamental aporia: how do we tell the difference between a liberal and non-liberal war? There appears to be no way of preventing the category of liberal war from becoming a lifeless and descriptive one: wars are liberal and fought biopolitically only if we are told that these are the motives by those fighting them.¶ **This separation of liberal ways of war from territorialised framings of geostrategic contestation makes little sense** as a framework for understanding either liberal rule or liberal ways of war. In fact, in defining liberal war in this way the connection between liberal rule and war is entirely severed. ‘Liberal war may on occasions also be geopolitical; which is to say that war may be simultaneously geopolitical as well as biopolitically driven since the imperatives behind war are never uniform or simple; but what distinguishes the liberal way of war as liberal are the biopolitical imperatives which have consistently driven its violent peace-making.’（p.85）Liberal rule has also resulted in wars for territory or in defence of territories; nevertheless, a story, of course, could have been told about how views of the human fitted those of struggles to command territory. This is acknowledged, but sits uneasily with the narrow view of liberal war for species life. If the racial doctrines of European empires, up to and including the genocidal racism of the Nazi regime, were also biopolitically driven ─ and the authors, indeed, write of race as part of the‘liberal biopolitics of the seventeenth century’─ then it seems difficult to separate a liberal way of war from allegedly ‘non-liberal’ wars of territorial control.¶ It seems clear that Dillon and Reid do not seek to take the logical step of arguing that the view of the human reflects, and is reflected by, how the human is ruled and how wars are both thought and fought. Why? Because for them there is something suprahistorically unique and distinct about the liberal way of war: a distinctly liberal view which foregrounds the human as the referent of security. Therefore, **a second aporia arises: on what basis is this specifically ‘liberal’?** It would appear that every form of rule and of war has at least an implicit view of the ‘human’ and through this view of the human the form of rule and the way of war are rationalized. There is not and cannot be anything specifically ‘liberal’ about this. The humanity in need of securing, through war on other humans, could be formed by Alexander the Great’s stoic cosmopolitan vision, or could be‘God’s chosen people’, ‘the master race’, or ‘the gains of the proletarian revolution’: there is little doubt that beliefs of what the human is, or could become, were a vital part of many non-Liberal dispositifs ─ the discourses and practices - of both rule and war. ¶ **The key starting assumption, that the liberal way of war can be isolated from any other - and** its alleged specific form, of ‘**unending violence’, explained by its referent of the human - appears to be** a **particularly unproductive** one. At the level of abstraction at which Dillon and Reid choose to work, there is very little here that would help to distinguish between a liberal and a non-liberal way of war（the asserted purpose of the book）. Of course, what matters is what this view of the human is. Here Dillon and Reid appear to recognise the limits of their essentializing approach: …just as the liberal way of rule is constantly adapting and changing so also is the liberal way of war. There is, in that sense, no one liberal way of rule or one liberal way of war. But there is a fundamental continuity which justifies us referring to the singular…the fact that each takes the properties of species existence as its referent object…finding its expression historically in many changing formations of rule according…to the changing exigencies and understanding of species being…（p.84）¶ Rather than understand our forms of post-political rule and post-territorial war today on their own terms and then consider to what extent this way of rule and war can be theorized, and to what extent, if any, Foucault’s conception of biopolitics may be of assistance, Dillon and Reid start out from the assumption that we live in a liberal world of rule and war and that therefore both can be critiqued through the framework developed by Foucault in his engagement with understanding the rise and transformation of liberal forms of rule. In transposing Foucault’s critical engagement with liberal ways of rule to an understanding of liberal ways of war, Dillon and Reid take a body of historical work about the changing political nature of liberal rule and transpose it into an essentialised and under theorized understanding of liberal war. This is no mean feat; how they manage this accomplishment will be discussed in the next two sections.

**2AC/1AR---AT: Root Cause**

**No root cause, especially in IR. Realism provides unique insights.**

**Cruz 20** – Professor at Baylor College

Miguel Cruz, “Between Theory and Practice: The Utility of International Relations Theory to the Military Practitioner,” Air University, 2-3-2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Wild-Blue-Yonder/Article-Display/Article/2063140/between-theory-and-practice-the-utility-of-international-relations-theory-to-th/

Constructivism helps to understand and navigate the complex ways in which states as well as influential non-state actors engage with one another, how they define themselves and others, and how these shape the boundaries of the world within which they act.48 It helps explain how norms based on common ideas and values can help promote security and cooperation, and how significantly different ideologies can lead to conflict. Constructivism goes a long way in explaining how individuals and organizations influence policy decisions. However, **constructivism alone can’t answer all** policy issues. There are **obvious gaps** that require the application of **realist** and liberalist perspectives to comprehend modern international relations.49 **In today’s complex, ever-changing environment, no theory** is **comprehensive** enough to stand alone.50 Policy makers and senior advisors should consider the insights of each theory when articulating national security policy. Conclusion **Theory cannot claim primacy over practice** and implementation, but its understanding is a useful precursor for both. This is the central argument of this examination. As senior advisors, how we choose to explain national security issues inform the solutions we propose. Because national security policy is important to the practice of military affairs, it is paramount that senior military leaders develop a good understanding of those aspects affecting policy formulation. Improving this understanding can **provide a stronger foundation** for senior military leaders to engage more **effectively** with civilian leaders **on defense-related policies**. IR theory helps describe **how policy makers** see the world and how **this influences policy making**. **Theory** influences their **perspectives** and **inform** their **biases** and thus, deserve study and analysis. Three predominant schools of thought attempt to explain the way states behave: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. In general terms, realism focuses on state power, typically in relation to other states. For the United States, realist policies can translate into hegemonic actions designed to maintain preeminence in the world. Liberalism stresses the emphasis on democratic institutions and economic interdependence. This can prompt policies designed to maximize international cooperation through international bodies and trade at the expense of defense-related capabilities. Constructivism highlights the influence of shared norms, values, and ideas on state behavior. Normative policies generally focused on establishing international rules and norms of behavior states are expected to follow with heavy emphasis in the diplomatic and legal arenas. **Theory**, however, **is no panacea**. While these theories offer useful frameworks with which to observe international relations, they tend to either **overemphasize or underestimate attributes** in state behavior such as the primacy of power, the importance of interdependence or the necessity of norms. Thus, policy making and subsequent execution relying on **one theory** at the exclusion of others **is risky**. Senior military officers and policy advisors cannot be content with simply knowing what policy is. They must understand what policy does and the mechanisms available to recommend appropriate and effective policy. Having an understanding of how perceptions of the world and state behavior affect policy decisions is a way to do so. In this regard, IR theory remains **essential** for **understanding** world events, explaining their causes, assessing their impacts, and proposing suitable solutions. As Snyder suggests, “to use the insights of each of the three theoretical traditions as a check on the irrational exuberance of the others.”51 There is utility in theory, but it is the practitioners’ role to determine how they apply. Most importantly, it is the practitioner’s job to make the best use of them in order to advance national goals.

**Totalizing claims of conflict are intellectually bankrupt.**

**Chan 20** – Professor of Political Science and Director of the Farrand Residence Academic Program at the University of Colorado, Boulder

Steve Chan, "Roundtable 12-2 on Thucydides’s Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry, and the Future of Sino-American Relations," ISSF, 11-9-2020, <https://issforum.org/roundtables/12-2-thucydides#_Toc55574357>

Having said all of this, I very much agree with Wang that “States can go to war for a **variety of reasons**. Attempting to **isolate** a **single cause for all wars** is **impossible**. The proposition that war tends to **break ou**t during a power transition is better understood as a **probabilistic—not** **deterministic—statement**.” In order to assess the **relevant probability of war**, it is imperative that researchers develop a **valid** and **comprehensive data base** to enable such assessment. **Sensible**, **consistent**, and **theoretically** informed rules for the **inclusion** and **exclusion of cases** would be **necessary to implement** this data project. Otherwise, an analysis can be seen to **engage in cherry-picking**, ransacking history for **evidence** supporting its proposition(s).

**Alt**

**2AC---Alt Fails**

**Other social structures overwhelm the alt AND securitization theory is wrong.**

**Goddard and Krebs 15** – Associate Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College; Professor in the Liberal Arts and Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

Stacie Goddard and Ronald Krebs, “Securitization Forum: The Transatlantic Divide: Why Securitization Has Not Secured a Place in American IR, Why It Should, and How It Can,” Duck of Minerva, 9-18-2015, http://duckofminerva.com/2015/09/securitization-forum-the-transatlantic-divide-why-securitization-has-not-secured-a-place-in-american-ir-why-it-should-and-how-it-can.html

Securitization theory has rightly garnered much attention among European scholars of international relations. Its basic claims are powerful: that security threats are not given, but require active construction; that the boundaries of “security” are malleable; that the declaration that a certain problem lies within the realm of security is itself a productive political act; and that “security” issues hold a trump card, demanding disproportionate resources and silencing alternative perspectives. Securitization thus highlights a familiar, even ubiquitous, political process that had received little attention in the international relations or comparative foreign policy literatures. It gave scholars a theoretical language, if not quite a set of coherent theoretical tools, with which to make sense of how a diverse set of issues, from migration to narcotics flows to global climate change, sometimes came to be treated as matters of national and global security and thereby—and this is where securitization’s critical edge came to the fore—impeded reasoned political debate. No surprise that, as Jarrod and Eric observe, securitization has been the focus of so many articles in the EJIR—and even more in such journals as the Review of International Studies and Security Dialogue. But there are (good) substantive and (not so good) sociological reasons that **securitization has failed to gain traction in North America**. First, and most important, securitization describes a process but leaves us well short of (a) a fully specified causal theory that (b) takes proper account of the politics of rhetorical contestation. According to the foundational theorists of the Copenhagen School, actors, usually elites, transform the social order from one of normal, everyday politics into a Schmittian world of crisis by identifying a dire threat to the political community. They conceive of this “securitizing move” in linguistic terms, as a speech act. As Ole Waever (1995: 55) argues, “By saying it [security], something is done (as in betting, a promise, naming a ship). . . . [T]he word ‘security’ is the act . . .” [emphasis added]. Securitization is a powerful discursive process that constitutes social reality. Countless articles and books have traced this process, and its consequences, in particular policy domains. Securitization presents itself as a **causal** account. But its **mechanisms remain obscure**, as do the **conditions** under which it operates. Why is speaking security so powerful? How do mere words twist and transform the social order? Does the invocation of security prompt a visceral emotional response? Are speech acts persuasive, by using well-known tropes to convince audiences that they must seek protection? Or does securitization operate through the politics of rhetorical coercion, silencing potential opponents? In securitization accounts, **speech acts** often seem to be **magical incantations** that upend normal politics through pathways shrouded in mystery. Equally unclear is why **some** securitizing moves resonate, while others [are **ignored**] ~~fall on deaf ears~~. Certainly not all attempts to construct threats succeed, and this is true of both traditional military concerns as well as “new” security issues. Both neoconservatives and structural realists in the United States have long insisted that **conflict with China is inevitable**, yet China has over the last **25 years** been more opportunity than threat in US political discourse—**despite** these **vigorous and persistent securitizing moves**. In very recent years, the balance has shifted, and the China threat has started to catch on: **linguistic processes alone cannot account for this change**. The US military has repeatedly declared that global climate change has profound implications for national security—but that has hardly cast aside climate change deniers, many of whom are ironically foreign policy hawks supposedly deferential to the uniformed military. Authoritative speakers have varied in the efficacy of their securitizing moves. While George W. Bush powerfully framed the events of 9/11 as a global war against American values, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a more gifted orator, struggled to convince a skeptical public that Germany presented an imminent threat to the United States. After thirty years as an active research program, securitization theory has **hardly begun to offer acceptable answers** to these questions. **Brief references to “facilitating conditions” won’t cut it**. You don’t have to subscribe to a covering-law conception of theory to find these questions important or to find securitization’s answers unsatisfying. A large part of the problem, we believe, lies in securitization’s silence on the politics of security. Its foundations in speech act theory have yielded an oddly apolitical theoretical framework. In its seminal formulation, the Copenhagen school emphasized the internal linguistic rules that must be followed for a speech act to be recognized as competent. Yet as Thierry Balzacq argues, by treating securitization as a purely rule-driven process, the Copenhagen school ignores the politics of securitization, reducing “security to a conventional procedure such as marriage or betting in which the ‘felicity circumstances’ (conditions of success) must fully prevail for the act to go through” (2005:172). Absent from this picture are fierce rhetorical battles, where coalitions counter securitizing moves with their own appeals that strike more or less deeply at underlying narratives. Absent as well are the public intellectuals and media, who question and critique securitizing moves sometimes (and not others), sometimes to good effect (and sometimes with little impact). The **audience** itself—whether the mass public or a narrower elite stratum—is **stripped of all agency**. Speaking security, even when the performance is competent, **does not sweep this politics away**. Only by delving into this politics can we shed light on the mysteries of securitization. We see rhetorical politics as constituted less by singular “securitizing moves” than by “contentious conversation”—to use Charles Tilly’s phrase. To this end, we would urge securitization theorists, as we recently have elsewhere, to move towards a “pragmatic” model that rests on four analytical wagers: that actors are both strategic and social; that legitimation works by imparting meaning to political action; that legitimation is laced through with contestation; and that the power of language emerges through contentious dialogue. We are heartened that our ambivalence about securitization—the ways in which we find it by turns appealing and dissatisfying—and our vision for how to move forward have in the last decade been echoed by (mostly) European colleagues. These critics have laid out a research agenda that would, if taken up, produce more satisfying, and more deeply political, theoretical accounts. In our own work, both individual and collective, we have tried to advance that research agenda. So long as securitization theorists resist defining the theory’s scope and mechanisms, and so long as it remains wedded to apolitical underpinnings, we think it unlikely to gain a broad following on this side of the pond. Second, securitization has been held back by another way in which it is apolitical—this time thanks to its Schmittian commitments and political vision. Successful securitization, in seminal accounts, replaces normal patterns of politics with the world of the exception, in which contest has no place. They imagine security as the ultimate trump card. But, in reality, the divide is not nearly so stark. Security **does not crowd out all other spending priorities**—or states would spend on nothing but defense and “securitized” issues. **Nor** does simply declaring something a matter of national security **guarantee its funding**—or global climate change counter-measures, including research on renewable energies, would be well-funded. Nor are security issues somehow aloof from politics: politics has never truly stopped “at the water’s edge.” Securitization considers only the politics of security. Its strangely dichotomous optic cannot see or make sense of the politics within security. In ignoring the politics within security, securitization is of course in good company. Realists of all stripes have paid little attention to domestic political contest, except as a distraction from structural imperatives. But while realism is unquestionably a powerful first-cut, this inattention to the politics within security is also among the reasons so many have found it wanting. As Arnold Wolfers long ago observed, some degree of insecurity is the normal state of affairs. But “some may find the danger to which they are exposed entirely normal and in line with their modest security expectations while others consider it unbearable to live with these same dangers.” And states, he further argues, do not actually maximize security—almost ever. “Even when there has been no question that armaments would mean more security, the cost in taxes, the reduction in social benefits, or the sheer discomfort involved have militated effectively against further effort” (1962:151, 153). A securitization perspective renders all this politics within security inexplicable. And yet, as Wolfers saw half a century ago, it is crucial.

**1AR---Alt Fails**

**Discourse changes fail — pragmatic approaches are key to solve.**

**Snetkov 17** – Senior Researcher at the ETH Zurich, Adjunct Lecturer at the Universities of Zurich

Aglaya Snetkov, “Theories, methods and practices – a longitudinal spatial analysis of the (de)securitization of the insurgency threat in Russia,” Security Dialogue, 4-7-2017, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0967010617701676

According to Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde’s foundational text of the theory of securitization, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), an issue can be non-politicized (it is not subject to public debate or policymaking), politicized (it is publicly debated and subject to policymaking) or securitized (it is presented as an existential threat, authorizing measures outside normal politics to address it), and ‘any issue can end up on any part of the spectrum’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). The Copenhagen School model outlines that for an issue to be repositioned from the status of non-politicized or politicized to that of securitized requires an authorized and responsible actor to name it as an existential security threat to a particular referent object, and for this ‘securitizing move’ to be accepted by the relevant audience of this referent object, the endorsing of extraordinary measures to address it. In turn, desecuritizations are processes ‘in which a political community **downgrades** or **ceases to treat something as an existential threat** to a valued referent object, and reduces or stops calling for exceptional measures to deal with the threat’ (Buzan and Wæver, cited in Coskun, 2008: 405).

As such, the key aim of securitization theory is to identify what, when, where and how an issue is moved from being part of the normal environment of politics to becoming a threat to security and beyond the scope of normal politics – and vice versa (desecuritization). The Copenhagen School securitization model gained considerable popularity during the 2000s, and was applied to the empirical study of a diverse range of security issues, including the War on Terror (Buzan, 2006), immigration, trafficking and minority rights (Huysmans, 1998, 2000; Aradau, 2004; Sasse, 2005; Jutila, 2006), societal insecurity, human rights (Morozov, 2002), environmental politics, HIV/AIDS (Elbe, 2006) and EU security (Huysmans, 2000; Balzacq, 2008; Neal, 2009). However, it has also been the subject of a series of critiques and modifications from both its staunch supporters and ardent critics. As Ciută notes, this critique has three main strands: conceptual (structural issues particularly related to speech act theory and other necessary components of the model); epistemological (how securitization views contexts); and normative (related to the shift from securitization speech acts to practices of the political and the liberal) (Ciută, 2009: 302).

In light of these critiques, a ‘second-generation’ research agenda emerged among ‘contextual securitization scholars’ (Stritzel, 2012: 553), which is concerned with combining the formal aspects of the securitization model with a greater emphasis on examining the interrelationship between security politics and the contexts in which it operates. The aim of this agenda is to ‘construct a more comprehensive understanding of underlying processes’ by focusing on the ‘socio-linguistic and/or socio-political micro-dynamics of generating threats’ (Stritzel, 2012: 553; see also Balzacq, 2005, 2011; Guzzini, 2011; Salter, 2008; Stritzel, 2007, 2011; McDonald, 2008, 2011). Mirroring the original debate about the Copenhagen School model, the initial focus of such second-generation scholarship centred on analysing securitizing moves, while the inverse process of desecuritizing moves did not receive much attention (Coskun, 2008: 393). Recently, however, second-generation scholars have begun to delve more deeply into what it means to desecuritize an issue and ask what a desecuritized issue would look like (see Åtland, 2008; Aradau, 2004; Aras and Polat, 2008; Behnke, 2006; Cui and Li, 2011; Hansen, 2012; Knudsen, 2001; Roe, 2004; Wæver, 1995; Oelsner, 2005; Coskun, 2008; Salter, 2008; Klinke and Perombelon 2015).

These efforts have revealed a **lack of basic consensus** on the nature of desecuritization as a concept, model or process. As Coskun rightly points out, ‘the Copenhagen School does not suggest an explicit framework for its analysis as it has done for securitization’; ‘different scholars have **interpreted** and **implied** desecuritization **differently**’ (Coskun, 2008: 395). The notion that to analyse desecuritization is simply to follow the Copenhagen School securitization model, but in reverse, has **proven problematic**. Åtland (2008: 292) argues that, as opposed to securitization, ‘desecuritization **does not necessarily happen** as the result of a “speech act”. Rather, there are many other ways that an issue or issue-area can be moved out of the sphere of security politics and into the sphere of regular politics’. For many scholars, desecuritizing moves have come to be considered as the product of a **wider management process**, rather than a **singular speech act or debate** (for more on this debate, see Roe, 2004, 2006; Jutila, 2006).

**The alt can’t overcome securitization.**

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Basar Baysal, “20 Years of Securitization: Strengths, Limitations and A New Dual Framework,” Uluslararasi Iliskiler, 7-1-2020, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1228409

In addition, by focusing on the illocutionary act, securitization is presented as happening within a single moment rather than as a process over time. Ole Wæver, for example, argues “the utterance itself is the act … by uttering security, a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means to block it.”37 That is, securitization occurs just within the moment when the speech act is performed, and the audience has accepted it.38 Although this Schmittian stance has somewhat changed in the 1998 book39 by focusing on the securitizing move and the inherent processual nature of persuasion of the audience, the processual understanding of securitization is still limited. Still, in this framework of the Copenhagen School (successful) securitization ends with the persuasion of a sufficient number of right people and the start of the extraordinary measures.40 However, I argue that securitization should be considered as a process that includes the definition of security, discursive efforts to convince the audience, security practices that normalize and routinize the security definition, the clashes between rival security definitions and arguments, and the insecurities that result from these security practices. I further argue that securitization lasts until the issue is fully desecuritized. It can further be argued that securitization and desecuritization may occur simultaneously; some groups may be struggling to securitize an issue, while others may be working for its desecuritization.

The main shortcoming of Securitization Theory relevant for the argument of this study is the lack of the analysis of rival voices. Securitization is considered as truth construction. That is, the Securitizing actor proposes a truth claim and convinces audiences of this claim. The securitizing actor proposes a security definition in which s/he describes the threat, legitimate security provider, referent object, and legitimate means to deal with the issue. However, there are always rivals who reject this truth claim or, in most cases, counter truth claims, and definitions emerge. This a constant conflict between these truth claims, while constructing security issues means that a securitization analysis should also examine these rival voices. These rival voices may take the form of non-violent opposition or counter-securitization. To overcome this limitation, a dual approach is required to examine rival voices in the securitization process.

The lack of a dual approach in Securitization Theory means that a securitization analysis can only problematize one side, namely that of the securitizing actors, by revealing how they create security issues and use security discourses to achieve their own aims. In most cases, this actor is the state or other formal institutions like the EU. In most cases, however, particularly when counter-securitization emerges, other securitizing actors are involved that should also be problematized. These may also use extraordinary or violent means like the use of force. For example, in the securitization of a minority group in a country, the state may be the securitizing actor, which uses extraordinary means as a result of a securitization process. However, there may also be a counter-securitization against the state from within this minority group, and this securitizing actor may also be using extraordinary means against the state like the use of force. The sequence of the primary and counter-securitization may also change. Hence, both primary and counter-securitizations should be investigated in a comprehensive securitization analysis. However, it should be stated that there does not have to be a countersecuritization in all securitization cases. There may also be non-violent opposition depending on the contextual factors, but I argue that there are always rival voices in line with the argument of Foucault that “where there is power there is resistance.”41

**2AC---Alt Fails---Realism**

**The Alt Fails – it can’t change realist structures.**

**de Araujo 14** – Professor of Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeir

Marcelo de Araujo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology, 6-xx-2014, https://jetpress.org/v24/araujo.htm

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of **morally enhanced individuals** would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by **climate change**, grand scale **terrorist attacks**, or the risk of **catastrophic wars.** The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ **moral motivation**. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be **fewer wars, less terrorism**, and more **willingness to save our environment**. Although simple and attractive, **this assumption is**, as I intend to show, **false**. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an **old political arrangement** that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the **real possibility** of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, **biotechnology or nuclear capabilities.** The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that **“structural issues,”** rather than **human nature**, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the **survival of humankind**, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or **to reduce evil in the world**, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the **only, relevant actors** in the context of international relations; and second, that states **compete for power** in the international arena. **Moral considerations** in international affairs, according to realists, are **secondary** when set against the state’s primary goal, **namely its own security and survival**. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this **structure** that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor **security over morality**, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, **even if** human beings turn out to become **morally enhanced** in the future, humankind may still have to face the same **scary scenarios** described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that **in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary.** Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, **but the very structure of the political international system of states** within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to **dismantle their nuclear weapons**. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators **in the present as possible enemies in the future.** The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often **fail to cooperate,** and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, **even if,** in the future, political leaders become **less egoistic and power-seeking** through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of **bioengineering** is unlikely to yield the **expected results**, so long as moral enhancement is pursued **within the present framework of the international system of states.**

**2AC---Securitization Inevitable**

**There’s no alternative to the current world order.**

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Dillon Tatum, “Toward a Radical IR,” Duck of Minerva, 11-28-2018, http://duckofminerva.com/2018/11/toward-a-radical-ir.html

David Brook’s latest column in the New York Times, banging on the same themes about “the kids are just not right,” raises some questions about what it means to engage in radical politics in the Trump era. Brooks compares the younger generation’s belief “that the system itself is rotten and needs to be **torn down**” to accomodationist and gradualisms. He continues on to speculate about how these new attitudes might affect older, more “pragmatic,” liberals who desire to work within the system. Brooks, as usual, uses a conservative argument to position himself in the “middle.” I have been thinking a lot about this issue of **“radicalism”** contra arguments about **working within systems** that are unjust in thinking about liberal world order and its futures. It has led me to a question I am currently exploring in a work-in-progress about what the possibilities are of radicalism as a way of approaching international politics. Against arguments like Brooks’, and even more sophisticated arguments about agonistic democracy developed by thinkers like Chantal Mouffe, I think there is a **place in IR** for radical conceptions of transformation, order, and politics. What is radicalism? Brooks never fully fleshes out this concept. Philosophy and political theory have engaged with the issue of radicalism as a concept, though the results are often divergent. To quote Agnes Heller, in her treatise on radical philosophy, it “can give the world a norm, and it can will people to want to give a world to the norm.” Radicalism as an idea, and as a form of critique, mobilizes many different modes of thinking about the social and the political. The most comprehensive definition of radicalism is that provided by Paul McLaughlin, who defines radicalism “in terms of (i) a fundamental orientation (toward fundamental objects) (ii) in the political domain (iii) of an argumentative nature.” More than that, though, we can add that radicalism intervenes in the political domain with the goal of fundamental transformation. Additionally, though radicalism indeed proceeds in an **argumentative nature**, this methodology for argument is one that is aimed at critiquing, and seeking the destruction/replacement of existing institutions. A revised working definition of radicalism, therefore, is: a way of thinking about politics that focuses on totalities, **praxis** and **political action**, and the deployment of historicist methods with an eye toward “getting to the root of things.” Thus, radicalism is both a broad range of critical thought and practice, but also is specific in the realms of focus, **action**, and method. If Brooks is right that there is a major clash between a radical younger generation and a more pragmatic and moderate older generation in American politics, these differences are not well expressed in contemporary thinking about IR. Some of the biggest divisions are between what Robert Cox called **“problem-solving theories”** and theories that **critique** such approaches, but provide little argumentation aimed at tearing structures of injustice down altogether. In short: IR, **even at its critical ends**, **is not radical** (for an excellent exception see here and here). Why is this important? This morning, I taught a seminar on the question “Is Liberal World Order Finished?” I asked my students to think about what makes a liberal order “liberal,” and then asked: “Can we fix the liberal world order, or can we imagine a world without it**?**—and **what would that look like?**” The students were quick to point out the violences, inequities, and problems inherent in a liberal world order, **but** it took a good bit of pushing and prodding to get them to articulate **whether**/**how** we **should**/**could** take this order apart and rethink it. This was not just a difficult task for the students—it is something IR has not spent enough time meditating on. There is a lot to be critical of these days. And, I disagree with Brooks’s pessimism about a younger radical generation. Politics is deeply intertwined with engagements with radicalism. What I think is **missing** when we consider global politics, though, is that many of our pressing questions about institutions, order, and state action proceed from the same sort of moderation, accomodationism, or—at the most—an immanently critical vein. If we want to intellectually and politically approach issues like: **What do we make of the future(s) of liberal world order?** IR needs to engage with radicalism.

**Link Defense/Turns**

**2AC---Russia Securitization Good**

**Russia is a geostrategic threat and labelling them as such is essential to maintain NATO cohesion and credibility---failure leads to deterrence collapse and Russian expansion**

**McInnis and Fata 22** – Senior fellow in the International Security Program and the director of the Smart Women, Smart Power Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense and a nonresident senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies

Kathleen J. McInnis and Daniel Fata, "Russia Still Threatens NATO Despite Military Failings," Foreign Policy, 5-20-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/20/russia-threat-nato-madrid-summit/?tpcc=recirc\_latestanalysis062921

Recent events in Ukraine have once again proved that reports of NATO’s death are an exaggeration. Many leaders across the alliance have been quick to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with aid to Kyiv, increases in their own country’s defense budgets, or both. But as the war grinds on and the **geopolitical reality** of an **adversarial relationship** with Russia sets in, NATO must once again take the **longer view** on what all this means for trans-Atlantic and global security.

Conveniently, in less than two months, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid to endorse the alliance’s new strategy. The key question, therefore, is whether member states will use the moment to reforge NATO’s raison d’être to meet current and future challenges—in particular, by naming Russia as a threat to the alliance itself. Given the implications of Ukraine for European and global order, **the stakes could hardly be higher.**

Some take the view that Madrid should mark a reprioritization of U.S. efforts away from Europe and back toward Asia. Their logic goes that not only is European defense spending increasing, but Russia has also demonstrated ineptitude in the prosecution of its war in Ukraine. That means the longer-term need for significant U.S. forces in Europe has also therefore declined. And, after all, China is the pacing threat for Department of Defense planning.

In fact, **the opposite is true**. For starters, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it **abundantly clear** that **he views NATO** as a **strategic threat**. Recent events suggest we should **take these statements** **at face value**. In the runup to the current war, some analysts developed **elaborate rationales** for why the buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border didn’t mean an invasion was coming, such as a strengthened negotiating position vis-à-vis Ukraine’s future political directions. Another Russian invasion of Ukraine was **so** **obviously** strategically counterproductive that there must have been another reason for the buildup. **In the event, there wasn’t.**

And while Russian military incompetence has been startling, planners **shouldn’t leap to conclusions**. Russian forces were not able to capture Kyiv, but they have been able to seize tens of thousands of square miles of territory along Ukraine’s eastern border—at least for now. Estonia, a Baltic NATO member that borders Russia, is less than 20,000 square miles in size. Militaries can also reform, especially after disaster, as Ukraine’s own army did after its failures in 2014.

The United States has **good reasons** to want to **keep NATO vibrant**: The **strategic benefits** of U.S. leadership are **manifold**. Not only does American leadership in NATO provide pathways for **organizing military coalitions**, but it also affords the United States privileged status on **trade partnerships** and **access to bases**. If Putin **achieves his aim** of **discrediting NATO**, this could lead to trans-Atlantic **strategic insolvency**: a situation whereby allies, including the United States, are **unable** to meet their **security obligations** and, relatedly, maintain favorable standards of living for their populations.

Which brings us back to Madrid. The last time that NATO agreed on a strategic concept was in 2010. It is a document that specified that, among other things, defense of allied territory remains a critical mission for the alliance, but it is silent on naming nation-state threats to NATO. For a variety of domestic and international political reasons, building formal consensus on threats among 30 allied states is extremely challenging. Indeed, in the 2010 document Russia is **viewed as an aspirational partner** for NATO when it comes to European security—despite the **warning sign** of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the intervening years, Russia has conducted **destabilizing disinformation campaigns** in NATO states and has **attacked Ukraine twice**. And while NATO leaders have condemned Russian aggression, the rhetoric falls short of formally declaring Russia as a long-term strategic threat to the alliance.

**Durable consensus requires clarity**. To **prepare NATO** to contend with this threat over the long term requires a **frank admission** of the **strategic realities that Russia poses** in the alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted in Madrid. As a practical matter, this will commit NATO members to take budgeting, force planning, acquisition, and possible troop repositioning seriously—and put teeth into the declaration. This is needed for NATO planners to determine, for example, whether spending 2 percent of GDP on defense is sufficient to meet the challenges to the alliance.

But the real value of the document is what the collective members reaffirm as to what NATO continues to stand for, what it calls out as the threats to the member territory, and what it intends to do to address, deter, and, if necessary, defend against these threats. By stating up front that **Russia is a** formal **threat**, member states—and the alliance as a whole—will find it **harder to backslide** from their **current cohesion**. It is **difficult to overstate** how important it is for NATO to ensure its **consensus is durable**; as the war grinds on and publics begin feeling the economic effects of the conflict and sanctions on Russia, the temptation to dilute support to Ukraine will undoubtedly mount. Not to mention, **calling it like it is** will **send an important message** to Putin: **NATO will not be deterred**.

**Words matter.** It is time for NATO leaders to formally **accept reality**: **Putin is a threat to the alliance and its members**, and, therefore, they should declare so in the news strategic concept. Indeed, **not declaring Russia a** formal **threat** to NATO territory would **compromise NATO’s credibility** and would **give Putin a pass** for the atrocities and violations he has committed in Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the United States can **afford to allow that** to happen.

**2AC---Threats Real---Generic**

**Threats real, fear good, and demands key.**

**Meisel Citing Wittner 17** – Climate Writer; citing Professor of History Emeritus at SUNY

Duncan Meisel citing Lawrence Wittner, "Mass Mobilization Stopped Nuclear War Before and It Can Again," Toward Freedom, 10-31-2017, https://towardfreedom.org/archives/activism/mass-mobilization-stopped-nuclear-war-before-and-it-can-again

A common thread running through the entire post-1945 period is that people **don’t want to think about nuclear war**. When they’re **forced** to think of it, when they can’t escape it, they **want to stop it**. But when it’s not in the **headlines** any more and governments are growing more reasonable, they’d **just as well not** think about it. If nuclear war did break out today, you can bet more people would focus on it, but, of course, we don’t want that war to have to take place. The peace movement’s challenge is to maintain its **momentum and sense of danger** — even though the world might **seem** safer and there are fewer nuclear weapons in the world. If the nations of the world are **maintaining their arsenals**, the struggle **hasn’t come to an end.** Do you think the moment we’re experiencing today with **Trump** and **North Korea** is **potentially** a driving force for **another peak** of movement **energy**? What’s different today? It’s possible that there will be some revival of the nuclear disarmament movement, but we **haven’t seen** the surge of resistance **yet**. I’m a co-chair of the national board of the group Peace Action, so I’m very well aware of how peace groups are doing. While Peace Action isn’t doing badly, we’re certainly not yet experiencing the surge of action in the streets, such as when its predecessors, SANE and the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, were taking off. One reason it’s not taking place is that the mass media rarely focus on the danger of nuclear war, and when they do focus on it, it’s the danger of some other country waging war on the United States. One day it’s Iran, another day it’s North Korea — but they don’t seem to get to the basic problem that nine countries have 15,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenals. It’s a worldwide phenomenon, as is the persistence of the idea of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of national security. Right now there’s also a sense that only Koreans are vulnerable, that most Americans aren’t at risk of being bombarded by nuclear missiles. At the height of popular protest in the 1980s, millions of people were in the streets — in part because U.S. and Soviet arsenals could reach both sides quite easily. That got people to wake up and realize that nuclear war wasn’t such a hot idea after all. How big a role did fear play in these spikes of organizing? How can people dealing with fear of the Trump administration, or of North Korean nuclear mobilization, help direct that energy into making nuclear conflict less likely? I think fear has probably been **the most important factor in mobilizing people.** When you look at things psychologically, people should be afraid of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. It seems irrational to go bury your head in the sand and not worry about them. But it’s also true, in two ways, that fear is dangerous. One is that it can be demobilizing, that people get so scared they’re scared silent. They become so frightened they retreat and they don’t feel powerful any more. They might take drugs instead of taking action. A second danger is that, if people are scared of nuclear war, the hawks have an answer for them. They turn fear on its head: Yes, they say, nuclear war could be a bad thing, that’s why we need nuclear weapons to deter the bad Russians, Iranians, North Koreans and so on. This means fear may reinforce the desire for nuclear weapons rather than for getting rid of them. For these reasons, the use of nuclear fear has to be very **careful**. Peace activists have to make the case that **as long as nuc**lear weapon**s exist there’s no real security from nuclear war**, and therefore we need to **get rid of nuclear weapons**. That’s the best case that can be made by nuclear disarmament forces: The arms race is a race no one wins. What are some of the forgotten “paths not taken” of weapons not built or decisions not made as a result of anti-nuclear organizing? How might the world be different if those things had been built? The neutron bomb was being proposed during the Carter administration. This enhanced radiation weapon was designed to destroy people rather than property, and was scheduled by the Carter administration to be deployed in Western European nations. But once peace groups learned of it and began to focus on its terrible effects, this caused massive protests in Western European nations and, eventually, an unwillingness to support the neutron bomb deployment by their government officials. As a result, the Carter administration finally concluded that, if Western governments weren’t willing to stand up for it, the U.S. government wasn’t going to be the villain of the piece. So Carter canceled plans for its deployment. The MX missile was the jewel in the crown of the Reagan administration during its first term of office. Peace groups said that it was a first-strike weapon, and there was so much popular protest against it that Reagan couldn’t get funding through Congress. Eventually, a plan that began as 200 missiles barely slipped through with 50 missiles. That failure became the basis of the U.S. government’s push for strategic arms reduction treaties, for it meant the U.S. government couldn’t keep pace with development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. And the next best thing was seeing to it that neither country had those weapons. The best way to do that was to sign a treaty: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START, which Gorbachev welcomed and showed him, in many ways, to be a peace person, strongly influenced by the movement. Gorbachev had his own peace-oriented ideas, but he also received a large amount of information from the disarmament movement in the United States and around the world. He would take time out of his meetings with heads of state to meet with representatives of groups like the Freeze campaign, SANE, and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. So, Gorbachev and Reagan’s detente and the overall drawback from the nuclear brink were heavily influenced by the peace movement — not just through public pressure but also through direct engagement. Are there other potentially winnable campaigns of this kind available to anti-nuclear weapons activists today that might limit the likelihood of the Trump administration using nuclear weapons? It seems to me there are two ways to **develop mass pressure** on **Trump** and **Congress** in connection with the general problem of nuclear weapons. The first has to do with the trillion dollar nuclear “modernization” program — the plan to upgrade the entire nuclear weapons complex, build new bombers and missiles and submarines and so on. That cost is so great that it provides the opportunity to reach people who are already concerned about the arms race or are satisfied with the weapons we already have and don’t want to bankrupt the country. So you can **make demands** for cutbacks in the “modernization” plan or stopping it entirely and mobilize a sympathetic constituency. A second way is to focus on Trump’s mental instability: The fact that he’s a reckless, dangerous leader, who really shouldn’t have the button to launch nuclear war in his hand. That’s what the currently proposed Markey-Lieu bill seeks to address: Under its provisions, unless there’s a nuclear attack on the United States, the president cannot initiate nuclear war without a Congressional declaration of war. Since Congress hasn’t declared war since 1941, that’s a pretty big restriction.

**2AC---Experts Good**

**Experts are credible.**

**Ravenal 9** – Professor Emeritus at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service

Earl Ravenal, “Designing Defense for a New World Order,” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a **threadbare concept** that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is **a convincing theory of why**, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section: In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects--- a.k.a. pork---funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182) Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes: Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly. There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general. This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities---at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)---for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups---about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense. Ironically, “public choice”---not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation---is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives. My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points--- empirically---to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role. Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed mili- tary, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rational- ity in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and **objectivity** in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more paro- chial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least **peer-reviewed**, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged. My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the **most accurate intelligence**. They **make it their business to know** where the threats come from. Thus, threats **are not “socially constructed**” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circum- stances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. **People are fired for presenting skewed analysis** and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a **severe risk of career termination**. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

**2AC---Realism Good**

**Realist IR understandings are accurate and key to prevent international conflict.**

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Rajesh Basrur and Frederick Kliem, “Covid-19 and international cooperation: IR paradigms at odds,” SN Social Science 11-9-2020, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43545-020-00006-4

The realist approach

In the realist view, the **basic principles** of international politics **never change**. International affairs always remain essentially a **struggle for power** among **self-interested states**. Since realism is not a unitary theory, **different branches** of realism rely on **different** independent **variables**. Classical realists like Hans **Morgenthau** see perpetual conflict rooted in an innately **selfish** human **nature**, which translates into competitive state behavior (Morgenthau 1985). Neorealists such as Kenneth **Waltz** focus on an inherently **competitive international system** without a central organizing authority that **monopolizes power** to manage inter-state relations and **protect states** from one another (Waltz 1979). Within this anarchic international system, **states** are the **primary actors** and employ self-help strategies to survive and, depending on the exact branch of neorealism, to **maximize power** or **security**. Because of an inevitably **asymmetric distribution** of power, the anarchic condition of international affairs may **compel** **weaker states** to either **balance** against or **bandwagon** with more powerful ones. Neoclassical realists marry neorealism’s systemic assumptions with domestic level factors that either facilitate or circumscribe foreign policy, for instance domestic institutions, government-society relations, and leadership perception (Ripsman et al. 2016).

Realism is generally **pessimistic** about the prospects for **coop**eration and **mutual support** among states. It would immediately **predict** the national **self-help and “us first”** **mentality** that characterizes the global management of **Covid-19** and its consequences. Travel and entry bans, international scapegoating, great power competition and pharmaceutical protectionism are ubiquitous.

Even in the world’s most integrated supranational organization, the European Union (EU), member states **readily violate** otherwise sacrosanct principles of cooperation, and realists would not be surprised by how quickly lofty European ideals and norms made way for national self-help once the Covid-19 crisis hit the continent. The outbreak was followed by immediate violation of many existing EU regulations: competition law, fiscal discipline, and freedom of movement. As countries closed their borders, EU capitals went into full nationalist gear (Guardian 2020a). Without any EU-consultation process, a number of EU countries immediately closed their borders and decreed export bans. When Italy, one of the worst affected countries in the world, asked fellow EU members for emergency relief with critical medical supplies, for several weeks it was met with precisely what realism would expect: its neighbors violated the EU’s single-market spirit by decreeing export bans on pharmaceutical equipment (Braw 2020; Reuters 2020).

Dismayed by the lack of European solidarity, Rome was happy to accept support from China, which, though itself badly affected, sent medical equipment and experts immediately. Far from being altruistic, however, Beijing aims to rewrite the Covid-19 narrative. It does not want to be seen as the point-of-origin of the Covid-19 virus and views the pandemic as an opportunity to come out ahead of the United States in a zero-sum competition for global primacy. In Italy and elsewhere, China’s “mask diplomacy” is a noteworthy public relations coup (Kliem and Chong 2020). Beijing wants to be recognized globally as a responsible provider of public health goods in the absence of US leadership, and thereby, progress towards its ultimate objective of comprehensive power accumulation relative to Washington.

Indeed, the US has not only been absent in terms of leadership, but has also actively engaged in nationalistic self-help at the expense of others. President Donald Trump of the United States, Europe’s closest non-EU ally and partner, tried to lure CureVac, a German firm that was developing a promising Covid-19 vaccine technology, to relocate its Covid-19 research and development division to the US and to guarantee exclusive American access to the firm’s products (Die Welt 2020). Similarly, Trump sought to block the sale of masks to Canada by a US-based firm (MacCharles and Ballingall 2020), though a compromise was arrived at later. The US (like other countries, e.g. Japan) has also sought to restructure global supply chains in order to bypass dependence on China (Pamuk and Shalal 2020), which—if it succeeds—will be a radical and long-term change.

Realists also point out that **international institutions** do not **enable states** to **concentrate** on greater **long-term gains** for everyone. Instead, international **anarchy** forces states to **treat** international **organizations** and **institutions** essentially **like the international system** itself: as an arena for zero-sum **competition**. Indeed, as realism predicts, the World Health Organization (WHO) has become **highly politicized**. For example, because of the PRC’s refusal to accept Taiwan as a diplomatically independent, sovereign nation state, the WHO disregards Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19 as well as related research and development results. Allegedly bowing to pressure from Beijing, the WHO does not recognize Taiwan and refuses to include Taipei’s very successful pandemic management strategies in its reports on global research efforts (Financial Times 2020). This also supports the neoclassical realists’ argument about domestic factors. It shows how domestic ideology shapes foreign policy decisions in China and hinders international cooperation.

If a severe **transboundary** global **crisis** cannot spur international cooperation, then **what can**? Realism reminds us that, because of the **trust deficit** systemically **inherent** in an international system characterized by **anarchy**, states **hesitate** to forgo their **first instinct** for self-help and zero-sum games, **even amidst** a common **global** **challenge**.

The liberal approach

Liberal theory highlights four imperatives for cooperation: interdependence, transnationalization, the growth of international institutions, and democracy (Doyle and Recchia 2011; Nye 1988).

When the fates of states are bound together, liberals claim, they must cooperate or pay a very high price. The global economy, for instance, is a complex network of trade, finance and manufacturing that places a premium on cooperation. From this perspective, states must cooperate to stem pandemics that flow seamlessly across the world and impose high costs on all societies. They must share knowledge and material resources to counter a scourge that harms them all. They certainly do so, for example, in US-led efforts to ensure the reliable availability of equipment to combat pandemics (Tribune 2020). But they do not cooperate consistently. The United States has sought to corner scarce medical supplies (Bradley 2020), European states have failed to coordinate policy (The Guardian 2020a), and China and the United States are squabbling over responsibility (Shi and Wu 2020). In short, the pattern is much as in another arena of contest between interdependent states: the as yet unfinished “trade war.”

Why? Interdependence does not automatically produce cooperation. It is only when the breakdown of interdependence raises the prospect of serious catastrophe that states cooperate. When nuclear-armed states are on the verge of war, for instance, they engage in tacit cooperation by practicing extreme caution and often seek explicit accommodation through talks, as was the case in Cold War crises. Even so, they continue to compete through arms racing, alliance building and occasional brinkmanship. Comparatively low levels of interdependence amidst the Covid-19 outbreak are unlikely to generate high levels of cooperation as the threat to national survival is limited.

The onset of pandemics has certainly produced unprecedented cooperation among epistemic communities, such as virologists, in a transnationalized world. Scientists from many countries have worked together to manage the threat of a viral outbreak ever since the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2002. The appearance of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012 quickly led to the activation of a scientific network that has been dubbed the “SARS club” (Butler 2012). More broadly, the onset of MERS spurred global research, producing as many as 883 scientific papers in 92 countries between 2012 and 2015 (Zyoud 2016). Likewise, as the New York Times has noted, the Covid-19 outbreak has galvanized unparalleled cooperative research in which scientists have bypassed standard protocols and competitive secrecy to engage in shared efforts (Apuzzo and Kirkpatrick 2020). But, not for the first time, politics has trumped cooperation. The possibility of a quantum leap in global scientific collaboration has been stymied by the China-US spat, which has reduced the prospects of shared funding and finance to fight the virus. The US, for instance, stopped funding of a critical coronavirus-related training program for Chinese and other scientists even before the current outbreak. National priorities have overridden collective action, which is entirely in accord with realist expectations (Baumgaertner and Rainey 2020).

The same malaise afflicts international institutions, which liberals see as fostering high levels of cooperation. The Group of 7 major economies (G7) failed to organize a summit meeting in March 2020, while a subsequent meeting of their foreign ministers came up with no more than an anodyne statement seeking to foster research cooperation and do “whatever is necessary” to counter the economic fallout of the crisis even as they disagreed on whether China was to blame for the onset of the crisis (Schult 2020). The G20 did not do much better. It did support debt relief for poor countries, but its announced $5 trillion injection into the global economy was in fact no more than the sum of moneys already committed by its individual members for themselves (Chodor 2020). The institution at the center of the crisis, the WHO, has been acknowledged as critical to the information flow relating to the crisis. But the WHO has also been dogged by controversy for announcing the onset of the pandemic late (on 11 March, by which time it had already spread to 113 countries) and for apparently deferring to China in doing so (Basrur 2020). Such failings have brought much criticism and calls for its reform (South China Morning Post 2020).

Finally, democracy is said to be a binding factor, at least among developed economies. This is largely true with respect to the relationship between democracy and war. But the evidence is not persuasive in the present context. Developed democratic states in Europe and North America have engaged in recurring tugs of war over the sharing of counter-pandemic resources such as protective equipment and ventilators and have done relatively little to take collective action (Cohen and Musmar 2020). Overall, liberal theory does not have much to offer to explain the weak nature of international cooperation in the crisis.

Ideational approaches

The constructivist approach is an essentially ideational theory (or set of theories) that stresses the importance of belief structures, identities and roles, holding that, fundamentally, the ways in which actors behave in international politics are shaped by a consensus about reality and appropriate responses to it (Onuf 1989). From this standpoint, responses to the Covid-19 crisis are determined by deeply embedded beliefs about the priorities that states should adhere to in such a situation. The possibilities of cooperation, from a constructivist perspective, are not circumscribed by the anarchic condition in which states coexist (as realists would have it), but by our beliefs about what is feasible and what is not in such a condition (Pouliot 2011). The central dictum of the constructivist—“anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt 1992)—thus sees the lack of collective action in the face of the pandemic not as an inevitable product of the material reality of the world as it actually is, but as arising from a realist thought structure. To wit, states fail to cooperate despite the urgency of the Covid-19 crisis because they are weighed down by the unquestioned notion that, even under the onslaught of a pandemic, self-help must come first, and the exercise of power must shape action. This worldview, for the constructivist, is an ideational construct that needs to be overridden if cooperation is to be achieved.

It is to the credit of constructivism that it widens the space for potential change by critiquing the realist perception of unalterable reality. However, while the concept of ideational structure is helpful in challenging established modes of thinking (and consequent habits of action) over time, it is not particularly helpful in offering insights into the short-to-medium-term responses of states to crises like the pandemic or to anticipating what, in fashioning states’ responses, might actually be do-able and what probably will not. On the contrary, since constructivist thinking views both cooperation and conflict in terms of thought structures, it explains very little as far as responses to the current crisis go. In short, constructivism is not a predictive theory and tends to be non-falsifiable and, more pragmatically, lacking in much utility other than urging new thinking. How to get from the present ideational structure to a more desirable one when a crisis breaks out remains a knotty problem.

Normative theory, which centers on moral judgment about what should be—as distinct from the materialist view of international politics as what is—is similarly problematic (Ramel 2011). Certainly, it offers useful space for the identification of responsibility when a crisis breaks out. The analyst may adopt two basic approaches that Robert Gregory labels “backward-mapping” and “forward-mapping” (Gregory 1998). The former looks at the origin and history of the policy process and how they might have created or contributed to the problem. In the present case, one would ask: who was responsible for the outbreak of the pandemic? A second question would be: was policymaker X warned about the problem and did he/she take action to avert it or mitigate its potential consequences? The latter approach considers the policy action taken at the time of the crisis. Did the policymaker act appropriately once the crisis had broken out? While both are normative questions, they also have strong practical implications. The attribution of responsibility relates to the consequences of the policymaker’s actions and to whether the individual held responsible was fittingly sanctioned or punished for it, whether legally or politically. This has important implications. If the person or persons responsible is/are not in some way punished, he/she/they may tend to repeat this or similar errors and cause a recurrence of societal harm. Here, China would certainly be one center of analysis, as questions mount as to whether Beijing took the necessary steps to share information once the outbreak of the novel Coronavirus was first confirmed by Chinese medical doctors in late December (The Guardian 2020b). As mentioned above, the WHO too is open to the charge of prioritizing political expediency by not including Taiwan in its assessments and recommendations.

The problem, however, of explaining why states behave as they do remains. The attribution of responsibility for a crisis is normally only a post facto phenomenon and does little to inform the analyst as to why international cooperation as a pattern of behavior does or does not occur. Even more, the scope for anticipating future behavior remains uncertain at best. Like constructivism, normative theory is valuable in understanding critical aspects of international cooperation or the lack of it, but it misses some of the most important facets of international reality: it fails to explain why states tend to let competition override cooperation when individual and collective interests collide.

Conclusion: realism redux

Much post-Cold War academic thinking gave the appearance of a “transition” in the way intellectuals view global politics: a “decline” of realism and the rise of alternative approaches in apex-level scholarly research (Maliniak et al 2011). However, this analysis shows that alternative paradigms in IRT have **much less grasp** over the current crisis than **realism**. The continued **dominance of the state** and of **individual** national **interests** over **collective interests** in the absence of effective international authority is **evident** in global responses to the pandemic. Realism tells us that, because of the systemic **trust deficit** in international affairs, especially in times of crises, states will turn to **self-help** and **zero-sum calculations** rather than to cooperative **collective action**. It is evident that precisely such behavior **dominates** the global **management** of the **Covid**-19 crisis. To be sure, cooperation does occur, but **only** when it **does not clash** with **national interest**.

Going forward, a realist would expect further restrictions on international exchange in order to minimize the threat and at least a temporary but nonetheless significant scale-down of globalization, as it were. The economic effects of the crisis are likely to be severe and unpredictable, and likely to include recession, flight of capital, widespread impoverishment, fall in agricultural output, and increased deaths from other diseases such as malaria and HIV (Congressional Research Service 2020; Economist 2020; Shiller 2020). These will be subject to the same dynamics of cooperation and conflict as described here, in particular in the context of Sino-US competition.

Rather worryingly, the Covid-19 crisis also points to what global action on other critical issues such as climate change, severe economic dislocation, or the apocalyptic consequences of nuclear war could look like in the future. They will in all probability not induce intense global cooperation to manage common challenges, but instead spur nationalism, zero-sum competition and the application of power to secure the objectives of individual nations.

On the positive side, realism also tells us that states try to imitate the successful activities of their peers. Governments may look jealously upon one another, but they will also adopt those measures used by others that are seen to be working. In that sense, we can place hope in the ability of Europeans and Americans to emulate successful measures taken by states like New Zealand, South Korea and Taiwan to contain the spread of Covid-19.

Clearly, while all branches of IRT have something to offer, realism is **best equipped** to explain and **anticipate** the ambit of international **coop**eration in a crisis of the **magnitude of** the **Covid**-19 pandemic. Discounting its value can only **subtract** from the **potential of IR** as a discipline to **meet** its **social function**.

**Realism is accurate AND the only methodology to analyze threats.**

**de Araujo 14** – Professor of Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeir

Marcelo de Araujo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology, 6-xx-2014, https://jetpress.org/v24/araujo.htm

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of **morally enhanced individuals** would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by **climate change**, grand scale **terrorist attacks**, or the risk of **catastrophic wars.** The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ **moral motivation**. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be **fewer wars, less terrorism**, and more **willingness to save our environment**. Although simple and attractive, **this assumption is**, as I intend to show, **false**. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an **old political arrangement** that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people,and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the **real possibility** of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, **biotechnology or nuclear capabilities.** The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that **“structural issues,”** rather than **human nature**, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the **survival of humankind**, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or **to reduce evil in the world**, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the **only, relevant actors** in the context of international relations; and second, that states **compete for power** in the international arena. **Moral considerations** in international affairs, according to realists, are **secondary** when set against the state’s primary goal, **namely its own security and survival**. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this **structure** that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor **security over morality**, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, **even if** human beings turn out to become **morally enhanced** in the future, humankind may still have to face the same **scary scenarios** described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that **in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary.** Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, **but the very structure of the political international system of states** within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to **dismantle their nuclear weapons**. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators **in the present as possible enemies in the future.** The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often **fail to cooperate,** and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, **even if,** in the future, political leaders become **less egoistic and power-seeking** through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of **bioengineering** is unlikely to yield the **expected results**, so long as moral enhancement is pursued **within the present framework of the international system of states.**

**AI**

**2AC---Securitization Good**

**Military applications of AI are inevitable, so de-securitizing isn’t an option. The risks are real and pretending they aren’t risks undermining effective governance strategies. National security framing is key for building trust.**

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Amandeep Singh Gill, Artificial Intelligence and International Security: The Long View, 2019, Ethics & International Affairs, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ethics-and-international-affairs/article/abs/artificial-intelligence-and-international-security-the-long-view/4AB181EAF648501422257934982A4DD5

An Agenda For Ensuring **Security** and **Stability** in the Age of AI

The starting point for dealing with the international **security implications** of AI must be the **acknowledgment** that we are in it for the **long haul**. There will be no quick fixes. The **economic**, **political**, and **security drivers** for mainstreaming this **suite of technologies** into **security** functions are simply **too powerful to be rolled back**. There will be plenty of **persuasive** national **security applications**—minimizing casualties and collateral damage through better discrimination of targets, fighting crime, defeating terrorist threats, saving on defense spending, and protecting soldiers and their bases—to provide counterarguments against concerns about runaway robots or accidental war caused by machine error.

This acknowledgment must be accompanied by an intensification of crossdomain literacy. AI cannot be the business of coders and cognitive scientists alone; nor can its security implications be the province only of diplomats, generals, and lawyers. Given the broad impact that AI businesses can have on society, the business of AI has to be everyone’s business. Governance of AI can only be based on a correct understanding of the power and limits of the technology, and such governance can only be effective globally if it is part of a tiered approach that includes actors at the intergovernmental, national, and industry levels.

Currently, though military investments in **AI** are being acknowledged, no state admits to the **existence** of lethal autonomous **weapon systems** in its inventory. Thus, if we want to **build** mutual **confidence** and **trust**, we are left either to add **discussions** on such systems to existing dialogues on cyber**security** and arms control more broadly or to begin with new dialogues on approaches to repurposable civilian capabilities. The latter might be a more productive venue for engaging the private sector, which is wary of being stigmatized by civil society as the maker or facilitator of “killer robots.” Tagging on discussions of AI to cybersecurity or traditional arms control would also be unhelpful because of the risk of false analogies.

Thus, new innovatively structured **dialogues** in the track setting (involving both government and nongovernmental parties) or the track setting (involving artificial intelligence and **international security** only informal nongovernmental parties) are **required**. The first objective should be to **enhance** mutual **understanding** through in-depth discussions on **national** approaches **to AI development**, **testing** and **validation**, deployment, and use. Another objective should be to allow some **sharing** of **best practices** or cautionary experiences. A third potential objective would be to shift thinking from zerosum competitive approaches to collaborative problem-solving using data and algorithmic insights pooled by the participants themselves or put in escrow with a trusted third party.

**Agreement on norms** to govern the military use of AI could take time, but influencing the direction of such use by other means **brooks no delay**. One important channel for shaping AI use globally is guiding principles short of binding law. At a time when there are **trust deficits** among **nations** and **multilateral negotiations** are at best seen as opportunities for “**lawfare**,” it makes sense to rally around shared values and ethical principles. In the context of emerging technologies, such an approach also permits more of an impact early on in the **innovation cycle**, when national or international regulatory reach is absent or ambiguous. Consistent with this logic, the EU High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence has identified five principles—beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy of humans, justice, and explicability—for the trustworthy and ethical development of AI.

More specifically, in the context of **military use**, in the Group of Governmental Experts of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems (**LAWS**), comprised of states and including all **countries** thought to be **pursuing national security applications** of AI, identified ten guiding principles on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS. These principles cover aspects related to the applicability of international humanitarian law, human responsibility, accountability, risk assessment and mitigation, and the need to take a nonanthropomorphic view of such systems. The guiding principles are accompanied by building blocks of common understandings on definitions and the nature of human intervention required throughout the various stages of technology development and deployment to uphold compliance with international law, in particular international humanitarian law.

Another channel for the soft governance of AI could be engineering standards and codes. At a minimum, a common vocabulary for assessing risks and aligning design with safety and reliability considerations is needed. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers’ Global Initiative on Ethics of Autonomous and Intelligent Systems has started building a shared, multidisciplinary, and evolving resource of terms. There is further scope for constructing common standards that can progressively align practices around the globe to responsible principles.

Last Word

There is a growing concern over the **repurposing of AI technologies** for warfare. As with cyber weapons, LAWS could have indiscriminate effects and be turned around to attack the attackers.They can create challenges for the application of international humanitarian law principles, such as distinction, proportionality, and precaution, all of which presuppose a degree of human reflection and control. Their international **security implications** are still **unfolding** but could be as **significant as the nuclear revolution** in warfare, if not more so. Innovative and agile ways of **governing** the use of **AI** are **needed urgently** to head off risks to **international peace** and **security**.

**Analysis through nation-states and security is good.**

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6. The two faces of security – and of peace Security, especially state security, tends to be enacted in contexts of the violently contested **political authority**. Often it is enacted through **violent power**, rebranded as legitimate force. Small wonder that some in the development community, including those who drafted SDG 16, hesitate to use the word at all. But **although** security is a **deeply disputed** idea, it is also a **highly necessary** one. Security functions simultaneously as an analytical construct, as a **frame for policy** and as a **moral narrative**. It is distinct from the equally ambiguous if less contentious concept of peace. Yet, at the same time, it is often seen as **essential** to the preservation of **peace**. Most of the things that international decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in security’s name are supposed to protect the safety and welfare of people in a world of multiple challenges and threats. However, there is a tendency to slide from **global**, to **national**, to **citizen** and to human security and back again, without enough serious reflection on how they **interconnect** and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong. The ambiguities stem in part from a deep-seated tension between two distinct visions of security (summarised in Table 3), which interconnect, yet are in deep tension with eachother. On the **one hand**, security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, aiming to reduce violence and keep the peace. As such it is territorially organised and kept in place globally as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including socially sanctioned violence. It connects to conceptions of what Galtung termed ‘negative peace’: the ending of overt violence, without necessarily **transforming the conditions** giving rise to this violence or attending to the **quality** of the **subsequent peace**. In this view security is a public good delivered in principle by states, much like official or donor-driven development.29 Yet in a world where states and indeed the international order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative nonstate or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection.30 Moreover, security is far from being an unalloyed public good. In principle, it is equally shared and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but, especially at the insurgent margins where insecurity is most acute. For in practice it protects **socially embedded power**, established property relations and **social privilege** – and reinforces global, national and local **inequalities**. On the **other hand**, security can be seen (in the vernacular) as an **entitlement of citizens** and more widely human beings to **social peace** and **protection from violence**, abuses of **rights** and **social injustice**, along with other **existential risks** such as **famine** or **disease**. It connects to the idea of ‘**positive peace’**, including **transformations** in the social conditions giving rise to violence and deepening the **relationships between states and** their **citizens**. The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are in this view the touchstone by which to evaluate security and violence reduction. Most people **fall back** upon their **social identities** – as women and men, members of families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their social worlds, to **respond to insecurity** and violence and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same time, these **identities** are **written into** the **structures of power and inequality**, being deployed to **establish hierarchies of citizenship** and **patterns of exclusion**. Ensuring that security is inclusive and not simply the security of particular groups or the property of the well-armed, powerful and wealthy, is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. ‘Security in the vernacular’ is the term used here rather than the interlinked but distinct concepts of ‘human security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank,31 which fit in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and intervention forces. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for ‘securitising’ development by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability through security lenses, and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of fragile states.32 ‘**Security in the vernacular’** paves the way for more precise and detailed empirical scrutiny of how security and plays out in particular local and national contexts. It highlights the experience and social agency of those who are ‘secured’. And it underscores the transformative potential of security as an **entitlement**, which can be **actively claimed** by those who **challenge** the **deeply rooted legacies** of **insecurity**, **exclusion** and **injustice**. Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens; or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 The **deformations** of **security in the vernacular** tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging – for instance, the submission of minorities and refugees to campaigns of exclusion and violence by populist majorities; forms of **popular justice** that **violate the rights**, dignity and safety of supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, local-level insecurities can persist or even worsen, when a state, like India or Brazil, is considered to be stable, or a region or locality is considered to be secure. Neither face of security can be considered without the other. The relationship between them is utterly crucial. The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis of the social contract.35 That is, the rights and security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least they **should be**. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of **social order**, however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both **affairs of governance** and **vital concerns** for **everyone** who lives under the **leaky umbrella** of **political authority**. **Political stability**, **durable institutions**, the **rule of law**, and **effective and accountable security apparatuses** **are** not just **desirable attributes of states** but are also in many respects conditions of the security of people. However, they **come at a price**, not just in taxes, but also because of the need for **constant vigilance** to ensure that those charged with delivering security do not ignore or still worse violate the entitlements of those they are supposed to protect.

**2AC---Securitization Good---Nuclear**

**Multilateral AI securitization reduces distrust and alleviates tensions – that prevents nuclear war**

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Edward Geist and Andrew J. Lohn, “How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?” RAND Corporation, 2018, <https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html>.

Overall workshop participants agreed that **AI has significant potential to upset the foundations of nuclear stability and undermine deterrence by the year 2040,** especially in the increasingly multipolar strategic environment. Dismissing the Hollywood nightmare of malevolent AIs trying to destroy humanity with nuclear weapons, experts were instead concerned with more-mundane issues arising from improving capabilities. AI applications discussed included the ability to track and target adversary launchers for counterforce targeting and the incorporation of AI into decision support systems informing choices about the use of nuclear weapons.

Some experts fear that an increased reliance on AI could lead to new types of **catastrophic mistakes.** There may be pressure to use it **before it is technologically mature**; it may be **susceptible** to **adversarial subversion**; or adversaries may believe that the AI is more capable than it is, leading them to make **catastrophic mistakes**.

On the other hand, if the nuclear powers manage to **establish a form of strategic stability** compatible with the emerging capabilities that AI might provide, the machines could **reduce distrust** and **alleviate international tensions**, thereby **decreasing the risk of nuclear war.**

At present, we cannot predict which—if any—of these scenarios will come to pass, but **we need to begin considering the potential impact of AI on nuclear security before these challenges become acute**. Maintaining strategic stability in the coming decades may prove extremely difficult, and all nuclear powers will have to participate in the cultivation of institutions to help limit nuclear risk. This goal will demand a fortuitous combination of technological, military, and diplomatic measures that will require rival states to cooperate. We hope that this Perspective will begin that discussion and open a path toward pragmatism and realism on these controversial and often polarizing topics.

**2AC---Securitization Inev**

**AI representations by foreign actors mean securitization is inevitable**

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Jinghan Zeng, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 14, Issue 3, Pages 417–445, Autumn 2021, <https://doi-org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/10.1093/cjip/poab005>

Geopolitically speaking, **China’s national approach towards AI and moves to make it a security matter are fuelled by ever more competitive United States–China relations. Each side’s perception of the other’s AI advancement as a threat accelerates the securitization process.** In the domestic arena, where the primary concern is the regime security of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), **the practical use of AI and its relevant discourses are geared to securing authoritarian rule**. In this regard, China’s bold AI experiments practice a unique digital technocracy, making its AI approach quite distinct from that in Western societies.

Currently, this securitization is an ongoing process. Although **the extent of its impact on targeted audiences**, namely, local governments, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public**, remains unclear, all nevertheless enthusiastically echo the central government’s AI campaign**. In this regard, such securitization appears to convince domestic actors. However**, it also generates unintended consequences**. They are: (i) **creation of a nationalistic environment that makes China less attractive to global AI labor and capital**; (ii) **impaired industrial efficiency by virtue of focusing on self-reliance**; (iii) **obstruction of China’s global AI governance leadership**; (iv) **reinforced technological rivalry due to disregard for potential global AI cooperation**; and (v) **constraints on the global access of Chinese AI companies**. All could undermine China’s key objectives of fostering a booming AI economy and becoming a global AI leader.

Indeed, **securitization of AI has progressively become a global movement**. In the United States and Europe, for example, **the AI advancements of geopolitical competitors, especially Russia and China, are often perceived as a potential threat to national and international security**. The relevant speech act frames AI not as a normal technology, but as a national security matter that **justifies the enablement of extraordinary actions from the state and society**. In effect, it signifies the urgent need to deploy more resources and support, for example, in the US case, not only to the American AI-enabled military sector, but also the AI commercial industry.

This article focuses on how AI is securitized within China. Needless to say, **the securitization process works differently in the Chinese context, given its unique state-society relations**. Despite a non-liberal democratic setting, however**, there is still a need to convince the domestic audience and thus win more support for China’s national AI plan**. Table 1 categorizes the arguments into the securitization framework. It argues that the Chinese central government, as the securitizing actor, is performing a securitizing move by labeling China’s AI advancement as a matter of security. In the relevant discourses, the national interests and survival of the Chinese nation constitute the referent object that needs to be protected. As part of the central government’s AI campaign to mobilize domestic actors, this performative act aims to convince the domestic audience including local, subnational, academic actors, market actors, and the mass, as the rest of the article will explore.

The relevant securitizing move belongs to the type of securitization referring to a directive elementary speech whose aim is to raise an item on the agenda.36 **It consists of “three sequential, elementary speech acts,” including claim, warn, and request.**37 In this case, the State Council of China aims to raise its audience’s awareness of AI’s importance, and requests the relevant actions. As the quote at the beginning of the article claims and warns, **other countries (i.e. China’s competitors) are elevating AI as a significant national strategy for the sake of national security.**

The document also claims that, **as China lacks significant original AI innovations, China’s overall AI development lags behind that of other great powers**.38 As such, **it requests the nation’s prioritization of AI advancement to protect national security**. On the heels of this request comes the setting of the broad goal to make China a leading AI power, along with a three-step plan and a targeted timeline to: (i) **catch up with the AI technological progress of world-leading countries such as the United States by 2020**; (ii) **make major breakthroughs in certain AI technologies by 2025**; and (iii) **become a global leading AI power by 2030**.39 In short, **the Chinese central government is labeling AI as a national security matter and highlighting the threat of falling behind in efforts to convince domestic actors to support its action plan.**

The serious damage American sanctions have inflicted on Chinese tech companies **has heightened China’s awareness of both its technological weakness and feelings of insecurity in regard to global reliance**. Understandably, therefore, **China wants to master leading AI technology independently**. As Xi Jinping elaborates:

accelerating the development of a new generation of AI is an important strategic handhold for China to gain the initiative in global science and technology competition…**We need to ensure that the core AI technologies are firmly in our own hands.**62

China’s AI aspirations extend to global leadership. Since China’s rise, the US-led global order has left China dissatisfied due to the limits it places on China’s say in global norms and rules.63 Rather than a norm-taker, China now aspires to be a norm-shaper, or even a norm-maker. Many Chinese scholars argue that current established norms are geared primarily to serving interests other than those of China.64 To maximize Chinese interests, therefore, future norms should be defined by/for China, and on Chinese terms.

In addition to history and geopolitics**, China’s securitizing move also has a domestic context**. Certain scholars see AI as exerting two types of impact on China’s national security—traditional and non-traditional.80 **The former refers to the military threat**, namely the aforementioned use of AI in warfare; **the latter includes such non-military sources as political security, economic security, environmental security, cyber security, and energy security**.81 However**, most important is the so-called political security (政治安全) or institutional security (制度安全), i.e., regime security.**

As far as regime security is concerned, the bold and controversial AI practices China applies to state governance is an inevitable topic. As part of the CCP’s adaptation strategy in the digital age, **China has invested heavily in AI technologies in order to advance towards digital governance**. Such **AI investment expects returns in the form of improved public services (by enhancing efficiency), and maintenance of authoritarian rule.**82 AI’s empowerment of digital surveillance is widely discussed among international analysts, having been used to upgrade China’s sophisticated state surveillance program and potentially reshape state-society relations.83 Although similar—though less intensive and extensive—AI surveillance programs have been implemented worldwide, due to privacy concerns they have met with considerable social resistance in Western societies in efforts to balance states’ use of AI.84 **In China, however, there is scant legal constraint on the relevant AI practices**. For example, China has pioneered AI facial recognition technology, which has been restricted, or even banned in many Western societies. Meanwhile, to reduce social resistance, **the Chinese government has proactively guided public opinion on AI by framing it as positive and modern social progress that is of enormous benefit in securing public safety,** as will be discussed later.

**Certain Chinese scholars also link AI with economic security.** Li Zheng from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, for example, holds that sustaining the current socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics is the core of China’s economic security.85 In essence**, this economic security extends to regime security, i.e., securing the CCP’s rule**. In spite of its quasi-capitalist market reforms, the CCP’s economic policies have always been constrained by its ideological commitment to being a communist entity.86 Thus, in the interests of its political legitimacy, the CCP must uphold certain socialist responsibilities. Li argues that **AI will be able not only to improve socioeconomic governance, including market supervision, and fight economic crime, but also strengthen the CCP’s capability to manage the macro and microeconomy**.87

**1AR---Securitization Inev**

**Chinese securitization makes AI competition inevitable**

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Jinghan Zeng, “Securitization of Artificial Intelligence in China”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 14, Issue 3, Pages 417–445, Autumn 2021, <https://doi-org.proxy.library.georgetown.edu/10.1093/cjip/poab005>

**This article shows that the Chinese central government is performing a securitizing move by labeling AI as a security matter in order to convince local states, market actors, intellectuals, and the general public**. But if AI is indeed being securitized, so what? Although it is difficult to quantify the exact impact of this securitizing move, it undoubtedly helps the Chinese central government’s mobilization of domestic actors towards advancing its AI agenda. Nevertheless, this move also generates unintended consequences for the securitizing actor’s goal in the long run. According to the State Council’s AI plans, its three-step AI plan carries the specific goals of fostering a booming AI economy, and a grand goal of becoming a global AI leader.125 Securitization may undermine these key objectives for several reasons.

First, a highly securitized AI sector will affect the flow of foreign AI labor and capital to China’s AI industry. To make it attractive to global talent and capital, a booming AI industry requires an outward-looking, open-minded, and international socio-politico-economic environment. However, the securitization trend is pushing in the opposite direction by producing a rising nationalistic, inward-looking, security AI discourse. This is counterproductive to China’s AI ambitions, because it puts China at a disadvantage in the global market. More specifically, there is a global shortage of AI talent and, as previously mentioned, China is short of 5 million or more qualified AI industry workers. This has led to fierce global competition in the AI industry for qualified workers, to the extent where Chinese tech companies offer extremely—or unreasonably—high salaries.126 Such financial attraction, however, could be offset by an unfavorably nationalistic domestic environment.

Second, the securitization trend could hinder economic efficiency. As previously discussed, it contributes to the rise of a self-reliance discourse on technology whose creation is often at the cost of economic efficiency. Precisely because China is lagging behind in AI development, it needs to make use of the global AI supply chain to catch up. However, the self-reliance discourse considers the risk of relying on foreign technology too high, and thus focuses on “Made in China.” Such self-reliance is difficult (if not impossible) to realize in the short run, and hinders China’s ability to benefit from the global AI market and thus maximize industrial efficiency. Similarly, the securitization of AI in the United States also undermines the appeal that America holds for Chinese national AI talent, capital, and technology. Growing tension between China and the United States has, moreover, undermined Chinese companies’ willingness to invest in the United States. In the long run, therefore, securitization is detrimental to the competitiveness of the American AI industry.

Third, in connection with the above paragraph, the domestic inward-looking nationalistic trend that securitization has created hinders China’s realization of global leadership. To lead AI in the global arena, China must provide public goods and win support from others through successful partnerships. It must play a key role in promoting global governance and, as a global leader, act according to common interests rather than solely national interests. However, a security-focused, inward-looking, nationalistic AI discourse is helpful to neither global governance nor common interests. For example, it can foster the rise of inward-looking national AI policies that prioritize national interests over those of the globalized world. This is in direct contrast to global governance goals, i.e., to build a shared future through global solidarity. Indeed, many of the problems that AI has created, such as those relating to ethics, represent collective challenges to humankind that require a globally concerted response. Inward-looking national AI policies may contribute to a fragmented global governance structure, and thus obstruct concerted global actions to address AI problems.

Fourth**, the securitization trend has reinforced technological rivalry at the expense of the potential for global AI cooperation, and will likely exacerbate the United States–China confrontation**. This is not to deny the existence of United States–China cooperation in the field of AI. However, **by speaking of AI in the language of security and a global race, the relevant security AI discourse emphasizes competition over cooperation and destruction over creation.** This may produce a real security threat, and perhaps an actual global AI race, thus undermining the space for cooperation from which both the United States and China can benefit. In other words**, the rivalry discourse adopts a zero-sum geopolitical angle for understanding AI innovation that is inevitably to the latter’s detriment in both countries.**127

More importantly, **securitization may push AI further into the hard security area by virtue of its military applications**. The securitizing actor tends to exaggerate the security threat to achieve a successful securitization, so enhancing the strategic risks of AI military practices and increasing the likelihood of war, and of escalating ongoing conflicts. **In this regard, a highly securitized AI politics may set China and the United States on a dangerous path towards a catastrophic confrontation that imperils everyone’s interests and security**. In the worst case scenario, as in all arms races, **blithe assertions about the inevitability of AI-enabled war are a self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecy.** In this regard, the aforementioned Fu Ying’s call to regulate AI’s military application merits more attention.

Lastly, by strengthening state involvement in China’s AI industry, **securitization may undermine the interests of Chinese AI companies**. The boundary between the state and the market is always far less defined in China than in other countries, due to China’s political environment. **Making AI a national security matter justifies the necessity for heavier state involvement, if not control**. Although a blessing in the Chinese domestic market, **close ties with the state are a burden on the global stage**. Take the aforementioned civil-military integration as an example. Although helpful in gaining China’s AI companies and research institutes more state funding, it undermines their global access. **Close relations with the Chinese government have caused certain Chinese AI companies, including members of the “national AI team of China,” to be subjected to punishment, in the form of the aforementioned American sanctions**. In this regard, **securitization could hinder the access of China’s AI companies to the global market, and hence their future development**. It also remains to be seen whether heavier state involvement in the AI industry hinders market efficiency.

**2AC---AT: No AI Threat---China**

**AI revolutionizes Chinese military capabilities – gives them the capacity to create asymmetric advantages over the US**

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Alex Stephenson and Ryan Fedasiuk, “How AI would – and wouldn’t – factor into a U.S.-China War,” War on the Rocks, 05-03-2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/how-ai-would-and-wouldnt-factor-into-a-u-s-chinese-war/>

How AI Could Enhance Chinese Capability

The most likely sources of a potential U.S.-Chinese conflict, such as a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or a contest over some South China Sea feature, would likely feature the full spectrum of civil and military information operations aimed at deterring U.S. intervention and degrading U.S. allies’ will to fight. AI could play a dominant role in each of these missions. The Network Systems Department of the People’s Liberation Army, for example, may try using generative language models to synthesize and amplify content on Facebook and Instagram, as it has done using botnets and other non-AI tools around Taiwanese elections. The Chinese military is also likely to wage a similar campaign to discredit U.S. military activities or sow division with partners, including Australia and Japan.

Soon after the start of a conflict, the People’s Liberation Army would likely attack U.S. sensor and communication networks, and several different kinds of machine-learning applications could aid this task. A cadre of scientists at the People’s Liberation Army National University of Defense Technology, for example, specializes in “fuzzing,” using machine learning to identify vulnerabilities in an adversary’s computer networks. Experts also point to AI’s role in attacking or defending critical infrastructure in Taiwan, Japan, Australia, or the United States.

Chinese planners also aim to use AI for electronic countermeasures and operations across the electromagnetic spectrum. For example, analysts from anquan neican (a Chinese journal for cybersecurity research) are optimistic about cognitive electronic warfare — using AI to analyze incoming radar signals, and then automatically adapting one’s own output to optimize jamming. But several other applications of AI also play a role in electronic spectrum operations. In 2020, for example, the People’s Liberation Army awarded equipment contracts for swarms of drones equipped with modular radar-jamming systems, which could be flown near U.S. carrier strike groups, military installations in Japan and South Korea, or shared facilities in the Philippines. Many systems under development by Chinese universities and military research institutions are explicitly designed to counter U.S. drone systems and swarm concepts. Chinese companies have already exported drones to Nigeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, among others. However, while some People’s Liberation Army experts contend that these drones have been “battle tested,” others are less sanguine about their capabilities in a real conflict.

Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army may attempt to use AI to enhance the lethality and reach of its surface ships and anti-access and area denial systems, which could hold U.S. forces at risk during a crisis. China’s current approach to territorial defense relies on hundreds of short- to long-range ballistic missiles that would target U.S. aircraft carriers and strike aircraft based in mainland Japan, Okinawa, South Korea, and as far away as Guam. As early as 2016, Wang Changqing, director of the General Design Department of the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, claimed that the company’s next generation of cruise missiles would use AI to adapt to specific combat conditions, being capable of adjusting flight profiles and even warhead yield. Chinese defense industry engineers appear inspired by the U.S. Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, which uses AI to improve accuracy and achieve more flexible targeting.

Finally, the People’s Liberation Army is building a wide array of autonomous vehicles and extensive undersea sensor networks that make use of AI and big-data analytics. These systems may be useful in recording and transmitting the locations of U.S. undersea vehicles, and would be crucial to overcoming the Chinese military’s disadvantages in undersea warfare. Large unmanned submarines, such as the HSU-001 and Haishen-6000, could be equipped with sea mines to deny the U.S. Navy access to undersea space between the first and second island chains, or to restrict access to the Taiwan or Luzon Straits.

Of course, AI has the potential to revolutionize Chinese operations in countless other ways, including through predictive maintenance, logistics, and back-office tasks not discussed in depth in this article. In any case, it is clear that the People’s Liberation Army is banking on the technology to create asymmetric advantages vis-a-vis the United States.

**Cyber**

**2AC---FW**

**Research in academic spaces can generate policy-relevant information necessary to navigate cyberspace. A focus on state-policy can be combined with critical approaches BUT abandoning statism makes relevant research impossible.**

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Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855

A second approach focuses on why cyber norms emerge only slowly, building on the existing IR norms literature (Finnemore & Hollis, 2016). Early works in this area focused on the debate among states, especially at the United Nations, followed by a growing number of proposal from the private and the civil sector (Hurwitz, 2014). However, cyber norms remain contested at the international level (Grisby, 2017). More recently, the interest of researchers shifted to the role of the creators (mostly private entities) and exploiters (sub-, semi-, and non-state actors) of digital technologies in shaping the behavioral standards that new regulation needs to take into account (Hurel & Lobato, 2018). **States** need to know how their **intelligence services** work in cyberspace, because through their **tools** and **practices** they set practical norms of acceptable (**cyber) espionage** with far-reaching effects on **state behavior** in **cyberspace** (Georgieva, 2019). The focus on the role of **intelligence** agencies in cyber conflict–as both the biggest threat and the most **capable provider** of **safety**–opens up interesting questions linked to the **larger transformation** of these agencies in the context of the **digitization of society**. Some authors argue that cyber conflict is primarily an **intelligence game**, because setting up cyber exploitation is much more expensive than countering released exploitation, which increases the incentive to keep the target at risk (Lindsay, 2017).

A third approach explores the broader repercussion of cyber conflict dynamics for government and governance. The concept of networked governance seems especially apt at capturing the essence of cyberspace as co-constituted by technical devices and networks and socio-political institutions (Hofmann, 2016). The key governance challenge in cyberspace is fragmentation of authority and accountability. A case in point is the lack in public transparency and trusted knowledge about the perpetrators behind most cyber incidents. Although the number of public attributions of cyber incidents by states and threat intelligence firms has been on the rise, both types of actors have political and economic reasons not to fully disclose their evidence (Egloff, 2019). As a consequence, attribution claims remain contested in the public domain, undermining the legitimacy of state action–from insurance matters and criminal proceedings to mechanism of international cooperation and potentially escalation control.

Cluster 3: Securitization, practice, and assemblages

Looking back at the beginnings of the cyber threat story, the policy debate was riddled with cyber-doom scenarios and constant attempts to mobilize in the political process. As a reaction to what was considered a “hype,” some scholars started to get interested in why and how this issue was presented the way it was and with what consequences. Early work to analyze the issues surrounding the politics of Internet from IR and critical security studies perspectives emerged at the end of the 1990s (Deibert, 2002; Eriksson, 2001; Saco, 1999). A bit later, there was a concentrated effort to apply variations of securitization theory to the issue of cyber security politics (cf. Dunn Cavelty, 2008; Hansen & Nissenbaum, 2009; Lawson, 2013). Securitization signifies the representation of a fact, a person, or a development as a danger for the military, political, economic, ecological, and/or social security of a political collective and the acceptance of this representation by the respective political addressee (Buzan, Waever, & De Wilde, 1998). The successful securitization of a topic justifies the use of all available means to counter it–including those outside the normal political rules of the game.

Following the theory, the prime questions this literature engaged with were related to the object of security, to what or whom was considered the main threat, and to what policy responses flowed from these threat constructions (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). Given its theoretical underpinnings, the Copenhagen School focuses mainly on official statements by heads of state, high-ranking officials or heads of international institutions (Hansen, 2006, p. 64). What a focus on elite speech acts ignores, however, is how these discursive practices are facilitated or prepared by practices of actors that are not so easily visible. The social competition for the definition of reality is not only held in the open political arena. There are always state and nonstate actors “under the radar”–that is, specialized bureaucratic units, consultants or other experts–which have the capacity to establish “the truth” about certain threats, thus pre-structuring the discursive field in relevant ways (Huysmans, 2006, p. 72).

Cyber security, so the common assumption, arises from the interaction of technologies, processes, and everyday practices. Thus, the literature pays particular attention to how a variety of actors uses different representations of danger to create or change different political, private, social, and commercial understandings of security in selected public spheres. In addition, it gives more weight to material aspects of the issue in the tradition of STS (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016; Collier, 2018; Shires, 2018; Stevens, 2016), looking at the co-constitution of technology and politics. In particular, it recognizes that the political reading of cyber security cannot be divorced from particular knowledge practices in different communities.

As the most recent research focus to emerge, literature in this cluster covers a variety of topics, united by a focus on understanding how cyber security emerges as an assemblage of people, objects, and enacted ideas. Questions of authority and power are most directly addressed by research in this cluster. C. Stevens (2019) sets out to better understand the role of cyber security companies by looking at Symantec’s analysis of Stuxnet and the publication of their reports in the public. Tanczer (2019) focuses on the increasingly blurred boundaries between field of security professionals and hackers, pointing to changes in the larger context of security and insecurity that are reflected in the practices of these technical experts and in the conception of them. Shires (2019) looks at how the cyber security industry portrays cyberspace as a terrain of persistent threat, systemic vulnerability, and intelligence ambiguity, a classic “noir” narrative that results from systemic economic deficiencies (distorted incentives for protection) and from systemic political deficiencies (black markets for new exploits). By focusing on non-traditional actors and aspects of politics, this type of research is able to make invisible aspects of cyber security visible.

Conclusion: Where is **cyber security** politics research headed?

Over the past decade, **research** in **cyber security** politics has seen the emergence of a **growing** interdisciplinary **body** of work that is at the same time **theoretically informed**, grounded in **empirical observations**, and **policy-relevant** in many of its insights. We have ended our **intellectual history** by outlining three research clusters. In place of a summary of the past and present evolution of cyber security as a security political issue, we want to look into a possible future of research on cyber security politics in this concluding section. We do this based on the same assumption discussed at the beginning of this article: that the trajectory of both cyber security research and cyber security policy will continue to be shaped by the interplay between technology, politics, and science. The direction in which research and policy will move will be co-constituted by technological possibilities, political choices, and scientific practices. We end our intellectual history with a brief outlook on likely developments in all three areas.

Digital technologies have politics, and technological possibilities and developments will require new governance mechanisms, while at the same time being shaped by politics. First, the interconnectedness between ever more complex socio-technical systems is bound to increase. Cyber security will grow in importance as a topic as countries all around the world strive to shape digital transformation processes that affect society, economy, and the state alike. In the context of what has been called fourth industrial revolution, the complexity of socio-technical systems will increase due the ubiquitous digitalization and automation of technical processes that support a great variety of socio-political institutions. As these technical system become tighter coupled and integrate more aspects of society and economy, cyber security concerns will inevitably expand to more policy fields at both the national and international level. These developments will create new demands for technical and organizational research that needs to be better integrated with approaches from the social and political science.

Second, cyberspace will become increasingly dependent on space-based technologies and interlinked with newly emerging technologies in the fields of quantum computing and artificial intelligence (AI). This will increase the size of cyberspace. More importantly, as an enabling technology with diverse applications in all areas of life, AI will link cyberspace to more policy fields. AI will become an essential element of cyber security and will have a profound impact on the speed, scale, duration, autonomy, and complexity of cyber operations, for both offense and defense. These new technologies will be primarily developed by global technology firms and the private sector. As a consequence, state actors will likely become more dependent on technology firms and independent technology experts, further transforming the relationship between public and private actors. The fact that there is considerable **uncertainty** regarding the tempo and scope of these technological developments creates new demands for **research** that maps, assesses, models, and **forecasts** new **technological possibilities**. As social scientists, we need to understand the increasingly salient **political** and social **aspects** that will affect the patterns of **cooperation** and **conflict** in politics and society at the national and international level.

**Political choices** at the **national** and international **level** have a **technological dimension**. Politics will **influence** and **govern technology** development while at the same time being **pre-structured** by **technology**. First, we can expect that **political** and military **actors** will attempt to better understand the (limited) **strategic utility** of cyber operations below the level of **armed conflict**, in order to find the right balance between **restraint** and **exploitation**. One key challenge in this context is ho**w best** to **manage** the **transformation** of state intelligence services in the digital age and their **growing dependence** on private intelligence firms. Another key challenge is linked to information operations and propaganda that might be spread more targeted and effectively via AI technologies and social media platforms. These political developments raise important research questions that require interdisciplinary answers.

Second, public actors will uphold their efforts to control the risk of escalation trough international cooperation. States cannot secure cyberspace on their own, without taking into account **market** and **social forces**; yet no **stable cyber governance** framework will emerge without greater **convergence** on **responsible behavior** among **great powers**. As long as great powers **disagree** about what represents responsible use of **cyber operations** in **state interactions**, and for that matter what forms of espionage and interference in the political process of other states through cyberspace are acceptable, **little** top-down **progress** will materialize. **Bottom-up progress**, on the other hand, presupposes that the actors become **more visible** for each other in order to **successfully work together** in a multi-stakeholder framework. **Research** can shed light on **invisible actors** and **analyze** the interaction between market **dynamics** and **political dynamics** in stabilizing cyberspace, it can evaluate if the socio-technical institutions that secure cyberspace reflect the tools and practices of public and private actors.

Third, the key governance challenge at the domestic political level is how to overcome fragmentation of authority and accountability. Tighter coupling of technical systems and their growing interconnectedness with socio-political institutions creates growing demand for governance in networks, which in turn means that governments increasingly share responsibility with actors from business and society. The integration of policy into a coherent overall framework involves difficult trade-offs between security and privacy and creates horizontal and vertical coordination and cooperation problems across government and at the intersections between state, economy, and society. Research can evaluate how states can fine-tune their multidimensional roles. How states decide to regulate their technology base is moreover directly linked to how they anticipate this will influence their relative economic, political, and military power at the international level. Academics in this context can study how different (democratic and authoritarian) political systems balance regulation and market forces differently and what this means for state access to the private technology sector, export control systems of dual-use technologies, and screening mechanisms of foreign investment into the strategically relevant technology base.

Scientific practice, as our third and final sphere of interest, will keep coevolving with the anticipated changes in the spheres of technology and politics. We started the article with the ascertainment that there is no “field” or “subfield” of cyber security politics–and we conclude with a wish that this remains true in the future. Research at the **intersection** of **cybersecurity** and **security politics** in order to remain **relevant** to **policy choices** and cognizant of technological possibilities needs to **speak to** a variety of **other bodies of research**, free to choose interesting and pressing issue without **disciplinary constraints**; it needs to co-opt some of the **new data** analytical tools **offered by AI**, and it needs to flexibly overcome some of the **institutional barriers** that slowed down its **independent contribution** to **cyber security**.

A first key challenge for cyber security politics research is conceptual and linked to the integration of theoretical knowledge from different disciplines and research traditions. Researchers need to better integrate concepts and mechanisms from IR and security studies, IPE, and intelligence studies to analyze the transformation of intelligence services and how this affects their relationship with private cyber security and intelligence firms. They need to better understand the interplay between (black) security markets and (covert) security political dynamics if they want to explain the co-existence of strategic restraint and low-level subversion in cyberspace. Cyber security politics research must pay more attention to economic aspects of the phenomena at hand. Practice theory with its focus on technological possibilities and socio-technical processes allows to integrate these different approaches at the empirical level. STS offers a productive lens for understanding the mutual interplay between the technical and the socio-political sphere and, from an analytical point of view, to deal with the opaqueness of cyber operations. Such an approach is of critical importance in an attempt to shed light on how the cyber security policy and practice of states, both at the national and the international level, are facilitated or thwarted by the interests and practices of actors that are not easily visible, in- and outside of governments.

A second key challenge or indeed an opportunity for cyber security politics research is linked to the fact that more data about cyber operations by many different actors around the world and better tools to monitor and analyze this data are becoming available. While there is room for theory development and theory testing, we will likely enter an era of empirical work. In-depth qualitative studies on the role of invisible actors in state interactions linked to cyber security can be combined with more data-driven approaches that evaluate how new AI tools affect the cyber offense-defense balance. As state actors begin to integrate these tools in their border guards, police corps, armies and disaster response structures, important social and political questions will arise linked to privacy, bias, and control. Conversely, governments and societies will need to discuss how much of this new data should be made publicly available and what this means for data protection and privacy. From a research point of view, these developments call for more interdisciplinary research at the intersection of computer science, mathematics, economics, and political science.

A third key challenge for cyber security politics research is linked to overcoming the institutional barriers that slow down its independent contribution to cyber security and cyber security politics. Universities can help the public actors at the national and international level to catch up in their technology competence, while educating the next generation of experts for society and industry. **Academia** can contribute to the study of **cyber conflict** and through its **independent** and peer-reviewed **knowledge** broaden the knowledge base for some of the **difficult** policy choices discussed above. Science can collaborate with the **private** and **public actors** in the development of **evidentiary standards** and norms that will underpin the **future resilience** of sociotechnical systems, and in the negotiation and establishment of new norms and institutions that should govern the use and misuse of these systems. Yet in order to free its full **potential**, universities must overcome the **institutional barriers** that slow down **interdisciplinary** and more so **transdisciplinary research** intersection of science, technology, while building a network of institutions and programs that together can considerably expand the body of **public knowledge** surrounding these societally and politically relevant questions.

**2AC---Perm do Both**

**Perm do both---studying both political power and individual contributions to security logics is necessary for generating change**

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Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Florian J. Egloff, “Hyper-Securitization, Everyday Security Practice and Technification: Cyber-Security Logics in Switzerland,” Swiss Political Science Review, vol. 21, no. 1, 2021, <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12433>

On the other hand, Everyday Security Practices are invoked frequently in the Swiss cyber-security discourse. Particularly, the idea of individuals as ‘responsible’ partners is reinforced in the various cyber-security policy documents and debates. This is partially manifest in the credo that everyone is primarily responsible for their own cyber-security. Such thinking echoes with the strong political ideal of subsidiarity that demands the leanest role of the state possible. The responsibility of individuals in the security of the whole collective is highlighted through calls towards more awareness and prevention campaigns, informing the broader public about cyber risks and countermeasures, thereby aiming to improve prevention and resiliency, security concepts of the everyday.6 Through the aim of resiliency, the individual is discursively constructed as being directly attached to larger security outcomes of social collectives.

Of all three, Technification is the most intriguing logic. Cyber-security ‘experts’ with a mostly technical background drive the Swiss discourse – be they ICT entrepreneurs, specialists, or researchers. This reflects the technification of the securitised cyber-security discourse, in that privilege is given to constructing cyber-security as a primarily technical issue. Other, non-technical commentators often preface their statements with “I am no technical expert, but...” demonstrating the need to legitimise one’s own contributions to a political discourse, when one is not considered ‘technical’ This technified discourse is further visible throughout policy solutions, be they the way critical infrastructure risk is measured (i.e. calculated in complex formulas and statistics), or the state of internet security in Switzerland is communicated (e.g. how many percent of Swiss websites implement a particular security technology).

Conclusion

In this contribution, we demonstrated that Swiss cyber-security politics can be fruitfully approached with constructivist research, more specifically, one that draws on practice approaches. Of the three securitization logics as described by Hansen and Nissenbaum, all three are present in the Swiss case, with technification being the dominant one at present. For democratic politics, technification is a particular challenge. Assigning an issue to the technical realm has a depoliticizing influence, which removes it from democratic deliberations. By making cyber-security an issue of the ‘genius few’, technification makes contestation from those with less technical expertise very hard if not impossible or makes it easy for those with the most valued expertise to discredit others without it. In addition, the power of technical expertise comes with a claim of being ‘neutral’ or ‘a-political’, and hence, of being more valid than anything that seems emotional or based on morals.

The Swiss case also highlights interesting aspects for securitization research and beyond. In theory, securitization assumes that there is one powerful actor who can make a convincing case for the exceptional nature of a policy issue. The entire Swiss political system works against this. **There are always multiple voices and multiple audiences to convince** – which makes it much harder to be successful in a simple securitization move based on urgency. In such a political system, **less ‘visible’ bureaucratic actors need to be studied more thoroughly.** Security is not mainly the domain of security elites and politicians. Instead, the research focus needs to shift to everyday security practices, to less traditional security actors, and to actors outside government that have a central role in the creation of danger knowledge and everyday security.

Beyond securitization research, it is evident that looking closely at the **intricacies of political systems, power distribution and political culture,** as studied by scholars in comparative politics and similar fields, becomes necessary to understand security logics in any policy field. **Bringing the two research traditions more closely together** in some form of conversation across sub-disciplinary boundaries **could be beneficial for both.**

**2AC---Securitization Good**

**Cyber securitization is inevitable AND good – recognizing the threat is key to developing necessary protections**

**Hersee 19** – PhD in Cyber Security, which focusses on the dispute between digital rights and national security in cyberspace.

Steven Hersee, “THE CYBER SECURITY DILEMMA AND THE SECURITISATION OF CYBERSPACE,” Royal Holloway University of London, 2019, https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/the-cyber-security-dilemma-and-the-securitisation-of-cyberspace(dcf65dd5-c75d-40ce-8994-6da979eaa1e7).html

5.2 SHOULD CYBERSPACE BE DESECURITISED?

**Desecuritisation** is the process by which an issue is removed from the security sphere and is **no longer considered to be an urgent threat**, requiring exceptional measures to counter. For the Copenhagen School, ‘it means not to have issues phrased as “threats against which me have countermeasures” but to move them out of this threat-defense sequence and into the ordinary public sphere’ (Busan, et al., 1998, p. 29).

But **desecuritisation is difficult to achieve once an issue has been accepted as threatening** and **desecuritisation does not guarantee than an issue will become re- politicised** and re-open to public debate. If securitising moves are rejected forcefully enough, then **issues can become both de-securitised and de-politicised** (See Figure 5.1). This means that **not only are the issues considered non- threatening, but they are also closed for discussion**. Islamic extremism and immigration are issues that are often difficult to discuss in a political environment because they are either securitised as existentially threatening or de-politicised because the responses to them are considered threatening, racist or intolerant.

Cyberspace scholars are in general agreement that cyberspace securitisation has mainly negative consequences. Kingsmith, for example, discusses the negative consequences that emerge from moves by states to securitise internet content.

Considering these securitising moves ... the more that filtering practices are withheld from public scrutiny and accountability, the more tempting it is for framing authorities to employ these tools for illegitimate reasons such as the stifling of both opposition and civil society networks (Kingsmith, 2013, p. 1).

Deibert also highlights the negative consequences of the securitisation of cyberspace, including the resultant threats to basic freedoms.

There has been a **growing recognition of serious risks in cyberspace**. The need to manage these risks has led to a wave of securitization efforts that have potentially serious implications for basic freedoms (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010, p. 49).

Whilst arguing that the securitisation of cyberspace is negative and inevitable, Deibert also contends that the form of this **securitisation can be influenced**. ‘The **securitization of cyberspace may be inevitable**, but what form that security takes is not’ (Deibert, 2012, p. 274). He suggests that it is better to securitise threats to human rights than to securitise threats to national security. Mariya Georgieva takes this further, citing the Snowden disclosures as an example of the securitisation of digital rights, arguing that Snowden had ‘successfully shifted the focus of the securitisation of cyberspace from values such as the survival of the state and effective national security to the survival of privacy and personal choice’ (Georgieva, 2015, p. 44). Whilst she celebrates this shift she does not explain why it is better to securitise privacy rather than national security. Helen Nissenbaum is one author who does take a more consequentialist approach to cyberspace securitisation, arguing that **it might be justified when the threat is as extreme** as its proponents claim.

If those who subscribe to a conception of security as cybersecurity are right, particularly **if the magnitude of threat is as great as those on the extremes claim, then an extraordinary response is warranted despite its chilling effects** (Nissenbaum, 2005, p. 73).

However, this approach is rare and most literature is either critical of state surveillance and the securitisation of cyberspace, or is complimentary of Edward Snowden and supportive of the securitisation of individual privacy. Given that a narrow majority of the British public support greater efforts to protect national security it is surprising that academic literature is weighted so strongly towards criticisms of state surveillance and the securitisation of national security (Pew Research Centre, 2016). Even when cyberspace securitisation by non-state actors is addressed, such as in Georgieva’s work on Snowden as an alternative securitizing actor, these forms of securitisation are **considered positive** because they **support human rights**. In the US and UK, academics have also been politically active in opposing state surveillance. In 2014 over one thousand scholars from a wide range of disciplines formed the ‘academics against surveillance’ campaign, which published an open letter criticising state surveillance (Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2014).

Whilst there is disagreement over whether desecuritisation is always best and what types of securitisation should be reversed, there are a variety of means through which desecuritisation can be achieved.

**1AR---Securitization Good**

**Even if cyber securitization is bad, it’s inevitable and necessary – their alt ensures infrastructure attacks and cyber crimes**

**Pickin 12** – MA in War Studies and University of London

Matthew Pickin, “What is the securitization of cyberspace? Is it a problem?,” University of London, 2012, https://www.academia.edu/3100313/What\_is\_the\_securitization\_of\_cyberspace\_Is\_it\_a\_problem

In analysing the problems of securitization, major issues have been raised. Threat inflation, surveillance, militarisation and the military-industrial complex are only some of the most prominent issues. There are **benefits of securitization** however, and at the very end of this analysis it will be explained why **securitization is necessary for now**. The main supporting arguments for securitization include, the future of cyber-attacks in conflicts, protecting critical infrastructure and cyber-crime.

The 2010 National Intelligence Annual Threat Assessment stated that the United States was under a severe threat of cyber-attacks (Blair, 2010). Due to the amount of infrastructure connected to the internet in the United States targets for cyber-attacks are nearly unlimited, as a superpower the United States presents a valuable target. “As the world’s hegemonic power, the United States is also the **main target** state that dissident groups, terrorists, and rogue states wish to damage (Valeriano & Maness, 2011, p. 145).” Therefore, the **United States must have some defence, or offensive capability in order to protect itself from future conflicts and attacks on critical infrastructure**. In Foreign Affairs William J Lynn the former deputy secretary of defence wrote that the centrality of information technology in the United States makes it a prime target. He argued that extending advanced cyber-defences was crucial for the American economy, and also stated that **failure of critical infrastructure** would **compromise national defence**, “Our assessment is that **cyber-attacks** will be a **significant component** of future conflicts (Lynn, 2011).” Therefore **in order to protect the United States, the government has been forced to securitize the issue**. According to William J Lynn an attack could compromise national defence; therefore the issue is very high in the national security agenda. In the article, he also addresses the critics who argue that cyberspace is at risk of being militarized and states that US cyber strategy has been designed to prevent this from happening, “Far from militarizing cyberspace, U.S. cyber-strategy will make it more difficult for military actors to use cyberspace for hostile purposes (Lynn, 2011).” In **securitizing cyberspace** and creating advanced cyber-defences and cyber-weapons the United States is **preparing for any future conflict or attack.** If such an attack or conflict is a real existing threat then it is **beneficial to prepare through securitization**, otherwise the disadvantages clearly outweigh any advantage.

The other **main benefit** of **securitizing cyberspace** would be **tackling cyber-crime**. According to the security company Sophos, in the first six months of 2010 it received 60,000 new malware samples every day. Apart from malware, cyber-crime covers many different areas such as financial, piracy, hacking and cyber-terrorism. These crimes are growing due to the constantly evolving communications system of social sharing of data, online data storage and social networking, “Although cybercrime has formed a hidden shadow and a kind of evil doppelganger to every step of the Internet’s long history from its very origins, its growth has suddenly become explosive in recent years by virtually any estimate (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 28).” Both Deibert and Rohozinski argue that the rise is cyber-crime has become a big problem for states, in 2011 counterfeiting and copying cost the Asia-Pacific region almost $21 billion. Certainly cyber-space has become a rewarding way to commit crimes with little risk of prosecution, “Cybercrime has elicited so little prosecution from the world’s law enforcement agencies it makes one wonder a de facto decriminalization has occurred (Deibert & Rohozinski, Contesting Cyberspace and the Coming Crisis of Authority, 2012, p. 29).” Due to the trouble of cyber-crime, **the only way of combating it effectively would be greater state regulation and intervention**. With the whole of cyber-space effectively securitized by the United States due to the threat to national security by technological and social shifts, the government is asserting itself increasingly to counter these threats.

Conclusion

In analysing what was the securitization of cyberspace, the beginnings of the cyber-debate in the United States have been examined; this country was used due to reliance on information technology and the status as a superpower. The securitization model from the Copenhagen school of thought was used to understand how issues are non-politicized, politicized and eventually securitized. A different range of security bills have been examined with this model to understand what was needed for cyberspace to become a securitized issue. With the definition of securitization dependent on the terms of national security, the changing definition of this concept was also examined. Securitization has occurred due to an evolving history whereby the military have understood the potential of information technologies in warfare and where vulnerabilities have been recognised that could damage national security.

In evaluating whether securitization of cyberspace is a problem, it is very clear that securitization is a growing concern with many complications. There are many issues including privacy, regulation, surveillance, internet regulation and the growing tension in the international system. However, because the United States is a superpower contesting with other cyber-heavyweights such as Iran, Russia and China **the issue will not be de-securitized in the short term**. With the discovery and use of cyber-weapons, many states are in the process of making their own for defensive and offensive purposes. The government of the **United States will not de-securitize the issue of cyberspace while there are rival states and groups which prove a threat to the national security agenda**. These problems will continue to exist until there is no defensive agenda and the issue is de-securitized, for now **securitization is a necessary evil**.

**2AC---Cyber-Threats Real**

**Cyber-security research is based in sound research. Cold war threat inflation is a thing of the past.**

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Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Andreas Wenger, “Cyber security meets security politics: Complex technology, fragmented politics, and networked science”, 2019, Contemporary Security Policy, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2019.1678855

Cluster 1: The **reality of cyber conflict**: Explaining state restraint and practices

In the **beginning** of this **intellectual history**, political aspects of **cyber security** were discussed almost **exclusively** in publications originating in U.S. **think tanks** and **war colleges** (for example: Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1992). This literature had **little ambition** to contribute to an academic debate. The two main questions it tackled were “who (or what) is the biggest danger for an increasingly networked nation/society/military/business environment” and “how to best counter the new and evolving threat.”

The first cluster is characterized by a **reevaluation** of the threat based on **empirical evidence** and a **gradual application** and adaption of “**old**” **IR** and strategic studies concepts to **cyber security** (Kello, 2013). Two cyber incidents–the discovery of **Stuxnet** in 2010 and later the **Snowden disclosures** in 2013–were **instrumental** in shifting the focus of both **policymakers** and **researchers** from the **threat politics** of “**what if**”-scenarios that had dominated the 1990s and early 2000s to the **reality** of the **strategic use** of **cyberspace** by state actors. In this new context, literature in **IR** and **strategic studies** could be used to examine how **state actors** use cyber instruments for their **political** or **military advantage** and analyze their impact on national and international security (Borghard & Lonergan, 2017; Kello, 2017; Maness & Valeriano, 2016). A strong disciplinary “**pull**” is visible in how early works **zoomed** in on an alleged **offensive advantage** in cyberspace due to the ubiquity of technical vulnerabilities (Peterson, 2013), grappled with the problem of **escalation dynamics** in cyberspace (Liff, 2012), and asked how deterrence might be adapted in order to uphold stability in cyberspace (Wilner, 2019).

As researchers began to build data sets of cyber operations (Kostyuk & Zhukov, 2019; Valeriano & Maness, 2014) to link cyber issues to the larger agenda of conflict studies, an empirical puzzle emerged that **challenged** many of the **theoretical tenets** and standards assumptions of the **older literature**. Most cyber operations did not seem escalatory, nor were they determined by power asymmetries or changed the existing strategic balance. **Overall**, states seemed to exercise a fair amount of **restraint** in cyberspace (Gartzke, 2013; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Valeriano & Maness, 2015). **At the same time, however**, a lot of cyber operations linked to **state rivalries occurred**, though as mere add-ons to existing conflict dynamics and not independent of a broad range of other foreign policy instruments (Betz & Stevens, 2011).

Reacting to this puzzle, the literature in this cluster has begun to move in two directions: First, and comparable to the evolution of the strategic studies literature during the nuclear age, some authors have started to integrate additional non-systemic explanatory factors into their analyses of cyber conflict. While some explore the role of beliefs and **cognitive biases** in cyber policy decision making (Gomez, 2019), others zoom in on the destabilizing role of bureaucratic politics and other deficiency of the policy process especially in crisis decision making. Second, and more consequentially, many authors acknowledge that the emerging empirical picture reflects the structural feature of cyberspace as an operating environment, which is marked by a high degree of technical interconnectedness and constant political contestation (Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2018; Smeets, 2018). Taking this into account, operating strategically in cyberspace seems to be more technically and organizationally demanding than the “cheap and easy”-metaphor suggests, while at the same time offering little enduring strategic gains in the sense of changing a rival’s political goals (Lewis, 2018; Slayton, 2017).

**2AC---Realism Good**

**A focus on the state is still necessary and appropriate. Critical approaches fail because they focus on theory and abstraction over empirical data.**

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In 2006, Eriksson and Giacomello stated that the discipline of international relations (**IR**) was struggling to **apply** its varied theoretical toolbox to the topic of **cyber security**, therein detecting “great difficulties for theoretical adaptation and application in analyses of the complexities of the emerging new digital world” (p. 236). **This observation no longer holds true**. Due to interlinked changes occurring in the **fields** of **technology**, politics, and **science**, research that applies **international relations** or **security** studies theory to different facets of the **phenomenon** is no longer as **rare**, inviting us to look at this emergent body of research in depth at this point in time (for a similar undertaking see Deibert, 2017a, 2017b).

This special issue displays the latest wave of cyber security politics research. The articles position themselves mostly in a post-positivist research tradition and use a set of different theories and conceptual frameworks to analyze the current state of cyber security in politics. Some articles examine the contested nature of public attributions of cyber incidents, the norm-setting day-to-day behavior of intelligence agencies, and discuss the consequences for governments and governance. Another group of articles explores the knowledgeshaping practices of IT-security companies, the co-production of risks and vulnerabilities by technology and experts, and aim at better understanding the role of firms and experts in strategic state interactions.

In this introductory article, we provide the intellectual history to situate the literature in its broader evolutionary context. In a first part, inspired by Buzan and Hansen’s framework from their “The Evolution of International Security Studies” (2009), we discuss six drivers that have been influential in the evolution of (Western) cyber security politics and how it is studied. In a second part, we identify three clusters of research. In each of them, we highlight the interplay between technological possibilities and political choices of state actors in combination with scientific factors. The focus on “**the state**” is **appropriate and necessary**, because **security** politics is **inevitably tied** to questions of **authority and power**. That said, the state is not the **only** important actor in this space–rather, it is at the **intersection** between state and nonstate actors, nationally and internationally, that the **specificities** of **cyber security** politics emerge.

In the conclusion, we use these same drivers to look into the possible future of cyber security politics research. We claim that it should not be conceptualized as a sub-field of anything, so that inquiry is not overly restricted by the disciplining power of disciplines. Cyber security transcends levels of analysis, necessitates considerable interdisciplinary knowledge, and will be shaped by the availability of new data and methods. Its relevance for society is likely to become even bigger in the future, with new digital technologies expanding the spatial boundaries of cyberspace and with new complex issues emerging. Scientific knowledge of both the problem-solving and the reflexive kind is crucial to understand what politics these technologies will have and how they will be linked to broader socio-economic changes affecting the society, the economy, and the state in the future.

Factors driving the evolution of cyber security politics research

Mapping a body of research is no trivial and certainly no purely objective undertaking. In order to simplify and abstract, a series of choices have to be made about what to include and what to exclude. As critical cartographers know, “[m]apping is epistemological but also deeply ontological – it is both a way of thinking about the world, offering a framework for knowledge, and a set of assertions about the world itself” (Kitchin, Perkins, & Dodge, 2009, p. 1). First, we hone in on “cyber security politics,” highlighting two areas that help to structure the debate. What we aim for in these pages is an understanding of cyber security politics that is flexible enough to deal with the dynamics of the phenomenon, yet precise enough to demarcate the research focus sufficiently to be of use. Second, and loosely following Buzan and Hansen (2009), we identify six driving forces that explain the dynamic co-evolution of cyber security politics and the academic engagement with it. These factors help us to understand what researchers choose to write about, what subjects and issues they define as the main cyber security problem(s) and which ontologies, epistemologies, and methods carry legitimacy (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 39–40).

Staking out cyber security politics

What is “cyber security” and how is it related to security politics? Far from allowing a straightforward answer, this question lies at the heart of the political and academic debates about the issue. First, cyber security is a relatively new term for a set of older practices around the security of computer networks (Von Solms & Van Niekerk, 2013). Second, definitions for the term are contested, exemplified by the refusal of some state actors to agree on a common vocabulary (Giles & Hagestad, 2013). Third, the meaning of the term is changing across time. Not so long ago, a limited circle of experts discussed cyber security primarily as a technical risk management issue in critical information infrastructure protection. Now the highest government circles deal with cyber security as a key challenge of national security (Dewar, 2018). Fourth, parallel to the advancing digitalization of ever more aspects of the economy, society, and politics, cyber security concerns are expanding to additional policy domains (Dunn Cavelty & Egloff, 2019). In sum, cyber security is at the same time moving upwards in the political agenda and expanding sideways as a problem area to a multitude of additional policy domains.

Simple and static definitions are not well suited to deal with constantly changing contexts. However, if we look down on the conceptual space from a sufficient height, we notice that cyber security politics’ common ground is characterized by two main factors: First, by digital technologies, specifically their use and misuse by human actors in economic, social, and political contexts; and second, by enduring and often highly conflictual negotiation processes in formal and informal settings between the state and its bureaucracies, society, and the private sector, geared towards defining roles, responsibilities, legal boundaries and acceptable rules of behavior.1

The first dimension is tied to the use of a set of distinct digital technologies and how these technologies are linked to broader conceptions of socio-economic changes (Papp, Alberts, & Tuyahov, 1997). The marriage of computers and telecommunications, the integration of these technologies into a global multimedia system, and their worldwide inexpensive availability is the bedrock for heralding multiple, rapid and consequential transformations in production, management, societal interaction, and governance (Schwab, 2018) though it remains to be seen just how revolutionary these changes will really be. The most pertinent questions in cyber security politics with regard to digital technologies are what their characteristics are, what actions they make possible and which ones they restrain, but also who develops them in what ways and why and who has the power to shape their use and misuse.

The second dimension is tied to the role of states and their engagement with other actors nationally and internationally. “Security” in cyber security politics can be read in two ways: As cyber security politics (the security political aspects of the issue) or as cyber security politics (the politics engaging with questions of cyber security more broadly). This ambiguity is deliberate because we consider the question of what type of politics emerges under what kind of rules and with what kind of boundaries to be crucial. From a theoretical point of view, the question of how much politics there is or should be in security–and how much security in politics–allows us to link research in cyber security to debates in security studies (Hagmann, Hegemann, & Neal, 2019). Importantly, the state has different roles in cyber security, ranging from security guarantor, legislator and regulator, to threat actor and danger to society and other states (Dunn Cavelty & Egloff, 2019). Hence, cyber security politics are defined by national and international negotiation processes about the boundaries of the responsibilities of state, economic, and societal actors and the agreement or disagreement over the means these actors use. This second dimension includes the projection of power by certain actors, like the control over populations and information flows, and the push-back against it as well.

Six driving factors

In their intellectual history of international security studies, Buzan and Hansen develop a framework of five interrelated factors (2009, pp. 39– 100)–great power politics, technology, key events, academic debates, and institutionalization–that drove the evolution of the field. For cyber security politics, we propose a slightly different framework, purporting that changes in research are linked to changes in the empirical phenomenon, whereby these changes can go both ways: A research phenomenon often influences directions of research, but research also illuminates aspects of the phenomenon that have gone unnoticed before. We focus on the interrelationship between technology and the world of policy and state practice–on what political actors say they are doing and on what they are doing in the field of cyber security as a political issue, both nationally and internationally, often in relation to other actors–and on the different ways to observe this interrelationship (Figure 1). The intellectual history of cyber security politics is thus shaped by the interplay of three broad spheres: Technology, Politics, and Science.2 Technological dynamics interact with social and political dynamics. Technological possibilities and constraints influence socio-economic processes. In turn, political preferences and contexts shape the evolution of digital technologies. This also applies fundamentally to the actors developing these technologies and to the dynamic interplay of cyber security markets and cyber security politics. Within each of the three spheres, we identify two main drivers. In different combinations during different times, these six factors stimulate or dissuade scholars from picking up specific research questions. A summary can be seen in Table 1, with a more detailed description in what follows.

[[Figure Omitted]]

Technology as a driver

It seems like an obvious choice to include “technology” as a category, since the issue of cyber security is linked to the development and use of cyberspace, a technological environment entirely built by humans. Yet scholars have rightly pointed out that the vision of one unique cyberspace is itself based on a social construction (Bingham, 1996; Graham, 1998). Indeed, the conception of what cyberspace is and what can be done with it has changed considerably throughout its history, highlighting the needfor historically contingent understandings of the development and use of technologies. However, a core characteristic of IR scholarship’s dealing with digital technology is “technological determinism” (Herrera, 2003). The majority of IR approaches chooses to deal with technology as an exogenous variable (McCarthy, 2018, p. 4), seeing technologies as a material objects or power resources that drive social change or as neutral tools that acquire meaning only through their use (Leese & Hoijtink, 2019).

In contrast, we understand technologies as embodiments of societal knowledge in the tradition of science and technology studies (STS), as sites where power relations can be seen in operation and where the shaping and coordination of the behavior of social and political actors happens (Behrent, 2013, p. 57). During the design stage of technologies, the intentions, norms, and values of their developers find their way into the artefacts, while existing power structures influence the desirability of specific aspects or forms of technology. Once technologies diffuse, they are often given particular meanings and acquire purposes other than the one initially intended by their developers (Matthewman, 2011), but always within certain inescapable material bounds (see also Fischerkeller & Harknett, 2018). For example: A pen can be used for writing, but it can also be used to stab someone. It can, however, not be used to make phone calls.

[[Table Omitted]]

That digital technologies “have politics” is hardly a contested statement (Deibert, 2003, 2013; DeNardis, 2014; Mueller, 2010; Price, 2018). Design decisions made by engineers in the late 1960s have implications until today, especially for security. From the early prototype phase as ARPANET (1967- 1972) to the gradual development into “the Internet” (1973-1983), technological protocols that define how data is exchanged were written in an egalitarian spirit (Naughton, 2016). The decision to have a system with minimal rules that had no central power and no censor was deliberate and based on philosophical and political beliefs of the technical community (Berners-Lee, 1999). Cyber security as we understand it today became an issue only gradually, when the system architecture changed from large proprietary machines with little connection to “smaller and far more open systems (not built with security in mind) coupled with the rise of networking” (Libicki, 2000), yet still ran on the same basic protocols.

The perception that cyberspace is creating and perpetuating insecurity with potentially catastrophic consequences is shaped by different key events linked to the technological sphere as a second important driving factor. In line with what we noted above, these events are not understood as causal forces that unidirectionally influence politics or science (cf. Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 54ff.) but rather as interrelated catalyzers. The category consists of events outside the cyber realm with influence on cyber security politics (examples include 9/11, the Snowden revelations, or the Arab Spring), and cyber incidents themselves. In its most basic form, a cyber incident is a disruption that challenges the normal operation of digital technologies. Undesired change inside machines create technical effects. Yet these technical effects alone are not sufficient to explain the salience of cyber security in politics. Between the initial effect in the machine and the political effect lies a knowledge production process that creates an incident embedded in a specific social context. A technical effect needs to be discursively linked to something with sufficient social or political value to become security politically relevant–which also explains why only some cyber incidents reach that stage while others do not (Balzacq & Dunn Cavelty, 2016).

Such moments of disruption highlight previously hidden characteristics of socio-technical artifacts, opening up opportunities for the study of new aspects of the phenomena that were not easily observable before or did not seem important (Best & Walters, 2013, p. 346; Latour, 1999). Incidents are also linked to another fundamental issue in the study of cyber security: the availability of data. Our current knowledge about cyber security relies heavily on data from commercial threat reporting and news reports. Yet this data provides a partial and biased view of cyber threat activity, because it is often politicized and influenced by the demands of powerful buyers and the interests of capable providers (Lindsay, 2017).

Politics as a driver

The discipline of **IR** is mainly interested in patterns of **cooperation** and **conflict** among **states** and how these patterns relate to shifts in the distribution and **character of power** in the international system: international power politics. As the issue of **cyber security** gained in importance in **state interactions**, experts and policy makers pondered whether **digital technologies** gave rise to a “**new**” type of **power** and how this power source would influence the **existing** power **distribution** in the system (Nye, 2011). Given that IR began as an “American discipline, was focused on American security and written by Americans” (Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 51), the debate about the security implications arising from the spread of information technologies also originated in America, with a series of implications for how the subject was studied. Though definitions vary, cyber power is understood as the use of resources related to cyberspace to achieve specific (political) ends inside and outside of cyberspace (cf. Nye, 2010, p. 3). In the contemporary U.S. setting, a discourse of simultaneous empowerment and disempowerment characterized the conceptual debate from the beginning. While the technological realm carried the promise of wielding a new sort of power, it highlighted new dependencies and vulnerabilities at the same time (Rattray, 2001).

Apart from giving the digital domain a particular weight in the broader questions that IR scholars are interested in, we also need to consider how **international politics** influence the **use** of **these technologies**. Given the **interconnection** between **technology** and politics, we can expect the **overall state** of **world politics** to have a noticeable influence on the forms of **use**/misuse of **these technologies**. Buzan and Hansen call this larger context “**patterns of enmity** and amity between **great powers**” (2009, p. 52). This highlights questions of cooperation and conflict, about the formation of alliances and the maintenance of strategic stability, about the proliferation and control of dual-use technologies, but also about the efforts of states to come to international agreements in the form of norms and institutions.

In our conception of politics, the **international dimension** is just **one aspect** of a broader set of political interactions. Cyber security is **not only** about **enmity** and **amity** and the potential for **war** and peace. In fact, it is not very often about situations of great urgency, but more often about “**normal” domestic politics**. Like many other complex policy issues, **cyber security** is cutting across different areas of **responsibility**, requiring coordination and cooperation between a wide **variety** of **public actors** at different levels of government, but also actors from business and society When government tasks and authority are delegated downwards (localization), upwards (supranationalization), or sideways (privatization) (Krahmann, 2003), governance in networks becomes important. Under such conditions, governments no longer simply issue instructions and monitor their implementation, but seek to shape the framework conditions so that cooperation operates as smoothly as possible even without constant oversight (Peters & Pierre, 1998; Salamon, 2002), coming with a set of challenges for state-society relationships.

Science as a driver

The last two factors are situated in the realm of science that is understood here as a collective term for “academic work,” “intellectual labor,” or “knowledge production.” Like Buzan and Hansen (2009, pp. 57-65), we focus on academic debates and on institutionalization. This introduces an element of internal conflict into our intellectual history, because even if academics would agree on the key events or issues that need to be studied, how they would study it would still differ widely. As a case in point, cyber security politics research is no subfield of anything–it is characterized and united by the engagement with a multifaceted and dynamic phenomena, but the disciplinary approaches used, the ontological and epistemological choices, vary greatly.

Debates about ontology, epistemology, and methodology are at the heart of some of the most fruitful key debates in security studies, but at the same time they divide the discipline. The biggest **cleft** exists between **problem-solving** theories and **critical theories**: the former do not explicitly question the prevailing social and power relationships, while the latter problematize these very relationships by analyzing their origins and their evolution (Cox, 1986). Which of these two approaches is **favored** in certain research settings however **depends** on many different factors (Bourbeau, Balzacq, & Dunn Cavelty, 2015). Building on decades of IR scholarship, **traditional approaches** have seen **incremental** **theoretical innovation** since the end of the Cold War. By contrast, **critical approaches** have gone through a phase of rich **theory** development and are only **slowly** becoming ripe for **empirical work** based on critical methods (Aradau, Huysmans, Neal, & Voelkner, 2014). The key focus of interest has been the analysis of the (social) power relations that underpin security policies in liberal states, highlighting security as a powerful political technology for social (and political) control (Dillon & Reid, 2009); as a collection of discourses that serve to empower and reproduce hierarchies (Shepherd, 2008); or as routinized and patterned practices carried out by bureaucrats and security professionals (Bigo, 2002). These overall research trends have an important impact on cyber security politics research, since the topic has been picked up by all approaches, leading to distinct takes on what cyber security politics is and how it should be studied.

**Emerging cyber-dynamics don’t make realism obsolete.**

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Akin Ünver, 6-11-2017, "Computational Diplomacy: Foreign Policy Communication in the Age of Algorithms and Automation," Edam, https://edam.org.tr/en/computational-diplomacy-foreign-policy-communication-in-the-age-of-algorithms-and-automation/

**Automation** doesn’t change the fact that **diplomats** and embassies still matter. **Foreign policy**, like all politics, is a factor of **human condition**, including sense, gut feeling and cultural cues, along with its **imperfections**. However, there is a **clear trajectory** whereby **states** that can best **adapt** to automation – in war, **foreign policy** and economy – will develop more **efficient ways** of dealing with the challenges of an **interconnected**, **data**-centric **world**. Diplomacy too, can retain its **relevance** and influence over **politics** between **nations**, so long as it can properly designate areas where **automation** can help and where it can’t. Although all **states** will come up with their **own answers** to these questions, based on their **own individual interests and needs**, the common direction in which automation and foreign policy is headed is more or less similar for all countries. In the future, diplomacy has to build data processing and management capabilities, with dedicated departments and scientists supporting diplomats and negotiators on the ground. The structure of this new framework will also heavily depend on regime type, scope of foreign interests and alliance behavior.

The structural shadow of **uncertainty** over diplomacy is stronger than ever. Some communicative rituals and **practices** of diplomacy are growing more **obsolete**, as modern political communication slides increasingly to short and sharp rhetoric, coupled with automation tools that bombard audiences at unprecedented levels. **Diplomacy itself** is **hardly obsolete however**, as the task of mediating and **negotiating power relations** is perhaps as important as it was during the **Cold War**. **New power** centers – in the form of technology companies and big data brokers – are **changing** the **state-centric parameters** of **classical realism perhaps**, but the **inherent dynamics of power realignment** still render **diplomacy** a **crucial endeavor**. To rise to the challenge however, modern diplomacy has to develop a strong computational **capacity**, able to adapt to the changing nature of **digital communication** and advances in automation.